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This dissertation examines the behavior of members of the House of 
Representatives on economic issues in order to ascertain how economic characteristics 
of their constituencies affect their actions.  Specifically, this paper examines their 
activity with respect to what these representatives are saying directly to constituents, 
what they are saying to their colleagues and those who closely monitor their behavior, 
and the ways in which representatives are actually acting with respect to legislation.  By 
utilizing the notion of anticipatory representation and focusing on the potential voters 
representatives are trying to win over, the research I present here attempts to use 
economic issues as a means of understanding the relationship between a representative 
and his or her constituents. 
Constituents’ economic needs are easy for representatives to gauge given the 
accessibility of economic indicators, such as the unemployment rate.  Therefore, as a 
result of the recent economic downturn and the fact that economic indicators are readily 
available, representatives are assumed to be fairly aware of their constituent’s economic 
desires.  Thus, the research presented here is an attempt to determine whether 
representatives are merely indicating to their constituents a concern for their economic 
well-being, or if they are in fact pursuing what is in their district’s best economic 
interests.  More often than not, findings indicate that the primary driver of 
representative behavior is party affiliation.  Representatives may occasionally pay 
attention to their district’s economic needs, such as when they directly address the 
public, but overall their biggest concern appears to be towing the party line. 
x 
 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The governing structure of the United States is designed to ensure that citizens 
have the ability to hold members of Congress accountable for their actions, as citizens 
are responsible for electing to Congress individuals to represent them on a national level 
in our federal government.  Representation affords citizens the right to have their voices 
heard by an official of the majority’s choosing.  Members elected to Congress are 
accountable to the citizens who elect them, empowering citizens with the ability to 
choose not to re-elect an individual to Congress if they are displeased with his or her 
actions while in office.  The Framers of the Constitution designed our government in 
this manner so that citizens could maintain power within our democratic government 
(Nino 1998). 
 The idea that the citizenry can hold a representative accountable is designed to 
ensure that a representative will do everything in his or her power to act in the best 
interests of those citizens with the ability to hold the representative accountable: 
constituents.  If a representative acts in a manner displeasing to his or her constituents, 
the constituents have the ability to vote the representative out of office and vote 
someone else into office in the next election.  However, representatives are intimately 
aware that their constituents do not follow their every action and thus realize they have 
some leeway with respect to their policymaking behavior, as not all citizens will be able 
to trace every behavior back to their representative (Arnold 1990).  If, as Mayhew 
(1974) suggests, a representative’s primary goal is to gain re-election and he or she does 
so through credit-claiming, advertising, and position-taking, then it is entirely possible 
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that these more public actions of the representative are the only ones of which the 
citizenry is aware.   
This research seeks to use economic issues as a vehicle by which to understand 
how needs of the constituency factor into representative action.  The choice of 
economic issues is based on both theoretical and methodological grounds.  From a 
theoretical perspective, economic indicators are readily available to representatives.  
Therefore, if representatives are going to be acting on the basis of their constituent’s 
needs, they are most likely to do so with respect to economic issues, when they are 
more aware of constituent desires on such issues.  With social issues, representatives 
may believe their district has a differing opinion than in actuality because of the 
difficulty in gauging constituent opinion on such issues; thus, in this latter instance, 
representative action could be a result of skewed perception of the position of his or her 
district on social issues, rather than the representative simply ignoring district desires.  
However, with economic issues the representative has a much more accurate perception 
of the needs of his or her district, and therefore, if the representative does not act in the 
district’s best interest, it is not because he or she perceived the district had different 
economic needs. 
Moreover, economic issues have always been of concern to voters because such 
issues directly affect them.  Social issues are likely to affect some citizens but not 
others, whereas economic issues affect society at large because all citizens have an 
interest in their own economic well-being, regardless of how much or how little they 
have.  In referencing the use of economic indicators to gauge an individual’s quality of 
life, Diener and Suh (1997) state: “People select the best quality of life for themselves 
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that is commensurate with their resources and their individual desires” (190).  Thus, it 
seems likely that representation is most likely to occur on economic issues, and that  
constituents are the most likely to hold their representatives accountable on these issues.   
Between 2007 and 2012, the United States experienced a housing finance crisis 
and “the great recession”, which made citizens extremely concerned about the state of 
the nation’s economy, their regional economy, and global financial uncertainty.  
Economic issues have always been of importance to society, but in the past few years 
they have become more salient than at any time in recent history.  Furthermore, the 
recession has been widely noted in the media, which has frequently utilized economic 
indicators such as the unemployment rate, foreclosure rate, or bankruptcy rate to 
illustrate the larger picture of how widespread and severe the recession is.   
For instance, a MarketWatch article from April of 2009 indicated that 5.1 
million jobs had been lost since the recession began and that “the labor market hasn't 
yet shown any signs of improvement. Leading employment indicators -- such as jobless 
claims or the number of temporary workers -- have worsened in recent months” 
(Nutting 2009).  Likewise, a December 2007 article by Reuters noted that foreclosure 
filings increased by nearly 68% over the same period the previous year (Reuters 2007).  
Given how prominent the recession was in the news, representatives could not deny the 
deep-seeded effects the economy had and continue to have on many citizens.  Table 1.1 
indicates the primary economic indicators that will be used in this study and how they 
changed over the period this study examines. 
[INSERT TABLE 1.1 HERE] 
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From a methodological perspective, economic data is much easier to obtain by 
district than would be data on social issues, which would necessitate a survey that could 
be subjected to measurement, data collection, or response error.  Utilizing the current 
economic circumstances of a district is an easy barometer of what the district’s 
economic needs are without requiring a survey of citizens of the district to indicate the 
constituency’s opinion, as would be necessary if the dissertation used social issues 
rather than economic ones.  Additionally, for the representative, economic issues are 
easy for them to gauge for the same reasons.  Representatives can easily and empirically 
see their constituents’ economic circumstances and thus have an understanding of their 
constituents’ economic needs that is accurate rather than merely a perceived 
understanding of constituent desire.  Moreover, the use of a variable to measure a 
representative’s perceptions of social issues has been heavily criticized, largely because 
the survey instruments used to measure individuals’ assessments of social issues have 
been found to be deficient (Andrews 1974). 
Not only does this dissertation present an understanding of representatives’ 
actions on economic issues, as is commonly done through data on member’s legislative 
activity, but it also examines how members present themselves to their constituents with 
regard to their public statements.  Additionally, I will examine how they are discussing 
issues when their constituents are less aware of their behavior, such as in Congressional 
floor speeches.  Thus, there are three components to the research presented in this 
dissertation: (1) what representatives are saying loudly to the public (public statements 
via their website), (2) what representatives are saying directly to congressional and 
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policy insiders (floor speeches), and (3) the actual legislative action of members (bill 
sponsorship and co-sponsorship). 
Recently, a large focus of the representation literature in American politics has 
been on descriptive and substantive representation (Dodson 2006; Overby et al. 1992; 
Vega and Firestone 1995; Williams 1998), as first proposed by Pitkin (1967).  While 
studying such aspects of representation is certainly important, such studies have taken 
hold of representation scholarship and, as a result, less research has focused on the 
dyadic relationship between constituents and their representative.  This relationship is 
one that is important to address and understand, as constituents are the individuals who 
can directly hold the representative accountable.  Therefore, in my research, I utilize the 
work of Arnold (1990) in describing attentive and inattentive publics in this dyadic 
manner.  In order to better understand this constituent-representative relationship, 
representative action on three economic issues will be discussed: unemployment, 
foreclosures, and bankruptcy.  These three issues have been selected because they are 
all common indicators of economic circumstances and because, as such, representatives 
should be easily able to access and gauge constituent preferences pertaining to the 
issues. 
 This dissertation attempts to determine how constituency characteristics feed 
into how representatives speak to their constituents, to their colleagues, and how 
representatives act on legislation.   Unlike other research that examines representative 
behavior, this research endeavors to go beyond the roll call vote.   Hall (1987) indicates 
the importance of understanding the behavior of members of Congress outside of roll 
call votes, stating: “Unlike other, more studied forms of legislative behavior (the roll 
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call vote, the committee assignment request), participation in committee decision 
making refers to no single, identifiable act” (106).  This research will examine 
purposive member behavior on unemployment, foreclosure, and bankruptcy issues over 
the course of a seven-year time frame (2005-2011) to determine the extent to which 
representation of the district was present on these economic issues.  The intention of 
this research is to determine the relationship between representatives’ behavior and their 
constituents’ economic needs. 
 
Research Question 
The proposed research seeks to answer the question: To what extent are 
constituency characteristics related to representative behavior?  More specifically, to 
what extent are economic characteristics of a district related to representative action 
publicly, toward colleagues, and legislatively on economic issues? 
 In examining the dyadic relationship between constituents and their 
representative, the economic circumstances of the constituency are a useful tool in 
understanding representative action on economic issues.  For instance, the 
unemployment rate in a given district provides information about the district’s 
economic well-being and, as a result, the district’s economic preferences.  The district’s 
representative may act on unemployment issues in a manner that corresponds with the 
district’s unemployment rate and thus economic preference. Representative’s 
responsiveness to such constituency characteristics may be a product of how fearful the 
given representative is of losing re-election.  However, representatives are aware that 
constituents may not be aware of their every move.  The primary intention of the current 
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research is to understand constituency influence (or lack thereof) on representative 
behavior pertaining to unemployment, foreclosure, and bankruptcy issues. 
 From a research perspective, representative behavior is comprised of three 
different elements.  First, it is necessary to understand the message representatives are 
trying to publicly send to their constituents.  This message is likely designed to maintain 
and/or gain the support of constituents when the representative is up for re-election.  
Second, when speaking with their colleagues on behalf of their constituents, 
representatives may present the issue differently than they do publicly to their 
constituency as a result of differing beliefs that they harbor or that are being pressed 
upon them by interest groups.  Under these conditions, such as in floor speeches, the 
majority of the constituency is likely unaware of what their representative is saying and 
the representative may feel he or she has some leeway as a result.  Lastly, the most 
common way of understanding how representatives are behaving with respect to their 
constituency is by viewing their actual legislative behavior, such as bill sponsorship and 
co-sponsorship (Frantzich 1979; Swers 2005; Wilson and Young 1997). 
Chapter Summary 
 In the chapters that follow, I will expand upon my theoretical expectations and 
examine the effects of the economic characteristics of the district on representative’s 
action.  First, in Chapter 2, a review of the relevant literature and explanation of the 
theory which guides this research will be presented.  The research at hand largely uses 
the idea of anticipatory representation and takes into account the visibility of a 
representative’s actions, similar in some ways to the work of Arnold (1990).  The theory 
explicated is one that assumes representatives are most concerned with winning over the 
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votes of skeptical constituents who may be persuaded to change their attitude toward 
the member.  Utilizing economic issues as a vehicle, this research assumes that 
representatives will win over these constituents by acting on such economic issues.  
Hypotheses are derived that assume that those actions most visible are those that will 
correspond best with constituent economic characteristics. 
 Chapter 3 examines how representatives are speaking directly to their 
constituents about these economic issues.  Members’ personal websites are coded on the 
basis of both their position on the given economic issue and how visible this position is 
on their website.  Because members’ websites are designed to be constantly accessed by 
constituents, it is assumed that the messaging on such sites will be in line with 
constituent economic characteristics.  However, findings reveal that representatives 
were not only often unwilling to take a strong stance on these issues, but also that their 
stance was often not reflective of their constituents economic desires.  Overall, the 
position which representatives took corresponded more to their party affiliation than 
anything else.   
 Chapter 4 is a study of representative floor speeches on economic issues as a 
means to understand how representatives are speaking to one another when they think 
constituents are less likely to pay attention.  All floor speeches given by the 
representative on a given economic issue (unemployment, foreclosure, and bankruptcy) 
were assessed to determine the frame by which the representative was addressing the 
issue.  Findings reveal that when speaking on the floor of the House representatives 
frequently see their audience as their colleagues and may be jockeying for position and 
influence within their party.   
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 Chapter 5 assesses the sponsorship and co-sponsorship of economic legislation.  
Bills were coded according to their impact on economically disadvantaged populations 
and then members were assessed as to the number of bills they sponsored or co-
sponsored within each category.  While sponsorship and co-sponsorship may be viewed 
differently by representatives, both appear to be influenced by constituent economic 
characteristics, particularly if the legislation has a positive impact on economically 
vulnerable populations.   Additionally, those representatives who previously won their 
districts by a larger margin of victory were more likely to sponsor legislation that would 
positively impact such populations.   
Finally, Chapter 6 provides a summary of the findings and indicates directions 
for future research.  While the analyses of representatives speaking to constituents and 
speaking to colleagues suggested that their primary concern was maintaining the party 
line, the findings with regard to their actual legislative behavior suggest that 
representative democracy may in fact take constituents needs into account.  In this 
extremely partisan era, representatives primary concern does appear to be acting in 
accordance with their party’s position; however, when it comes to introducing and co-




Chapter 2: Examination of the Literature and Theoretical 
Expectations 
 In order to better understand the relationship between a constituency and their 
representative, it is important to review the scholarship in this field to gain a better 
understanding of how the literature on representation can aid in such an endeavor, as 
well as how present research can build upon it.  Based on much of the research on 
representation, I explicate a theory toward classifying constituents that is used as a 
driving force in understanding representative behavior.  The review of the literature that 
follows seeks to examine representation in the following manner: the methods of 
studying representation, how citizens hold representatives accountable, why 
constituents matter, and the influence of economic factors on representation.  




In order to better understand the purposive behavior of members of the House, it 
is necessary to understand how they view their respective constituency whose support 
they seek.  While Arnold’s (1990) characterization of the public into attentive and 
inattentive citizens is useful, it may be too broad.  For instance, Gilens (2001) finds that 
some citizens are entirely ignorant of policy-specific information.  There exists a 
distorted sample of the population that actually gets out to the polls and votes; 
generally, socioeconomic characteristics are indicative of whether a citizen is likely to 
vote (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).  Thus, there is some segment of the population 
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that is either completely ignorant to the political process and/or is unconcerned with 
becoming involved in this process.   
Fenno (1977) creates distinctions among constituents, describing multiple 
different sources of potential support a representative may have within his or her 
district.  Starting from the broadest level, these levels are: (1) the geographic 
constituency from which the representative is elected, (2) the supporters or those who 
voted for the representative in the previous election, (3) the strongest supporters, and (4) 
the intimates who know the representative well.  Hence, it is the case that, particularly 
given the current partisan political climate, there are some citizens who are strongly 
opposed to a representative.  This opposition is likely a product of both how partisan the 
representative is and how partisan an individual citizen is.   
Bishin (2000) examines the ‘prospective constituency,’ or those members of the 
constituency who are swing voters or moderately partisan in the opposing direction.  He 
indicates, “The ‘prospective constituency’ holds that legislators appeal to a moderate 
subconstituency along with their own party extremists.  As such, they ignore 
“opposition party extremists, whose voters are unavailable” (395).  Using a seven-point 
scale, Bishin classifies constituents from ‘strong Democrat’ to ‘strong Republican,’ 
indicating that a representative’s prospective constituency includes the six 
classifications closest to his or her own party affiliation but does not include those who 
identify strongly with the opposing party.  Thus, it is the case that a representative has 
the ability to gain favor with certain citizens, but others will remain opposed to the 
representative solely based on his or her ideology or previous actions.  Utilizing the 
American National Election Study: Pooled Senate Election Study, Bishin examines the 
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key votes of Senators and the role constituency may have had on such votes.  His 
findings indicate that constituency ideology plays a role in Senators roll-call voting 
decisions.    
I conceptualize four categories of constituents within each district: advocates, 
potentials, uninterested, and opposed (Table 2.1).  This typology incorporates the work 
of other researchers who have found that different segments of the constituency exist.  
Dividing these subgroups as such illustrates the importance of understanding potentials, 
as these voters are the ones the representative is most likely to target if he or she wants 
to win over more voters.  Research often contends that representatives want to maintain 
the support they have and gain support from other voters and the conceptualization 
presented here shows who specifically these voters are.  Further, this research tests 
whether or not representatives are in fact targeting such constituents and does so on 
economic issues surrounding a recession – a time in which they are most likely to be 
salient. 
Based on this conceptualization, it is assumed that advocates will always support 
their representative unless the representative acts in a significantly uncharacteristic 
manner.  Potentials are voters whose position on the representative is not fixed, but 
rather their position changes when they are aware of the representative’s actions. 
Uninterested citizens are assumed to nearly always stay out of the political process 
unless an issue gains so much traction that they somehow become aware and interested 
in it.  Opposed citizens are those who hold very different ideological and policy 
standpoints from the representative, and who are unlikely to become supporters except 
under extreme circumstances. .  
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[INSERT TABLE 2.1 HERE] 
On the basis of this classification, I assume that representatives will generally 
not factor advocates or those opposed to them into their actions unless they are acting in 
a significantly uncharacteristic way.  However, many representatives will attempt to 
gain the support of potentials through their behavior and will hope that, if the policy on 
which they are acting gains enough traction and attention, they can also gain the support 
of those uninterested.  Economic issues provide a unique case to examine this notion 
given the economic downturn and the resulting attention the issue has garnered.  
Potentials are a moving target that representatives want to be able to have as supporters, 
and with economic issues at the forefront of many constituents’ minds, representatives 
know their actions on such issues could influence such potentials vote choice.  
Representatives may be acting for these different constituencies depending on the venue 
in which they think they have an audience and who they believe, among these 
constituencies, is in that audience. 
Anticipatory representation is the idea that representatives anticipate how voters, 
on Election Day, will retrospectively evaluate their representatives’ accomplishments.  
Representatives thus need to be vigilant and aware of how their actions and the 
visibility of such actions will influence voting decisions, particularly as they are seeking 
to maintain or gain the support of their constituents.  The concern for representatives 
during their term then becomes pleasing these potential supporters (as shown in Table 
2.1).  Representatives do their best to anticipate how these potential supporters will 
respond to the actions they take; however, representatives are aware that some of their 
actions will be more obvious to these potential supporters than others (Arnold 1990).   
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This classification of constituents serves to inform the proceeding research.  The 
following literature review examines the representation and constituency literature on 




Methods of Studying Representation 
 Considerable recent literature on representation has been the result of the work 
of Pitkin (1967), in which she first introduces the concepts of descriptive and 
substantive representation.  Since her work, a number of scholars have studied the effect 
of gender, race, and ethnicity on representation and on representative action (e.g. 
Dodson 2006; Overby et al. 1992; Vega and Firestone 1995; Williams 1998).  While 
such scholarship is useful in understanding how minority groups are represented in our 
government, it does not present a concept of direct accountability., Under strict 
accountability theory, representatives are held responsible by the constituents who 
elected these representatives into office based on electoral promises made, not shared 
characteristics. 
 Accordingly, Mansbridge (2003) classifies representation into four categories: 
promissory, anticipatory, gyroscopic, and surrogate.  Literature on descriptive and 
substantive representation is thus just one way of focusing on representation, as it can 
be seen as surrogate representation, in which elected officials may be representing those 
outside their districts as surrogates.  However, in this classification, promissory 
representation is the only type of representation in which the representative is held 
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accountable in a traditional sense by his or her constituency and is thus forward-
looking: “Promissory representation thus focuses on the normative duty to keep 
promises made in the authorizing election, uses a conception of the voter’s power over 
the representative that assumes forward-looking intentionality … and results in 
accountability through sanction” (Mansbridge 2003, 516). 
On the other hand, the term anticipatory representation is used to describe 
citizens utilizing retrospective voting and thus focuses on previous action: “Anticipatory 
representation flows directly from the idea of retrospective voting: Representatives 
focus on what they think their constituents will approve at the next election, not on what 
they promised to do at the last election” (Mansbridge 2003, 515).  Mansbridge’s (2003) 
conception of gyroscopic representation differs from these other types of representation, 
as it focuses on how the representative’s own viewpoint guides his or her actions and 
thus assumes the voters entrust the representative to act on their behalf when electing 
their representative into office.   
 Arnold (1990) posited that constituents must have the ability to trace 
representative action and that such ability comprises the tenets of anticipatory 
representation, which this dissertation seeks to investigate. For instance, Arnold 
indicates that representatives think about voters in the next election voting on the basis 
of outcome preferences rather than policy preferences.  Representatives are acting with 
the knowledge that they have an upcoming election and thus must maintain or gain the 
support of constituents to be re-elected to their offices.  While this is not accountability 
in the traditional sense, as Mansbridge (2003) points out, representatives are still 
accountable to their constituency in the sense that they must please their voters 
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throughout their term if they are to gain support, as voters will look retrospectively at 
their previous actions.  Thus, in this context, the choices the representative makes with 
respect to economic issues during his or her term in office will be reflected upon by the 
voters when the representative seeks re-election and voters must again cast their ballot, 
along the lines of anticipatory representation. 
[INSERT TABLE 2.2 HERE] 
 The way in which voters retrospectively view representative action is largely 
based on how visible, or easy to attain, that information is (Arnold 1990).  Table 2.2 
indicates how different representative actions can be seen as visible, less visible, and 
invisible by retrospective voters.  Arnold’s (1990) discussion of traceability deals 
directly with the causal chain by which voters can link policymaking actions to 
representatives.  He speaks of the difficulty in tracing policies back to representatives 
and those making a retrospective voting calculation when the causal chain is longer.  In 
my research, more visible policymaking actions are those that constituents are more 
likely to be aware of and/or to have greater access to and, thus, constituents are more 
likely to hold their representative accountable for such visible and accessible actions.  
The proceeding research assumes that representatives are aware of when their actions 
are more visible to constituents and that they act in a manner corresponding to the 
visibility of such actions. 
 In one of the seminal works in representation scholarship, Miller and Stokes 
(1963), indicate that there are two ways in which the district can control its 
representative: (1) to elect a representative that has the same or similar policy 
preferences on all issues, and (2) for the member of Congress to act in a manner he or 
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she thinks is pleasing to constituents.  While Miller and Stokes argue that 
representatives’ perceptions are not always accurate, Page et al. (1984) examined data 
from both constituents and members of Congress to determine that there was a high 
degree of representation with respect to social welfare issues.  Additionally, Miller and 
Stokes (1963) find a low correlation between constituency behavior and representative 
action, as they indicate that representative’s perceptions of constituent opinion are not 
highly correlated.  They conclude: 
Our evidence shows that Representative’s roll call behavior is strongly 
influenced by his own policy preferences and by his perception of preferences 
held by the constituency.  However, the conditions that presuppose effective 
communication between Congressmen and district are much less well met.  The 
Representative has very imperfect information about the issue preferences of his 
constituency, and the constituency’s awareness of the policy stands of the 
Representative ordinarily is slight (56). 
Nonetheless, such findings have been disputed, as there may be methodological 
problems with the data utilized by Miller and Stokes. Specifically, each district they 
surveyed had a small number of respondents raising questions about generalizability 
(Erickson 1978).  While Miller and Stokes set the wheels in motion in the examination 
of the relationship between constituents and their representative, their use of surveys to 
gauge district opinion has caused other researchers to call their findings into question. 
In this research, I posit that representatives have access to accurate economic 
data and that the recent economic crisis provides constituents with heightened 
awareness of economic issues.  Thus, a focus on economic issues provides a better test 
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of member-district linkages than using a survey with a small sample size to determine 
district opinion as did Miller and Stokes (1963).  Additionally, I present a model of 
representation along the lines of Arnold’s (1990) understanding of attentive and 
inattentive publics and, accordingly, utilize anticipatory representation in doing so.  By 
making use of the model of anticipatory representation, this research acknowledges that 
representatives are concerned with how voters view them when these voters head to the 
polls. 
 
How Do Citizens Hold Their Representative Accountable? 
Representatives seek to minimize electoral damage when taking an action on 
policy and thus frequently try to please as much of their constituency as possible, at 
least when it comes to actions that may be visible to and accessible by the public.  One 
of the foundational scholars of Congressional literature, Mayhew (1974), suggests that 
the primary goal of members of Congress is to gain re-election, such that all actions 
taken by the representative are aimed toward this goal. Mayhew argues that 
representatives primarily use advertising, credit-claiming, and position-taking as means 
of gaining constituent support to ensure their re-election goal.   
While other scholars indicate that re-election is not the sole goal of members of 
Congress, they do concede that it is one of the foremost goals of representatives 
(Bullock 1976; Dodd 1977; Fenno 1973; Hall 1987).  Furthermore, elections are seen as 
the defining characteristic of a representative government (Manin 1997; Wahlke 1971).  
Nonetheless, Gastil (2000) points out that despite the existence of representative 
government in the United States, it does not always function the way it should. Voters 
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may be uninformed and yet representatives maintain their office year after year.  Gastil 
writes, “There are two fundamental problems in American politics: The first is that most 
Americans do not believe that elected officials represent their interests.  The second is 
that they are correct” (1).  Thus, it is the case that the electorate may not be as well 
represented as one would hope in a representative government – which is what I will 
explore in this research.   
If constituents are in fact poorly represented, as Gastil (2000) suggests, then it is 
unlikely that their economic needs will be predictive of representatives’ actions on 
economic issues, as representatives can maintain their office while showing little 
concern for constituent preferences.  On the other hand, Jacobson (2009) raises the 
concern that members of Congress, who he feels are in fact primarily concerned with 
pleasing their constituents, are ineffective at successfully meeting policy challenges 
because of how fragmented electoral districts in America are.  Jacobson sees Congress 
as ineffective as a result of systematic failure, whereas Gastil faults the representative as 
an individual for being ineffective.  If Jacobson is correct in assuming representatives 
are expressly concerned with the desires of their constituents and attempt to act on 
constituent preferences, then my findings should show that constituents economic needs 
predict representative’s economic issue action.  Therefore, it is necessary to understand 
representative actions while in office as a means of gaining or maintaining constituent 
support, and in doing so to examine the ways in which representatives view their 
constituents with respect to electoral margins. 
Some of the most well-known research on re-election margins is that of Fiorina 
(1974; 1977).  Fiorina (1974) argued that representatives could have one of two 
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strategies toward re-election: either maintaining the support they have or maximizing 
the number of supporters within their district.  Generally, representatives in fairly safe 
districts will not need to gain a great deal of additional support and thus they merely 
need to work to maintain the support they already have in place.  As a result of the 
partisanship present at the electoral level, the nature of safe seats has changed over time.  
Nevertheless, even in those districts that are safe, representatives need to ensure that 
they are aware of constituent’s economic circumstances and are supporting them in their 
policymaking action. 
In a later work, Fiorina (1977) indicated that at the time representatives were 
experiencing larger margins of victory because representatives concerned themselves 
with less contentious matters, by providing casework and pork barrel benefits instead of 
actual policymaking.  Nonetheless, Kuklinski (1977) examined three policy areas 
(liberalism, taxation, and government administration) to determine their effects on 
incumbent electoral margins.  His findings indicated little difference between those 
districts that were viewed as competitive and those viewed as noncompetitive with 
respect to change in electoral margin as a result of representative action.  Such a finding 
indicates that representatives may not be entirely motivated by the desire to gain 
support from constituents.   
Additionally, representatives are concerned with “the personal vote” as they 
build credibility by serving their constituents through casework (Cain, Ferejohn, and 
Fiorina 1987).  Therefore, gaining voter loyalty may be the result of personal favors, not 
policymaking actions that potentially affect the public at-large.  While citizens may be 
concerned with how representatives are meeting their needs in terms of casework, I 
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argue that economic issues may negate the power of the personal vote because issues 
like employment, housing, and finances are extremely salient to the citizenry and have 
high policy relevance.  Although these issues may require large-scale policymaking, 
such issues may also be deeply personal for a vast majority (if not the entirety) of the 
voting public. 
More recent research suggests that there does exist a correspondence between 
electoral margin and party platform wherein representatives may be aware of 
constituent preferences, as on average the more an incumbent votes with his or her 
party, the smaller the electoral margin (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; 
Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002).  For instance, Bovitz and Carson (2006) 
examined this marginality hypothesis by examining roll call voting in the 1970s and 
determined that roll call votes do influence an incumbent’s electoral margin come 
election day: “Our findings offer strong evidence for the contention that members 
behave strategically when considering how to vote on prominent roll calls and that they 
do indeed worry about taking the ‘wrong’ position on a set of votes” (305). 
On the other hand, Bartels (1991) argues that, with respect to representative 
support for defense spending in 1980, even those representatives in secure districts 
supported their constituents’ desires.  Unlike Bartels’ analysis, my research utilizes 
electoral margins as an independent variable to determine its relationship to 
representative action, assuming that representatives who won by smaller margins in the 
last election are more likely to fear losing their seat in the next election and therefore act 
accordingly, that is, seek to gain the support of potential voters.  
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The majority of representation literature that examines the correspondence 
between constituency opinion and representative action focuses on the Senate.  Such 
scholarship measures Senators behavior through roll call votes (e.g. Bullock and Brady 
1983; Thomas 1985; Wright 1989).  As there are a vast number of House districts and 
surveying constituents in each one is a difficult task, a number of scholars have used 
roll call votes as a means of gauging representative action.  
Given the predominant use of roll call votes as a means of understanding 
representative behavior, the research I propose will instead utilize other dependent 
variables that measure representative action.  The utilization of roll call votes has come 
under criticism, primarily by Krehbiel (1993, 2000), who asserts that roll call votes are 
merely measures of preferences rather than of actual partisanship, as his findings 
suggest “positive and significant party effects are rare” (Krehbiel 1993, 235).  Other 
scholars have developed their own measures of representative action that they contend 
are superior to the use of roll call votes (e.g. Binder, Lawrence and Maltzman 1999; 
Cox 2001; Cox and McCubbins 2002; Jenkins, Crespin, and Carson 2005; Snyder and 
Groseclose 2000). 
Rather than focus on the Senate, as is often done when examining the dyadic 
relationship between constituent and representative, I will focus on the House of 
Representatives.  Borrowing from Fiorina (1974), Shapiro et al. (1990) posited that two 
constituencies exist for Senators: the at-large constituency and those who are members 
of their party, and that the latter influence Senators roll call voting to a larger degree.  
There is little reason to expect this finding to differ with respect to the House.  
However, because House districts are likely less diverse than state-wide Senate districts, 
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it is that much more important to determine how a member of the House is pleasing his 
or her constituents.  
It is important to note that the voting public within a district may not encompass 
the entire constituency given that every citizen within a district may not show up to the 
polls on Election Day to cast his or her ballot.  Additionally, those citizens who are the 
most politically active are likely the ones with the motivation and resources that enable 
them to become involved politically (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  Given that 
these citizens are the most active, scholars find that representatives seek to please them 
more so than other constituents.  Furthermore, citizens who rationally evaluate the costs 
and benefits of going to the polls may actually not end up voting because they see the 
costs as outweighing the benefits (Downs 1957).  If constituent policy preferences 
disadvantage certain subgroups of the population and only favor those who are 
generally the most politically active, representation is compromised.  Nonetheless, 
representatives may act on the economic betterment of those citizens who are politically 
supportive and attentive and ignore those who the representative believes to be unaware 
or uninterested.  Under this circumstance, the constituency’s at-large economic needs 
will not be reflected in representative’s action.   
Hence, this dissertation seeks to understand how representatives are attempting 
to maintain or gain support within their district and the actions they take that they 
believe will payoff for them come re-election.  Such actions may only be those actions 
that are the most visible to constituents, such as their public message, because 
representatives may not believe constituents will dig deeper.  However, certain 
segments of the constituency differ from others. 
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Why do These Constituencies Matter? 
 The focus of this research is on the relationship between the constituency and 
the representative. As previously mentioned, the representative looks to the 
constituency for votes as he or she seeks to gain or maintain support from the previous 
election.  Each constituent views the actions of the representative in terms of what the 
representative has done about the issues in which that individual is specifically 
interested.  The understanding of representative action posited here is based largely on 
that of Arnold (1990) and his conception of attentive and inattentive citizens. 
Arnold (1990) introduces a way of understanding the behavior of members of 
Congress on the basis of what he terms attentive publics – those citizens with known 
policy preferences – and inattentive publics – those citizens who do not hold stable 
policy preferences.  According to his logic, members of Congress will act on the basis 
of the known preferences of the attentive public and the inattentive public’s potential 
policy preferences.  Thus, members of Congress anticipate what they believe citizen’s 
retrospective opinion of their actions will be when the citizens go to the polls.  
Additionally, the ability of citizens to trace a policy decision back to a given member of 
Congress influences the actions of representatives who are aware of such traceability.  
Citizens, particularly inattentive citizens, must be able to make a connection between 
policy and representative action for citizen behavior to help or hurt a representative.  
The accessibility of information varies on the basis of how knowledgeable and 
determined the citizen is to find information, thus making representatives perhaps more 
accountable to some more than others.   
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Arnold (1990) indicates that while representatives’ decisions are based on 
subjective cost-benefit analysis as well as how well they think constituents will be able 
to trace their actions down a causal chain.  The ability of a constituent to trace such 
effects is dependent on magnitude, timing, proximity of those affected, and the presence 
of an instigator.  If these effects lead constituents to blame a representative for an action 
he or she took, then voters are likely to hold that action against the representative.  
While the proposed research does not seek to understand this causal chain, it does build 
on Arnold’s argument about the ability of citizens to trace action to their 
representatives.  Representatives tell their constituents what they want to hear in order 
to maintain or gain support; however, representatives may be acting differently behind 
the scenes or when they take legislative action, such as sponsoring, co-sponsoring, 
and/or voting on bills.   
Arnold’s (1990) depiction of attentive and inattentive citizens helps us to 
understand this disconnect.  When making public statements, such as on their websites, 
all citizens are easily able to access representative’s information without putting forth a 
great deal of work (Adler, Gent, and Overmeyer 1998).  Thus, inattentive citizens, who 
may not closely follow the policy process and to whom such information may be the 
most accessible, are able to gain an understanding of representative beliefs from 
representative websites.  However, representative action that is less accessible to their 
constituents, such as their speeches on the floor of the House, may greatly differ from 
such public statements and the vast majority of constituents are unlikely to view 
transcripts from floor speeches, as they may be unaware of how to obtain them.  
Instead, only those attentive citizens, largely comprised of interest groups and 
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hyperaware supporters, are likely to pay attention to what representatives say in their 
day-to-day floor speeches. 
Such behind-the-scenes action has been examined by Hall (1996).  He indicates 
that there are three primary reasons that members might be active on legislation: to gain 
re-election, to further their own policy goals, and to aid the president’s agenda.  With 
respect to behind-the–scenes actions, Hall finds that personal goals are the most likely 
influence of representative behavior, whereas the electoral incentive most likely 
influences the more visible actions of members, such as during bill markup and floor 
consideration.   
 Additionally, much of the work on the behavior of members in Congress has 
focused on their function within the committee structure.  For instance, Fenno (1973) 
discusses how committees can function for the betterment of members to reach their 
goal of re-election, the formation of good public policy, and power.  Given that 
representatives face environmental constraints, such as the executive branch, 
committees form an organizing structure that helps them achieve these goals despite the 
obstacles.  The institutional mechanisms of Congress, such as the committee system and 
party organizations, have been the subject of a great deal of scholarly research (e.g. 
Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Krehbiel 1991; Rohde 1991). 
 While such research is generally not at odds with the representation literature, 
research addressing partisanship often overlooks the role of representatives as 
responding to constituents within their district to focus on them as members of a 
Congressional organization that functions through the work of members.  However, 
Adler and Lapinski (1997) use an institutional approach to explain how constituency 
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characteristics factor into member’s actions with respect to a member’s desire to be 
placed on a specific committee.  They argue that economic, social, and geographic 
explanations are the best way of understanding committee membership, as members of 
Congress are more likely to join committees when they think that committee’s policy 
work will benefit their district. 
 Kingdon (1973) also examines the influence of the constituency from a more 
institutional perspective, as he examines how a number of factors (such as constituency, 
fellow members, party and committee leaders, interest groups, the executive branch, 
and the media) influence members voting decisions.  Upon interviewing members of 
Congress about their recent votes, he found that constituents and colleagues played the 
largest role in members’ vote choice.   
 
What Effect Do Economic Circumstances Have on Representation? 
Several scholars have examined the influence the economic climate has on 
electoral behavior.  Two models predominate in this literature: (1) pocketbook voting, 
the idea that an individual’s personal economic circumstances influence his or her 
voting, and (2) sociotropic voting, in which the national economic climate influences an 
individual’s vote decision (Markus 1988).  Additionally, scholars have also attempted to 
determine whether voters perceive the economy with respect to how it has been and is 
at present, known as retrospective voting, or with respect to how they think it will be in 
the future, referred to as prospective voting.   
MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1992) find that, with respect to voting for the 
president, voters anticipate the economic future and reward or punish on the basis of 
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their own calculations.  On the other hand, Norpoth (1996) finds the retrospective 
model much more convincing, indicating that voters are much more likely to base their 
decisions on the recent economic climate.  Rudolph (2003) attempts to decipher voters’ 
views of presidential versus congressional responsibility for the economic climate, 
finding that voter sophistication and party identification play a critical role in voters’ 
willingness to attribute blame, as more sophisticated voters were less likely to solely 
blame the president for a poor economy.   Hence the economic climate clearly 
influences voters’ decisions to some extent and therefore examining how the economic 
characteristics of a district feed into representative’s economic policymaking actions is 
an important avenue of inquiry. 
As previously indicated, economic issues will be the vehicle used to assess the 
relationship between constituents and their representative because such economic issues 
are easily accessible indicators by which a representative can understand his/her district.  
Given the recent economic recession, unemployment, foreclosures, and bankruptcy are 
salient concerns in the public’s mind, and both constituents and representatives are 
likely to be mindful of economic indicators.  The recent recession has also become a 
very contentious political issue and, as a result, economic policymaking has become 




 Speaking publicly is likely the way in which representatives are most likely to 
try to gain support of their constituents, because they know that constituents are going 
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to see these cues more so than any other.  The way in which representatives publicly 
speak is directed toward constituents in an attempt to gain their support when it comes 
time for re-election.  As such, public statements are the most easily accessibly 
information constituents have.  As Arnold (1990) indicates in his discussion of 
inattentive citizens, “The cautious legislator, therefore must estimate three things: the 
probability that an opinion might be aroused, the shape of that opinion, and the potential 
for electoral consequences” (68).   
In this manner, representatives need to make calculated decisions about how 
potentials may or may not support them on the basis of their actions.  Representative’s 
public statements are ways of attempting to gain the support of voters, specifically and 
most often, potentials.  Therefore, we can assume that these public statements are the 
most likely to be in line with constituency characteristics.   It is my expectation that 
when speaking publicly on economic issues, representatives statements will likely be in 
line with the economic characteristics of their constituency.  When representatives have 
won their district by a large margin of the vote, they may be less inhibited in the way 
they address the public and therefore may do so in a way that is less reflective of their 
constituent’s economic characteristics given that they feel safe and secure in their seat.  
Representatives who previously had won by a large margin of the vote are more likely 
to have strong advocates and not need to win over a lot of potentials in comparison with 
representatives who had a smaller margin of victory.  The majority of their constituents 
may continue to support them regardless of their public statements. 
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Speaking Publicly Hypothesis 1: Representatives are more likely to visibly speak on 
economic issues that affect those constituents facing economic hardships when their 
district’s economic indicators are poor. 
 Speaking Publicly Hypothesis 1.a.: Representatives are more likely to visibly 
speak on economic issues that affect unemployed constituents when their 
district’s unemployment rate is high. 
 Speaking Publicly Hypothesis 1.b.: Representatives are more likely to visibly 
speak on economic issues that affect homeowners when their district’s 
foreclosure rate is high. 
 Speaking Publicly Hypothesis 1.c.: Representatives are more likely to visibly 
speak on economic issues that affect those constituents facing bankruptcy when 
their district’s bankruptcy rate is high. 
Speaking Publicly Hypothesis 2: Representatives are more likely to visibly speak on 
economic issues when they have previously won their district by a large margin of 
victory. 
When representatives speak on the floor of the House, it is unlikely that their 
constituents are aware of what they are saying.  While this information is often publicly 
available, few constituents are aware of how to look up the actual discourse and what 
their representative said while speaking to his or her colleagues nor do they generally 
think to spend time doing so.  Speaking to a smaller audience on the issues allows 
representatives to articulate a different understanding of the matter than they may 
publicly state because they believe that their constituents are unlikely to hold them 
accountable for these floor statements.  Thus, it is the case that constituency 
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characteristics are less likely to be predictive of the position a representative articulates 
while speaking “behind-the-scenes,” as in not directly to the constituents.  While 
publicly the representative may indicate support for an issue of concern to his or her 
constituency, with a smaller audience, comprised primarily of colleagues, his or her 
position may change drastically because he or she doesn’t think the constituency will 
hold him or her accountable for what he or she says while speaking in Congress. 
Speaking to Colleagues Hypothesis 1: Representative’s floor speeches on economic 
issues are unlikely to reflect the economic characteristics of his or her constituency. 
Speaking to Colleagues Hypothesis 2: Representatives victory in the previous election is 
unlikely to influence the language the representative uses in speaking to colleagues on 
the floor.  
However, the constituency may follow a representative’s actual legislative 
actions, largely as a result of such actions being brought to light come Election Day.  
When a representative is up for re-election, retrospective voters, will look at what he or 
she did during his or her term in office.  They will be aided in doing so by the media, 
who will try to present to them information on the representative, particularly if the 
representative is in a highly contested race.  If the representative has a strong 
challenger, that challenger and/or the media is likely to bring to light the legislative 
actions the representative took in the previous term.  While it is not always the case that 
a safe seat remains safe from one election to the next, it is likely true that a 
representative who had difficulty gaining a seat one term because of a close vote will 
likely have a more difficult time the next election than someone who had no difficulty 
at all.  A representative who had a strong challenger in a previous election will want to 
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ensure that he or she holds onto his or her seat and thus act in a manner he or she thinks 
will please the constituency.   
Legislative Activity Hypothesis 1: Representatives are more likely to be legislatively 
active on economic issues that affect constituents facing economic hardships when their 
district’s economic indicators are poor.  
 Legislative Activity Hypothesis 1.a.: Representatives are more likely to be 
legislatively active on economic issues that affect unemployed constituents when 
their district’s unemployment rate is high. 
 Legislative Activity Hypothesis 1.b.: Representatives are more likely to be 
legislatively active on economic issues that affect homeowners when their 
district’s foreclosure rate is high. 
 Legislative Activity Hypothesis 1.c.: Representatives are more likely to be 
legislatively active on economic issues that affect constituents facing bankruptcy 
when their district’s bankruptcy rate is high. 
Legislative Activity Hypothesis 2: Representatives are more likely to be legislatively 
active on an economic issue when they previously won their district by a smaller margin 
of the vote. 
Hence, those representatives who won by a large electoral margin are more 
likely to pursue legislative activity that is not a reflection of constituency characteristics 
in comparison with those representatives who won the previous election by a smaller 
electoral margin.  As with the other theoretical expectations, this conjecture is based on 
the size of the potential group of voters and how actively a representative is working to 
try and win these voters over.  If the representative has a strong group of advocates and 
 33 
merely seeks to maintain that support and not gain further constituent support, he or she 
is more likely to pursue legislation that may not be in line with constituent needs.  
However, if a representative comes from a district with a small number of advocates 
and large group of potentials, his or her legislative activity may be such that he or she is 
attempting to gain the support of these potential voters. 
Therefore, what a representative says publicly, what he or she says to 
colleagues, and what he or she does legislatively, may not all be one in the same.  
Representatives are acting with their own well-being in mind and are attempting to 
please their constituency only if they think their constituency is paying attention and/or 
will be aware of the actions they take.  Hence, representatives are most likely to speak 
publicly and take legislative action that is likely to please their constituency when they 
had a small margin of victory during their previous election.  When speaking privately, 
representatives are not likely to do so in a manner reflective of constituent desires. 
 
Variables 
 The proposed research is an attempt to determine how constituency 
characteristics influence representative policymaking action.  To do so, there are three 
types of dependent variables: (1) how the representative speaks publicly, (2) how the 
representative speaks to colleagues, and (3) how the representative acts legislatively.  
Furthermore, it is necessary to gauge constituency characteristics through the use of 
data on the economic circumstances of the given district.  Other data, such as campaign 
contributions and characteristics of the representative might also affect the 
representative’s behavior. 
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 All the data used is confined to the 109
th
 Congress through the first session of 
the 112
th
 Congress (2005-2011), but it effectively offers a quasi-experimental design 
with very different political contexts (Table 2.3).  These years include both divided and 
unified government, as well as divided and unified chambers within Congress.  While 
some scholars argue that the influence of divided government is marginal (Mayhew 
1991), others suggest that it’s important we understand Congress both at times of 
divided and unified government because in these instances productivity may differ 
(Coleman 1999; Edwards et al. 1997; Howell et al. 2000).  The 109
th
 Congress included 
a Republican Congress and a Republican President.  The 110
th
 Congress featured a 
Democratic Congress and a Republican President.  In the 111
th
 Congress, the Democrats 
maintained control of both chambers of Congress but the presidency became 
Democratic when Obama was elected.  The first session of the 112
th
 Congress includes 
a Republican House, Democratic Senate, and Democratic President.  
[INSERT TABLE 2.3 HERE] 
 The data analyses I utilize throughout this dissertation include primarily the 
same predictor variables in each of the different inferential models; thus, a discussion of 
those variables occurs below.  An in-depth discussion of the dependent variables will 
take place in the corresponding chapters that follow. 
 
Independent Variables 
 Table 2.4 summarizes the independent variables that will be discussed below.  
These variables are divided into the following categories: key factors, district 
characteristics, member characteristics, and election characteristics. 
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[INSERT TABLE 2.4 HERE] 
District Characteristics 
 The most critical district characteristics to this study are those statistics 
pertaining to unemployment, foreclosures, and bankruptcies, as these are the primary 
economic issues that this research utilizes.  Patchwork Nation 
(http://www.patchworknation.org/), a project of the Jefferson Institution, provides data 
on foreclosures.  Other district characteristics can be found using Proximity One 
(http://proximityone.com/cdprofiles.htm), including the percentage of unemployed 
individuals in the district.  Proximity One compiles a great deal of data at the district 
level, some of which it obtains from Census Bureau databases.  District-by-district 
bankruptcy data is difficult to find, but as a proxy, I use Proximity One’s percentage of 
people living below the poverty threshold.  In general, it is the case that an increase in 
poverty is associated with an increase in bankruptcy rates.  Nelson (1999) found that, 
“The results for the poverty rate indicate that lower income individuals will tend to use 
Chapter 13 more often” (561).  Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1997) similarly found 
that many of those applying for bankruptcy were below the poverty level.   
 Other district characteristics from Proximity One may also be utilized as 
predictor variables.  These include: 
 Percentage of population that is black 
 Percentage of the population that is Hispanic 
 Percentage of the population with at least a Bachelor’s degree 
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Additionally, it is necessary to gauge party affiliation by district.  Data obtained from 
Kyle Kretschman provides information on the number of registered Democrats and 
Republicans per district for the election years 2004, 2006, and 2008.   
The unemployment rate, foreclosure rate, and poverty rate (as a proxy for 
bankruptcy) are the key independent variables of interest, as they correspond with the 
economic issues in this study.  The other district characteristics are part of a separate 
district characteristics model that accounts for how differences in such factors across 
districts could influence representative action. 
 
District Competitiveness 
 As previously indicated, considerable research about electoral margins and 
representation exists.  However, most of these studies utilize electoral margin as a 
dependent variable and examine how other factors affect it (e.g. Bovitz and Carson 
2006; Kuklinski 1977).  In the present study, electoral margin will be used as an 
independent variable to predict representative behavior.   
Therefore, it is necessary to calculate the percentage by which the representative 
defeated his or her closest challenger.  Representatives who narrowly won their 
previous election may have more at stake because they may need to gain supporters to 
win their next election.  A district competitiveness variable examines whether 
representatives with more at stake will act differently when representing their district 
than those who won with larger electoral margins and therefore feel as though they have 




 The characteristics of the representative may contribute to the way in which the 
representative acts and therefore need to be taken into account when attempting to 
determine the explanation for member behavior.  The following member characteristics 
will be used in this study: 
 Race – White or Black 
 Gender – Male or Female 
 Party Identification – Republican or Democrat 
 Seniority – Number of years of service in the House 
The Republican Party is often associated with big business (Miller et al. 1991), 
and as a result, the expectation is that representatives who are affiliated with the 
Republican Party are more likely to act in a manner characteristic of a pro-business, 
pro-market, and pro-banking mentality.  Members of the Democratic Party, on the other 
hand, are more likely to take a more liberal stance that is more favorable to those facing 
economic difficulties, such as unemployment, foreclosures, and bankruptcies.  Despite 
that these are traditionally the way members of these parties behave on such issues, this 
research seeks to determine if members who see clear economic indicators are acting on 
them, regardless of party affiliation. 
 
Campaign Contributions 
 Lastly, I take into account the representative’s campaign funding.  It is highly 
probable that representatives’ actions are meant to please those individuals who fund 
their campaigns, in the hope that they will receive future donations and thus have an 
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easier time running their re-election campaign.  However, Hall and Wayman (1990) 
argue that interest groups use their contributions to “buy” time with members and 
therefore their expenditures are more likely to matter in a committee setting than on 
actual floor votes.  If they are correct, then these contributions may affect the dependent 
variable pertaining to representative’s behind-the-scenes activity moreso than the 
representative’s legislative action. To measure campaign contributions, Open Secrets 
(http://www.opensecrets.org/) will be utilized, as it maintains extensive data on 
campaign contributions for each representative.  Open Secrets provides information as 
to the total dollar amount representatives received from labor as well as the total dollar 
amount they received from “finance, insurance and real estate,” both of which will be 
used as variables in this study.  These variables will be able to indicate whether 
representative’s economic policymaking actions are the result of who is funding their 
campaigns.  It is expected that representatives who receive a larger amount from labor 
will act in a manner consistent with a pro-worker, pro-buyer, and pro-consumer 
mentality whereas those receiving a larger amount from “finance, insurance, and real 




 An iterative principal factor analysis followed by a Varimax rotation was 
utilized as a means to scale down the four key economic characteristics of the district, in 
order to create a meaningful way to discuss these economic characteristics through use 
of a limited number of key characteristics.  As shown in Table 2.5, income and poverty 
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load highly on the first factor, which has been named the personal financial insecurity 
factor as both median income and poverty are directly related and measured through 
one’s finances.   
[INSERT TABLE 2.5 HERE] 
The foreclosure rate loads highly on the second factor, the macro-economic stress 
factor, while the unemployment rate variable loads reasonably well on the personal 
financial insecurity factor but also to some extent on the macro-economic stress factor.  
The analyses reported in chapters 3-5 will utilize factors scores derived from this 
rotated two-factor solution to represent the finance and economic factors as the key 
independent variables used to explain the relationship between the districts economic 
conditions and the dependent variables. 
 
Dependent Variables 
 A thorough examination of each dependent variable will take place in the 
following chapters.  The first such chapter will examine how the representative speaks 
publicly, or when he or she is speaking directly to constituents.  In order to best gauge 
the representative’s message, his or her official website will be examined to determine 
both how visible these economic issues are, as well as the position the representative 
takes on the issue.  Next, in order to understand how representatives are speaking when 
they are not directly talking to constituents, I examine their floor statements.  I 
developed frames on the basis of differing stances and representatives were classified 
into primary and secondary frames based on all their economic statements within the 
given economic issue.  Finally, to examine representative legislative activity, bills were 
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classified on the basis of who would directly benefit from the legislation.  A count of 
the total number of bills within each category that the representative sponsored and co-




Chapter 3: How the Representative Speaks to Constituents 
 A member of Congress only remains in office as long as constituents support 
him or her when they go to the polls and cast their vote.  As Mayhew (1974) argues, the 
primary goal of a member of Congress is to seek re-election and therefore remain in 
office.  Whether in fact it is a representative’s sole goal may be somewhat contested, as 
others argue it is one goal among several (Fenno 1973; Hall 1987); nonetheless, it 
remains the case that a member of Congress must please, at the very minimum, one 
more voting constituent than his or her opponent in order to remain in office.  However, 
appealing to constituents only matters if constituents are paying attention to or are 
aware of their representative’s actions. 
 
Literature Review and Theoretical Expectations 
 In Chapter 2, I argued that a group of citizens, namely those citizens who are 
uninterested in the political process, are unlikely to follow their representative’s 
behavior unless the issue on which they are focused becomes extremely salient to them.  
Therefore, I speculate that these citizens generally are not paying attention and therefore 
representatives are unlikely to attempt to appeal to them, as they assume doing so will 
not greatly benefit them and their efforts are better spent elsewhere.  Those citizens 
opposed to the representative may very well notice member behavior; however, their 
attention to such behavior will generally make little difference, as they are unlikely to 
ever support the representative.  The opposite can be said for advocates who may or 
may not pay close attention to member behavior, but will support the representative 
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regardless.  Thus, one group is left for which a representative targets his or her action: 
the potentials. 
 Representatives want to make potentials aware of their behavior such that they 
can win the vote of as many potentials as possible in the upcoming election.   Potentials 
are more likely to pay attention to representative behavior than those citizens who are 
uninterested; therefore, representatives seek to reach out to these potentials to make 
them aware of why they should support the representative in the next election.  
Representatives reach out to constituents in a number of ways: by going to events in the 
district, by going on television and radio programming, by giving speeches, and/or by 
writing press releases.   
However, in recent years, as a result of expanding technology, members have all 
created personal websites as a means to reach out to constituents.  Each and every 
member of Congress has a website, and many potentials, who may want to become 
more knowledgeable about their representative, are likely to log onto their 
representative’s website for information at some point in time. While it is certainly the 
case that those constituents who both support and oppose the representative may access 
the representative’s webpage, they are generally less likely to be the primary target of 
such publicly available information.  The representative’s strongest advocates, as well 
as his or her strongest opponents, are unlikely to change their opinions as a result of the 
information on the websites.  Websites are perhaps the easiest way for constituents to 
access information about their representative, as (assuming they have internet access) 
they can do so at their own convenience.  These websites are constantly available, 
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unlike a speech, which occurs at a particular moment in time and then might not be 
accessible to everyone. 
 A representative’s website can serve as a useful tool in understanding the direct 
message the representative is sending the public.  On a representative’s website, he or 
she presents the information that he or she wants constituents to review.  Constituents 
are likely to seek out their representatives’ websites for information and to see where 
their representative stands on the issues: “Legislative websites can serve as a one-stop 
portal for constituents to discover how the member portrays themselves and their 
accomplishments and to discover the explanations the legislator uses to justify their 
actions” (Esterling, Lazer, and Neblo 2010, 3).  While it is certainly the case that not all 
constituents will have internet access, those constituents without such access are likely 
the ones who face significant barriers to voting.  As Verba, Schlozman and Brady 
(1995) point out, certain forms of civic engagement require resources (time, money, 
skills and information), which may not be available to persons who also lack access to 
political information via the internet.  Therefore, representatives are unlikely to view 
these citizens as potentials and may instead view them as uninterested and not attempt 
to gain their support.    
Official congressional website data are only analyzed for the 112
th
 Congress.  
While web archives exist that provide access to previously existing websites, my 
attempts to collect such data indicated that not every representative’s website was 
accessible through archival resources, raising the issue of whether sampling bias could 
occur on the basis of those websites that were and were not accessible.   Those websites 
that were available in the archives were generally only reached during differing times of 
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the year; for instance, one representative’s website might be available from June 2010 
while another’s could be available only in October 2010, right before the representative 
was up for re-election.  Given that such differences in the time at which they site was 
available archivally could influence findings, the determination was made that website 
data would only be collected for the 112
th
 Congress, at the same point in time in the 
year.   
As a result, the respective representatives’ websites were all accessed and coded 
over a three-day period in January 2012 such that timing would be less of an issue with 
respect to the nature by which websites might be changed as the result of an upcoming 
election.  January 2012 marks exactly halfway through a representative’s two-year term 
and thus gives representatives the ability to adjust their position based on the previous 
year but also is not directly before the election.  However, it is the year in which the 
election is occurring and therefore representatives are very mindful of the message they 
may be sending to potentials.  Accessing all representative websites at the same time 
was critical. 
 At present, the internet is widely regarded as a source for obtaining information 
and thus every member seeks to utilize his or her website to convey information to 
constituents.  Adler, Gent, and Overmeyer (1998) indicate that websites are a means of 
constituency contact, as is any other form of communication with the constituency; 
however, at the time of their study not every member had invested resources into an 
internet website.  Nonetheless, Esterling et al.’s (2011) recent work illuminates how 
members create and change their personal websites, indicating that there is a degree of 
path dependence in the utilization of the internet by members, as even freshmen 
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representatives are locked into a status quo of web design that was present before they 
rose to office.  This uniformity in websites was nearly universal, as policy positions by 
members were nearly always a tab featured at the top of the representatives’ site during 
the present research. 
Scholars have broadly recognized that there exists a difference with respect to 
accessibility of the internet on the basis of race, as Caucasian populations traditionally 
are more likely to have access to a computer (Babb 1998; Hoffman and Novak 1998; 
Hoffman et al. 2000).  However, more recent research suggests that campaign websites 
from districts with a larger Caucasian population were not of better quality than those 
websites from less predominately Caucasian districts (Latimer 2009).  Additionally, 
there appears to be a strong relationship between household income and computer 
ownership and internet usage, indicating that those constituents with a higher income 
are more likely to own a computer and have internet access (McLaren and Zappala 
2002; Rice and Katz 2003). 
Since 2001, the Congressional Management Foundation (CMF) has coded 
representatives’ websites with respect to a large number of dimensions in order to 
determine their quality.  Utilizing nearly 100 criteria, CMF assesses Congressional 
websites on a variety of characteristics, including: usability, timeliness, information on 
issues, constituent services and casework, promoting accountability to constituents, 
legislative process information, district/state information, floor proceedings, media 
communications, and communication technology (Congressional Management 
Foundation 2011).  As a result of this data collection, scholars have been able to 
conduct research with respect to representative websites (e.g., Brotherton 2007; Burden 
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and Hysom 2007; Johnson 2004).  For instance, Esterling et al. (2012) utilized CMF 
data coded for the quality by which the website presents national issues, state and local 
issues, and issues important to the representative, as well as the representative’s 
rationale for such issues.  However, of note to the present research, CMF states, “We 
looked at how effectively websites were providing content and information, and not at 
the individual merits of the position” (Congressional Management Foundation 2011, 2).  
The focus of the research presented here is, in fact, the content of the representative’s 




In order to code the websites of representatives on the basis of their stance on 
economic issues, I employed a coding scheme that utilized a 5-point Likert-type scale to 
classify the information the websites have on them and how they emphasize the issue.  
As shown in Table 3.1, the representative’s position on each issue was classified 
according to his or her economic interest position.  A code of 0 was employed when the 
issue was not present on the representative’s website. 
[INSERT TABLE 3.1 HERE] 
Under such a coding scheme, a representative was considered “very pro-worker” or 
“somewhat pro-worker” if, in discussing unemployment issues, he or she articulated a 
desire to create jobs and/or appealed to labor unions.  On the contrary, a representative 
was considered “very pro-business” or “somewhat pro-business” if he or she stressed 
the importance of investing in corporations and offering tax cuts to businesses.  
 47 
Naturally, there is an element of subjectivity to this coding scheme, particularly with 
respect to differentiating the somewhat and very categories.   
The qualification for a representative to be in the extreme category (1 or 5 on the 
scale) is that he or she must indicate a strong stance on the issue that offers a clear 
statement about actions taken or intention with respect to the policy position.  For 
instance, mentioning a desire to create jobs may be considered “somewhat pro-worker” 
whereas mentioning a desire to create jobs and articulating the need for such job 
formation would be considered “very pro-worker.”  The middle-of-the-road position 
(coded three) was employed when the representative chose not to take any real stance 
on the issue but still mentioned the issue on his or her website. 
 For example, André Carson (D-IN) is considered “very pro-worker” given that 
he indicates the problem with unemployment, indicates the legislation that can be used 
to address it, and shows what he personally has done and would like to do to address the 
problem.  His website indicates, 
In response to our economic downturn, I became involved in bipartisan 
negotiations that led to the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act. This landmark legislation addresses our ongoing recession with initiatives 
that will help bring 3.5 million Americans back to work, including 75,000 across 
Indiana, and provide much needed tax relief to 95% of American families. Soon, 
unemployed workers in industries ranging from manufacturing to health care 
will see their job prospects greatly expanded.  
On the other hand, Steven Palazzo (R-MS) indicates a “somewhat pro-business stance,” 
stating: 
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I have run a small business and I know what it means to meet a payroll and read 
a balance sheet.  It’s my view that the federal government should look at ways to 
strengthen small businesses instead of abusing them with higher taxes and more 
regulation.  With unemployment rates in Mississippi remaining even higher than 
the national average, it is critical for us to reign in the red-tape factory that is our 
federal government.  Small businesses are a critical part of our economy, both 
locally and at the national level.  Over the past 15 years, they have accounted for 
nearly 65 percent of all new job creation.  
Congressman Palazzo does not go into depth about his pro-business stance but does 
clearly indicate the need to “strengthen small businesses.”  Unlike Congressman 
Carson, Congressman Palazzo’s discussion does not include specific details on bills or 
on actions he has taken.  
 The middle-of-the-road position can be found on the website of Stephen Fincher 
(R-TN) who has an issue section on his website entitled “Economy and Jobs” which 
states at the top “The issues of Economy and Jobs are important to our district and to 
my work in Congress.”  However, the only statement he makes regarding the issue of 
employment is: “Getting our economy back on track must be our number one priority in 
Congress.  Government needs to foster an environment where small businesses are 
aggressively growing and creating jobs in Tennessee and across the nation.”  Thus, 
Congressman Fincher addresses the issue of employment but not to the extent that he 
clearly indicates a position that can be classified as “somewhat pro-business” or 
“somewhat pro-worker.”  His statement regarding the growth of small business also 
encompasses the idea of job growth and does not go into detail on the matter.  
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Therefore, his website was coded as an articulation of the middle-of-the-road position 
regarding unemployment. 
Using this coding scheme, each representative’s website was coded according to 
the economic issue positions of interest.  Coding the websites as such allows us to see 
how constituency characteristics lead to representatives who are more or less concerned 
with the interests of constituents who are likely to need economic benefits, such as 
economically vulnerable citizens who may be in need of better employment 
circumstances, greater assistance in housing, or at risk of bankruptcy. 
Additionally, some representatives are likely to have such economic information 
more visible on their websites than are others; therefore, a visibility scale was also 
employed when coding these websites.  Dolan (2005) examined the websites of 
members of Congress to determine the different approaches used by male and female 
members; she does so by examining what representatives indicate their top issues of 
interest to be.  She coded her data according to whether or not the issue was present in 
the candidate’s top five issues as well as where it ranked among the issues the candidate 
listed.   
Rather than focusing on issue importance in comparison with other issues, the 
present research seeks to examine how visible the issue is, in general, to those 
individuals visiting the website.  Thus, visibility was coded according to the extent to 
which the representative’s website discussed the issue.  If the issue is not mentioned at 
all on the site, it was coded 1; mentioning an issue briefly was coded 2, while an at-
length discussion of an issue was coded 3.  Table 3.2 provides information on the 
coding of the visibility scale. 
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[INSERT TABLE 3.2 HERE] 
Hence, the visibility scale can show whether district characteristics are predictive of the 
information of which the representative wants the public to be aware. 
 An example of a member whose website is coded on the high end of the 
visibility scale (3) with respect to the visibility of the unemployment issue is 
Congressman Ruben Hinojosa (D-TX).  The front page of his site features a picture of a 
factory with the caption “Training a World-Class Workforce” which links to an article 
about Hinojosa’s action on the Workforce Investment Act, indicating in it the 
importance of workforce training. Another picture shows Hispanic women and is 
captioned, “Education and Labor Legislative Victories” and is linked to an article about 
the accessibility and affordability of higher education.   
When examining Congressman Hinojosa’s issue positions, “Jobs and the 
Economy” focuses directly on unemployment, specifically in his district in Texas.  This 
section of his site even features a graph that compares the unemployment rate within his 
district with the rest of the United States, as he indicates he has closed the large gap that 
used to exist wherein his district had a much higher than average unemployment rate.  
Given that Congressman Hinojosa’s district’s unemployment rate stands at 10.6% and 
the average unemployment rate across districts is 10.0%, it is fair to say that he is 
accurately representing his district’s circumstances regarding the unemployment rate. 
 A representative who mentioned the unemployment issue but did not discuss it 
at length was Congressman Sam Johnson (R-TX).  Information pertaining to the 
unemployment rate can only be found in his “Jobs and the Economy” section which is 
merely ten sentences long.  The issue is thus mentioned but never in detail, as 
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Congressman Johnson primarily asserts that the stimulus bill was ineffective and the 
government has failed to create jobs.  The Congressman never mentions policy 
pertaining to how he plans to create such jobs but instead briefly mentions the issue as a 
means of a political attack on the Democratic Party.  Congressman Johnson clearly has 
an issue position he is taking, but visibility on the issue on his website is not as strong 
as other members, like Congressman Hinojosa. 
 Because such coding is subjective by nature, it was necessary to ensure 
reliability via a second coder.  In his work on images of poverty, Gilens (1996) 
indicates that, “to ensure reliability of the coding, a random 25 percent sample of 
pictures was coded by a second coder” (519).  Likewise, I randomly selected a quarter 
of the websites coded for a second coder to review, after this coder had been trained in 
the coding scheme utilized for these websites.  Cohen’s Kappa between myself and the 
second coder revealed a Kappa of .91 with a p<.0001, indicating strong reliability in the 
coding scheme. 
[INSERT TABLE 3.3 HERE] 
More often than not, representative websites did not specifically mention and 
take a position on these economic issues, particularly on foreclosure and bankruptcy 
issues which were not mentioned 79% and 84% of the time (respectively), as shown in 
Table 3.4.  Foreclosure and bankruptcy issues generally effect fewer people than do 
unemployment issues, in addition, the unemployment rate is often the most widely used 
indicator of the health of the economy.  Of those members who took a position on these 
economic issues, the most common stance to take was the strongest pro-low income 
position (5).  With respect to unemployment, nearly a third of representatives who took 
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a position on the issue, took the strong pro-low income stance while upwards of 60% of 
representatives took the same stance on foreclosure and bankruptcy issues.  In the case 
of unemployment, it was fairly common to take the middle-of-the-road position as well, 
which was not the case for foreclosure and bankruptcy issues.  
[INSERT TABLE 3.4 HERE] 
Because those representatives who did not mention the issue on their websites 
represent a large portion of the overall number of representatives in the 112
th
 Congress, 
further examination of these members appears necessary.  As shown in Table 3.5, those 
representatives who did not discuss the issue at all were more likely to be Republicans.  
Given that Republicans make up only slightly more than half (55.63%) of the seats in 
the House in the 112
th
 Congress, it is surprising that they make up a larger share of 
those unwilling to take a stance on these economic issues.  Additionally, a χ
2
 test of 
independence examining the relationship between party affiliation and willingness to 
mention these issues indicated a significant difference between Republicans and 
Democrats [χ
2
(1) = 41.43, p < .001] in willingness to mention these issues.  Because 
Republicans maintain the majority, they could deem taking a public stance on these 
issues as a gamble and think that not mentioning these issues will maintain the status 
quo, meaning keep their party in power. 
Interestingly, women as well as Black and Hispanic members were increasingly 
more likely to take a stance on bankruptcy and foreclosure issues, opposite the trend 
seen overall and with respect to parties in which the unemployment issue received the 
most attention.  With respect to race in the 112
th
 Congress, 397 members (90%) could 
be considered Caucasian; thus, a slightly higher than representative sample of white 
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members appeared to not mention these issues on their websites, as more than 90% of 
Caucasian members did not mention these issues across each issue area.  Similarly, 336 
members (83%) are male indicating that a larger than representative number of male 
members (roughly 85% or more across issue areas) are not mentioning these economic 
issues in comparison to their female counterparts. 
[INSERT TABLE 3.5 HERE] 
 Additionally, most members who did not mention these issues were not in 
classically defined positions of power.  For instance, on the unemployment issues 
98.22% of those not mentioning the unemployment issue were not a member within the 
party leadership (Speaker of the House, Majority Leader, Minority Leader, Majority 
Whip, Conference Chair, etc.).  Given that roughly 96% of members were not defined 
as party leaders, there does appear to be a slightly larger presence of non-party leaders 
not mentioning the issue.  Additionally, when examining the number of years of 
seniority those not mentioning the issue have (Table 3.6), a pattern is revealed wherein 
those representatives with the least experience are the most likely to have no mention of 
these economic issues on their websites.  Those less senior members may be the ones 
least likely to mention these issues because of fear of losing their next election.  The 
mean electoral margin for those representatives who did not mention these issues is 
21.12%, which is considerably lower than the 33.61% overall electoral victory margin.  
However, an independent samples t-test comparing electoral margin of those 
representatives who took a stance to those representatives who did not take a stance 
indicated that there was no significant difference between the two groups of 
representatives on electoral margin. 
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[INSERT TABLE 3.6 HERE] 
Also of note is that those members who did not mention these issues on their 
websites were overwhelmingly the same members who were less likely to sponsor or 
co-sponsor legislation pertaining to these issues.  It may be the case that those members 
who are not taking a stance on these economic issues on their websites are overall 
refusing to take a stance regardless of the venue.  Nevertheless, I conducted a logit 
analysis to examine those taking a stance on their website versus those who chose not to 
take a stance on their website.  As the findings in Appendix: Logit Comparing Those 
Taking a Position on Their Website vs. Those Not, few variables were found to be 
significant.  It is noteworthy that the party variable was significant only for the 
foreclosure and bankruptcies, as this follows the general trend of this research in that 
unemployment appears to differ from these other issues. 
[INSERT TABLE 3.7 HERE] 
Table 3.7 indicates that the foreclosure and bankruptcy issues were also much 
less visible on the representative websites than the unemployment issue.  Over two-
thirds of all representative websites did not mention these economic issues, while 
roughly two-fifths of all sites had little to mention regarding unemployment issues.  The 
websites coded as not mentioning the issue were one in the same as those coded as zero 
on the issue position scale.  In terms of each of these economic issues, those websites 
with the highest degree of visibility more often than not discussed these economic 
issues at-length and in-depth rather than had a superficial discussion of the issue. 
In order to examine the relationship of each dependent variable – the economic 
issue position and visibility of these representative websites on each of three economic 
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issues (unemployment, foreclosures, and bankruptcy) – to the independent variables 
mentioned in Chapter 2, both simple Pearson product-moment correlations and an 
ordered logit model were utilized.  The selection of ordered logit was based on the 
nature of the dependent variables, as each may be classified as ordinal in nature.   
 
 
Discussion of Findings 
 While it is certainly the case that some members choose not to mention these 
economic issues on their websites, as previously discussed, those members who do may 
be doing so for a particular reason.  The correlations in Table 3.7 (which do not include 
those who do not mention the issue on their websites) show the relationship between 
each of the economic issue positions and the other variables in this study.  Examining 
these correlations shows that there clearly exists a relationship among each of these 
economic issue positions because those taking a stance on one of these issues often take 
a stance on the other economic issues of interest and these representatives are more 
likely to do so in a visible manner. 
 Many of the members who listed a section under “Legislative Issues” as “Jobs 
and the Economy” also had one entitled “Housing” to discuss both unemployment and 
foreclosure issues.  While it was much less likely that a “Bankruptcy” section was 
listed, if bankruptcy-related issues were discussed, it was often tangentially through one 
of these sections or one pertaining to taxes or small businesses.  For example, Rush Holt 
(D-NJ) has an issue section on his website titled ‘Workforce Issues’ in which he 
discusses minimum wage, labor unions, job training, unemployment benefits, and 
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discrimination at length.  In another section, titled “Housing,” he discusses the need to 
mitigate the foreclosure crisis and discusses the Housing and Economic Recovery Act 
as well as the Helping Families Save their Homes Act.  In a section titled “Economy,” 
Congressman Holt discusses the heavy tax burden on the middle class and economic 
growth. 
 The issue positions and visibility of these issues on Congressman Holt’s website 
are somewhat surprising when one considers that his district, the 12
th
 district of New 
Jersey, is not struggling financially in comparison to many others.  For instance, the 
district’s foreclosure rate is well below the average, their median income is over 40% 
above the mean income across districts, and their poverty rate is over 60% below the 
mean poverty rate.  However, Congressman Holt won his district by just 7% in the 
previous election and consequently may be using his website as a means of gaining 
support by strongly advocating for these economic issues.  The positions he takes are 
very pro-worker, pro-business, and pro-consumer which may not necessarily be 
successful with a district that voted only marginally (53.6%) for the Democratic 
presidential candidate in the previous election.  Congressman Holt is sticking to the 
traditional Democratic party line despite that his constituents may not have a great deal 
of economic concerns and may only slightly favor the Democratic Party. 
Although the economic circumstances of Congressman Holt’s district do not 
appear to indicate a need for such economic concern, the correlations in Table 3.8 show 
that often it is the case that a linear relationship exists between many of these economic 
characteristics and the willingness of a representative to take an issue position on his or 
her website.  A prime example is Congressman Joe Heck (R-NV), who had by far the 
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highest number of foreclosures, with 143 per 100,000 people.  The clear message this 
economic indicator sends to Congressman Heck is that his district is highly concerned 
with the effects of the recession, particularly as it relates to homeownership.  On his 
website, Congressman Heck states,  
I voted to maintain the FHA Refinance Program. This program allows for those 
who are current on their mortgages, but underwater, the ability to refinance. On 
March 29, 2011, I voted to protect the Home Affordable Modification program 
(HAMP), a program which provides incentives to mortgage servicers to provide 
loan modifications to troubled borrowers. I voted to protect these programs 
because taking away programs which help homeowners who are trying to do the 
right thing is not the answer. 
Despite his membership in the Republican Party, Congressman Heck indicates support 
for homeownership programs that are much more liberal than would be expected.  Some 
Republicans have strongly opposed the FHA Refinance Program and HAMP to the 
extent that several pieces of legislation have been introduced to try to repeal and 
terminate it.  Congressman Heck is thus going against the view of his own party and 
political beliefs in order to support legislation that he believes his constituents will view 
favorably.   
[INSERT TABLE 3.8 HERE] 
 Table 3.8 also reveals that representatives’ positions on the unemployment issue 
more strongly correlated with many of the independent variables than the positions they 
took on the foreclosure or bankruptcy issue.  Given that Table 3.4 revealed that 
members were much more likely to take an issue position on unemployment than the 
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other economic issue, it is no surprise that these variables have a stronger relationship 
on this issue.  A strong and significant correlation occurs between the representative’s 
party and the unemployment issue position while another strong and significant 
correlation exists between those members taking a pro-worker stance and districts with 
a higher percentage of voters voting for the Democratic presidential candidate in the 
previous election.   
Interestingly, while members with less seniority were significantly more likely 
to take a pro-worker stance, those with more seniority were also significantly likely to 
take a more pro-market stance on foreclosure issues.  Labor PACs appear to be only 
significantly related to members who take a pro-worker stance on unemployment issues 
while contributions by finance PACs appear to be correlated with members taking a 
more pro-business, pro-market, and pro-banking statement across all economic issues. 
 We next turn our attention to the correlations between the visibility of these 
issues on member’s websites and other variables (Table 3.9).  Of note is that the 
relationship between visibility and issue position on these economic issues is 
consistently strong and significant with the exception of representative’s issue position 
on unemployment issue and their visibility on foreclosure and bankruptcy issues.  
However, in general it appears as though representatives, who are stating a position on 
one issue (particularly when that is the foreclosure or bankruptcy issue), are the ones 
stating an opinion on other issues and are more likely to do so with a higher degree of 
visibility.  More often than not, those representatives who did not have an issue position 
on unemployment issues were unlikely to discuss the other economic issues.  While in 
some cases they discussed other issues (economic or otherwise) and just left 
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unemployment out, other times it was the case that the representative did not have 
specific issue positions on his or her site at all.  For example, Duncan Hunter (R-CA) 
has no section of his website devoted to his issue positions.  He does have a 
‘Legislation’ section that links to his floor speeches and sponsored and co-sponsored 
bills in THOMAS but nowhere does he explicitly state his stance on issues on his own 
website.  The lack of position on his website illustrates how inaccessible his positions 
on such economic issues are, as we know Congressman Hunter likely has a stance but 
for a constituent to determine it, he or she may have to do extensive research.  
[INSERT TABLE 3.9 HERE] 
 While none of the key factors appeared to have strong or significant correlations 
with the unemployment or bankruptcy issue, many of them did with the visibility of the 
foreclosure issue.  Unlike with the other two issues, if the foreclosure issue was 
mentioned on the representative’s website it was much more likely discussed at-length 
rather than just mentioned, as three times as many websites featured an at-length 
discussion compared to just a mention (Table 3.7).  Thus, representatives who have 
districts that show they are struggling on the basis of economic indicators are more 
visible in discussing the nature of the foreclosure crisis. 
 The characteristics of the representative appear to have a significant correlation 
with nearly every economic issue.  Non-minority members of Congress were more 
likely those visible on the foreclosure issue, while male members were more visible on 
each of the economic issues.  A fairly strong and significant relationship exists wherein 
Democrats are likely less visible than Republicans on these economic issues.  Because 
the Democratic party maintained control of the House previously and leads the 
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administration in the 112
th
 Congress, they may feel as though their party could be 
blamed for the recession and thus they may be less inclined to address these issues with 
visibility for fear that the onus to act to correct the economic circumstances rests with 
them.   
 However, districts with a higher share of voters casting ballots for the 
Democratic presidential candidate in the previous election were more likely to have 
representatives who were visible on these economic issues.  Of note is that while 
finance PAC contributions appeared to correlate with economic issue positions across 
the board (Table 3.8), with respect to issue visibility, labor PAC contributions are more 
strongly and significantly correlated.  Given that labor PACs likely advocate for the 
more pro-worker, pro-buyer, and pro-consumer positions, the fact that they are more 
visible across these economic issues is fitting with the correlations with respect to the 
Republican and Democratic Vote Previous Election variables.  
In order to gain a greater understanding of the relationship between the 
independent variables and the two dependent variables, an ordered logit model was 
evaluated.  Table 3.10 shows the ordered logit model wherein the dependent variable is 
the economic issue position the representative took on his or her website, excluding 
those representatives who did not take a position (that is, their website position coded as 
0).  While it was hypothesized that the economic characteristics of a constituency could 
be related to the issue position a representative took, the findings in this model indicate 
that may not be the case.  While there was a correlation between many of the key 
constituency variables, the linear relationship that exists may not be predictive in the 
context of the other predictor variables.  With respect to the unemployment issue, 
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neither of the two factors based on district economic conditions were significant, 
although personal financial insecurity did reach marginal significance on the bankruptcy 
issue.   
Additionally, the electoral margin variable indicates that a larger margin of 
victory in the previous election to a marginally significant extent is related to an 
increased likelihood with which a representative will take a pro-business position on 
unemployment issues and yet a more pro-buyer position on the foreclosure issue.  
Members who won their previous election by a narrow margin may be those 
emphasizing the pro-worker position to try and gain support in the next election, but at 
the same time, they may not see the foreclosure issue as gaining enough momentum to 
show concern for the pro-buyer position.  
[INSERT TABLE 3.10 HERE] 
 Representatives may be attempting to reach out to constituents using their 
websites; however, their constituents’ economic circumstances may not be reflected in 
the member’s personal position on economic issues, as indicated by the results in the 
ordered logit model analyses.  Tables 3.11-3.13 indicate the odds ratios for these 
analyses by economic issue area.  As these tables show, the unemployment rate is most 
likely to be related to a change in the key dependent variables, particularly on the 
personal financial insecurity and macro-economic stress variables in which they are 
associated with more than a 10% change.  Overall, the relationship of these key factors 
to representative’s position stance is fairly small across issues.   
[INSERT TABLE 3.11 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 3.12 HERE] 
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[INSERT TABLE 3.13 HERE] 
 Interestingly, while many of the variables in the model failed to reach 
significance, both the size of the black and Latino populations in the district was 
significantly related to the position the representative took on the foreclosure issue.  An 
examination of the correlation of these minority populations with the foreclosure rate 
itself in the district reveals a significant relationship at p<.05 for the black population 
and p<.001 for the Latino population.  The adjusted odds ratio for the percentage black 
population was significant (AOR=1.089, 95% CI: 1.025, 1.166) indicating that for each 
one percentage point increase in the black population the odds of providing a rating in a 
higher rating category is 1.089 higher, while the adjusted odds ratio for the percentage 
Latino population was significant (AOR=1.030, 95% CI: 1.001, 1.060) indicating that 
for each one percentage point increase in the Latino population, the odds of providing a 
rating in a higher rating category is 1.030 higher.   
Given this high correlation, it may be the case that representatives are stricter in 
their position on the foreclosure issue given the relatively high rate of foreclosures 
present in their districts.  It may also be the case that representatives may be oblivious 
to actual economic circumstances but more aware of statistics regarding the race and 
ethnicity of their constituents and draw conclusions about their economic preferences 
on the basis of such characteristics. 
Another confounding factor is the representative’s party, as the ordered logit 
reveals, has a very strong and significant relationship with the representative’s position 
on all of these economic issues.  Democratic party members are far more likely to adopt 
a pro-worker, pro-buyer, and pro-consumer position than are their Republican 
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counterparts.  Adjusted odds ratios similarly indicate just how strongly related party is 
to a representative’s position on a given economic issue on his or her website.  For 
instance, on the unemployment issue, the adjusted odds ratio for party affiliation was 
significant (AOR=126.371, 95% CI: 29.414, 542.931) indicating that odds of being in a 
higher rating category is 126 times more likely for Democrats than for Republicans.  
Across each economic issue, the party variable has a very strong relationship to the 
issue position a representative expresses on his or her website. 
Representatives appear to be concerned with their issue position on their website 
reflecting their party’s platform rather than appealing to constituents.  Perhaps because 
websites are available to the general public and may be accessed by individuals who are 
outside of a member’s constituency, a representative may want his or her site to directly 
reflect the party’s position, particularly if he or she seeks to win favor within the party.  
Pressure from party members may influence a representative’s public statements, 
particularly those that are accessible to the general public, such as on a website. 
Also of note is that both labor and finance PACs were significant for the 
bankruptcy issue but opposite to the direction one might expect, as labor PACs seemed 
to influence the representative to be more pro-banking and finance to be more pro-
consumer.  This finding could be a function of the small sample size available for the 
bankruptcy issue, as it was seldom mentioned on representative’s website.  
Nevertheless, the substantive significance for all three issues, despite how frequently 
they were mentioned, is relatively high, as this model explains over 66% of the variance 
on unemployment and foreclosure issues and 85% on bankruptcy issues. 
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 An ordered logit model was also constructed in order to examine the 
relationships between the independent variables and how visible information about 
these economic issues is on representative’s websites.  As shown in Table 3.14, the 
macro-economic stress factor is significant with respect to the foreclosure issues, 
indicating a negative relationship such that districts with a higher foreclosure and 
unemployment rate are likely to have representatives who are less visible in addressing 
these issues.  The adjusted odds ratio for the macro-economic stress factor was 
significant (AOR =0.703, 95% CI = 0.542, 0.911) indicating that a one unit increase in 
the score on the macro-economic factor is associated with a .703 decreased likelihood 
of providing a rating in a higher rating category.    The personal financial insecurity 
factor again failed to reach significance showing that perhaps income and poverty rates 
in a district are less useful in predicting members’ behavior, even when it comes to how 
they directly appeal to constituents.   
[INSERT TABLE 3.14 HERE] 
Table 3.14 shows that macro-economic stress factor is inversely related to the 
representative’s visibility on foreclosure issues.  Because the foreclosure rate within a 
district loads significantly on the macro-economic stress factor, this undermines the 
predicted relationship between districts with a higher foreclosure rate being 
significantly more likely to have representatives visibly advocating for pro-homeowner 
policies.  The example of Congressman Joe Heck serves as a prime example of this 
expectation given the high rate of foreclosures in his district.  Because the 
unemployment rate also loads significantly on the macro-economic stress factor, it 
 65 
comes as no surprise that the unemployment rate in his district is 11.2%, well above the 
9.9% average among districts in the 112
th
 Congress. 
 Congressman Heck is an atypical Republican in his support of homeowner 
policies, as the findings in Table 3.9 indicates, the average Republican member is more 
likely to favor pro-market policies in comparison to pro-homeowner ones.  The same 
can be said for bankruptcy issues, as Democrats are those members significantly more 
likely to indicate a position that is pro-consumer.  These findings are not necessarily 
surprising, as the Democratic Party often presents itself as the party fighting for the 
middle-class and those without economic wherewithal.     
The key factors variables’ inability to widely predict in both this and previous 
model may be in part due to the issue selection; on unemployment issues, members are 
likely to pay the closest attention to the unemployment rate while on foreclosure issues 
they are paying attention to the foreclosure rate.  While the poverty rate, along with 
median income are useful variables as indicators of the bankruptcy rate, they may be 
insufficient to properly understand it.  Nevertheless, both factors utilize unemployment 
rate and neither appears significant on unemployment issues.  The odds ratios (Tables 
3.15-3.17) similarly indicate that the key factors may not influence how visible 
economic information is on a representative’s site.  If representatives are not espousing 
positions on the basis of constituent economic needs but instead on the basis of their 
own personal ideology, as was previously found, then they may be merely indicating a 
party stance and not going into detail on the issue. 
[INSERT TABLE 3.15 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 3.16 HERE] 
 66 
[INSERT TABLE 3.17 HERE] 
This ordered logit model shows that the foreclosure issue is addressed to a great 
extent by representatives than are the other economic issues, as many more of the 
variables are significant within this model and the R
2 
indicates slightly greater 
predictive ability.  For instance, within the foreclosure model, both the percent Latino 
and the percent with a college degree appear to be related to how visible information is 
on foreclosure issues such that districts with a larger Latino population and those with 
more college-educated individuals are likely to have representatives who have 
webpages with less visibility on foreclosure issues when addressing constituents.  Odds 
ratio estimates further indicate that districts with higher Latino populations and more 
individuals who are college educated are more likely to be visible on these economic 
issues. 
The party variable once again is a significant predictor but not with respect to 
the unemployment issue, as it may be that both parties are equally animated on this 
issue.  As this issue often gains a large amount of national attention, members of both 
parties may want to be expressive on this issue.  However, Democrats are less likely to 
visibly address foreclosure issues on their websites than are Republican representatives.  
These findings confirm what was previously discovered when examining the 
correlations. 
 In order to determine the relationships of the different sets of independent 
variables with the dependent variables, I conducted a multiple-df contrast utilizing the 
Wald χ
2
 test for each respective set of independent variables.  These tests examine the 
ability of each of the four conceptual sets of independent variables (key factors, district 
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characteristics, member characteristics, and election characteristics) to predict a 
dependent variable, within the context of the entire model.  Thus, it is a simultaneous 
test of whether the respective set of estimates within a set equal zero.   As shown in 
Table 3.18, member characteristics appear to be critical in explaining economic issue 
positions on unemployment issues, largely a function of the strength of the party 
variable at explaining representative position.  Member characteristics also appear to be 
a strong predictor on bankruptcy issues, as do election characteristics, despite the fact 
that the percent of voters casting ballots for the Democratic candidate for president in 
the previous election did not appear significant within that model.  Rather, contributions 
from PACs appear to be a strongly associated with representatives’ positions on 
bankruptcy issues.  No set of variables appears to have a great import for foreclosure 
issues although the key factors and member characteristics did approach significance. 
[INSERT TABLE 3.18 HERE] 
 The contrast findings with respect to issue visibility juxtapose those findings on 
issue position, as in this contrast nearly all the variable sets are significant on the 
foreclosure issue.  Key factors, district characteristics, and member characteristics all 
are predictive of the visibility with which representatives discuss foreclosure issues at 
the p<.05 level.  A number of sets of characteristics also appear to predict bankruptcy 
issues; however, on unemployment issues the only significant predictor is election 
characteristics.  Foreclosure and bankruptcy issues were much less prevalent on 
representative websites and therefore the large number of significant sets of 
characteristics may be a product of the less variation among these variables, as most 
websites were coded as the issue not being mentioned on the website. 
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[INSERT TABLE 3.19 HERE] 
Conclusion 
As stated in Chapter 2, the expectation of this research is that representatives 
will indicate concern for this country’s (and/or their districts) economic well-being on 
the basis of their districts economic circumstances.  Representatives will show this 
concern directly to their constituents via their websites that they use as a direct means of 
contact under the assumption that potential voters will visit it and ideally be more 
inclined to support them.  Two different dependent variables were used to measure the 
way in which representative’s addressed constituents on economic issues on their own 
website: (1) the representative’s position on the economic issue, and (2) how visible 
information on this economic issue was on the representative’s website.   
On coding these variables, it became evident that representatives seldom 
mentioned such economic issues on their websites.  As a result, analysis of those 
representatives not mentioning these issues was assessed to determine whether such 
members differentiated from those did mention these issues.  In general, those members 
not mentioning the issues were more likely to be white, male Republicans. 
With respect to the representative’s position on economic issues, correlations 
indicated a linear relationship did in fact exist between several of the key independent 
variables such that the direct economic characteristics in the district correlated strongly 
and significantly with the representative’s position on these issues.  However, the 
ordered logit analysis found that more often than not, representatives’ position on these 
issues was not predictive of their constituents’ economic situation.  On foreclosure 
issues, the economic factor did appear to be predicted by representative’s position 
 69 
showing that higher foreclosure and unemployment rates lead to a more pro-homeowner 
position.  On the unemployment issue, higher electoral margins indicated a more pro-
business stance on unemployment issues.   
In general, the party variable was found to be perhaps the most consistently 
predictive of representative’s position on these economic issues.  Even if representatives 
may be concerned with appealing to constituents based on their economic needs, their 
greater desire was to maintain the party line and show how they fit well into the mold 
one might expect of them given their affiliation.  Interestingly, the same finding held for 
visibility of economic issues, wherein party appeared to be among the strongest 
predictors of how visible an economic issue on a representative’s website with 
Republicans significantly less likely to take a visible stance. 
Thus, findings with respect to representative’s behavior when addressing 
constituents directly indicates that perhaps party affiliation of the representative matters 
above all else.  Representatives may choose to concern themselves with their overall 
public message on their website rather than just the message they are sending directly to 
their constituents.  They know that other individuals, including high-ranking individuals 
within their party, can access their website and therefore want the information on it to 
be reflective of their party’s position.  The Republican Party is known for having 
disciplined members who stick to the party line, as the findings suggest. 
While it was expected that in their public messages, above all else, 
representatives would concern themselves with appealing to constituents by indicating a 
position along the lines of constituents economic desires, findings revel that in fact 
representatives are far more concerned with their party than anything else.  Websites 
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were chosen as a vehicle to examine representatives message to their constituents, as it 
was presumed that constituents seeking further information about their representative 
(likely to be potentials), would access their website to gain such information.  It may be 
the case that representatives view their websites as their own public message that is 
expressed beyond their constituents and therefore the dyadic relationship is less 
exhibited through the web venue. 
Regardless, websites were examined because such a message is vocal and 
displayed to all constituents not particular groups, such as a speech at a specific district 
location.  It may be that representatives are less likely to tow the party line in such a 
venue and they may be more inclined to exhibit a position knowing the issue 
preferences of such a small group.  On their websites, representatives may be trying to 
appeal to all of their constituents (and perhaps even those outside their constituencies) 
which is why they may be less inclined to take a position or to take a very strong 
position. 
 
Chapter 4: How Representatives Speak to Colleagues 
 On June 12, 2008, in the midst of the recession and a high unemployment rate, 
members of the House debated the Emergency Extended Unemployment Compensation 
Act of 2008.  Congressman Charles Rangel (D-NY), a liberal Democrat from New York 
who represents a district that is not very economically prosperous, introduced 
legislation that much of the Democratic Party supported, as they argued for the need to 
provide assistance to unemployed workers amidst the recession.  Congressman Jim 
McDermott (D-WA) defended the legislation, stating “It would immediately provide 13 
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weeks of extended benefits for workers in every state who have exhausted their 
benefits.”  He went on to attack the Republican Party, stating, “Helping the American 
people should not be a partisan issue; but the Republicans and the president [George W. 
Bush] are trying to make it just that.” 
 The Republican response came from Congressman Wally Herger (R-CA) who 
indicated that his party also wanted to help the American people but that the 
Republicans did not see the Democratic solution as one that would be helpful to the 
American public.  He indicated, “Instead of creating an untargeted expansion of 
unemployment benefits, we should be focusing on growing the economy . . . Today’s 
legislation will result in higher taxes on small businesses, resulting in slower job 
creation.  This won’t help U.S. workers.”   
Exchanges like this one between Congressman McDermott and Congressman 
Herger are all too common on the House floor, particularly with respect to economic 
issues.  With so much partisan backlash on the floor of the House, to whom are 
members really speaking in their floor speeches?  Do members represent their districts 
in floor debate or seek some other goal?  Are members making targeted appeals to 
potential supporters? These are the questions that this chapter seeks to address. 
Members of Congress have an interest in maintaining and/or gaining constituent 
support, but they are aware that constituents may not always pay attention to their every 
action or every word.  If members think constituents are less likely to pay attention to 
some of their behaviors, will they alter their actions in such instances?  While 
representatives attend events which they speak directly to a constituent audience, there 
are times in which representatives may not see their constituents as their direct 
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audience.  For instance, when speaking on the floor of the House, representatives may 
presume that constituents are not paying attention and may instead direct their message 
toward their House colleagues, particularly toward members of the opposing party.   
 
Literature Review and Theoretical Expectations 
Constituents certainly can access C-SPAN and view their representatives’ 
speeches, but representatives may believe that the vast majority of their constituents are 
unlikely to tune in to listen to their every word.  Uninterested constituents are certainly 
unlikely to tune in to watch their representatives.  Those constituents strongly opposed 
to the representative may in fact pay attention to a representative’s every action, but 
even in doing so, the constituents’ opinion is unlikely to change with respect to how he 
or she feels toward the representative.  They may only accept information they feel is 
consistent with their previously held beliefs of the representative and his or her position 
on the issue (Zaller 1992).   
The same may be true of the advocates of the representative, who, even if 
paying close attention to what their representative says, may also only accept 
information that is strongly consistent with how they view the representative.  
Advocates for the representative may also pay close attention to representative action, 
as conceptualized by Arnold’s attentive citizenry (1990), but advocates are also unlikely 
to change their opinions about the representative, as they will continue to support him 
or her under almost any circumstance.  These active citizens are the ones that the 
representative is most likely to be aware of; as Miler (2007) indicates, “Legislative 
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offices are more likely to see those constituents who contact them and who make 
financial contributions” (598).   
However, the same cannot be said for potential voters who are skeptical of the 
representative and his or her actions.  Such potentials may not have as strong a stance 
toward the representative prior to receiving each additional piece of information, such 
that when they receive new information, they are much more skeptical and less willing 
to accept it.  In essence, potentials, unlike advocates and opposed constituents, may be 
unaware or unwilling to accept new information until they are spurred to action by a 
specific message from the representative.  How, then, will representatives address 
potentials when speaking on the floor?  
On the one hand, representatives could view their floor speeches as a means of 
reaching out to potentials.  They could state information that they believe potentials will 
accept more eagerly because of how salient such information could be.  For instance, 
they could choose to discuss unemployment issues if they know the issue is of great 
concern to citizens of their district under the supposition that such potential voters are 
more likely to readily accept information on unemployment issues if the information fits 
their beliefs.   
On the other hand, representatives could view floor speeches as an obsolete 
method of winning over potentials.  They may assume that the costs associated with 
winning over potential voters in giving a floor speech are too high if, in doing so, the 
result is that they hinder their position and standing within their own party. 
Representatives may view towing the party line as necessary in floor speeches, as their 
colleagues are their direct audience.  Dodd (1977) asserts that Congress is a collection 
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of individuals in search of power, and he asserts that the committee system is a means 
of doing so. Other representatives have come to use floor speeches as a means to bolster 
their position within their party to gain power, particularly in light of the increasing 
partisan nature of the body (Binder 1997). 
Maltzman and Sigelman (1996) conduct a study of floor speeches and determine 
that when members are given unconstrained time they use it to advance a policy or 
political position rather than to benefit their potential electoral circumstances.  When 
examining one-minute speeches, their findings were similar though they suggested a 
greater use of shorter speeches by lesser-known members than by party leaders.  The 
research here utilizes all floor speeches, whether unconstrained or limited in time, to 
determine whether members are in fact merely seeking to advance themselves within 
the institution or to reach out to constituents. 
Members may act under the assumption that potentials are unlikely to have the 
time to attend to all of their floor speeches.  They may be aware that some potentials 
may watch but may presume that the percentage of overall potential voters is small, and 
unlikely to be won over just by a single floor speech. Therefore, a member may view 
floor speeches as more beneficial to their career to speak directly to their colleagues and 
gain status within their party or within the chamber. 
 Congressional floor speeches were examined to analyze how individual 
representatives speak on economic issues.  The way in which representatives speak on 
unemployment, foreclosure, and bankruptcy issues when addressing the chamber 
signifies how the member may be acting when constituents are less likely to pay 
attention to their representative’s behavior.  Thus, this research codes the way each 
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representative speaks on these economic issues in an attempt to understand 
representative action at different levels of visibility. 
 Floor speeches are not a frequently used measure of legislative activity except as 
a count variable (coded as the total number of speeches) or as a count in conjunction 
with other legislative variables as a measure of member activity (e.g., Krutz 2005; 
Moore and Thomas 1991).  In an assessment of Senate floor speeches, Godbout and Yu 
(2009) state, “Unlike in the roll call analyses, we actually know very little about the 
content of speeches simply because speech as data – as opposed to legislative voting – 
contains too much information.  The sheer volume of text produced on the floor of 
Congress renders any attempt to organize and analyze this data extremely difficult” 
(188). 
 Literature that utilizes floor speeches as an independent variable often produces 
mixed findings with respect to whether floor speeches hurt or help the legislative 
success of a bill (Moore and Thomas 1991).  Anderson et al. (2003) suggest that 
members who speak on the floor at a moderate rate gain the most in terms of legislative 
reward.  Those representatives who seldom speak and those representatives who speak 
too often are not met with the same level of success. 
Some scholars have examined floor speeches and how they relate to constituent 
support.  Box-Steffensmeier et al. (2003) use floor speaking as a variable in their 
analysis of electoral advantage but choose to take the log of this count variable, as they 
indicate that there are a large number of floor speeches given by House leadership.  
They indicate that “members can garner media coverage and constituency recognition 
through this activity” (262).  However, they choose to look at floor speeches as a 
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symbolic indicator and therefore do not examine actual member discourse on the issue.  
Nonetheless, their findings indicate that those members giving a larger number of floor 
speeches had less constituent support in the following election. Other studies have 
examined the influence of electoral margins on floor speeches and found mixed results; 
Morris (2001) found a relationship between these variables whereas Maltzman and 
Sigelman (1996) concluded that no such relationship exists. 
Scholars more frequently analyze the policy content of speeches offered in 
committee hearings, utilizing the work of work of Baumgartner and Jones (1993).  Due 
to the vast nature of their Hearings Data Set within their Policy Agendas Data Project, 
scholars have been able to utilize data on hearings in their examinations of Congress 
(e.g., Leech et al. 2005).  For instance, the work of Whitford and Yates (2003) utilizes 
this dataset in examining the U.S. Attorney’s agenda for drug policy.  While their 
primary variable of interest deals with presidential rhetoric, they employ the Hearings 
Data Set to control for congressional attentiveness toward the issue, but find that the 
president is the one directly responsible for influencing bureaucratic attention. 
 
Dependent Variables 
 In order to code the statements representatives make in floor speeches, I 
examined the Congressional Record and coded each representative’s statements 
according to the primary and secondary frame he or she used when speaking on the 
matter.  Issue framing is a useful research technique and while it is often used for 
studying how the media frames an issue for public consumption (e.g., Iyengar 1990), 
other scholars have used it as a means for understanding public policy.  For instance, 
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Lau and Schlesinger (2005) examined how cognitive frames of a given policy influence 
public support for that policy.  Lau and Schlesinger interviewed members of the general 
public to find that policy metaphors, meaning constructed ideas individuals held about 
institutions based on an ideal type, constrained their beliefs regardless of their level of 
sophistication. 
 Jacoby (2000) discusses how issue framing can be more broadly or narrowly 
defined by different elites who are attempting to control the political discourse on the 
issue of government spending.  Not only is he able to clearly indicate the differing 
frames that Republicans and Democrats champion on the issue (indicating Republicans 
make use of a more general frame), but he also shows how these frames influence 
citizen attitudes: “Differing frames produce widespread changes in the ways that people 
respond to a single issue, with systematically lower support for government spending in 
the general presentation and greater support in the specific frame” (763).  In short, issue 
framing is of critical importance to convey a clear message.  Even if the constituency is 
unaware of this message, the representative is still utilizing a frame to indicate his or her 
beliefs concerning the matter and supporting one stance over another. 
Unlike research that examines the effects of framing (e.g., Nelson and Oxley 
1999), I seek to understand which representatives are utilizing what specific frames and 
to examine which factors influence this choice.  In other words, rather than 
investigating the influence of issue frames, my research attempts to examine what 
influences the choice of frames a representative uses.  Specifically, are district 
characteristics influencing how a given representative speaks on the issue at hand?  In 
order to create methodologically rigorous frames, it was first necessary to examine the 
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framing of these issues when they are not being addressed by members of Congress.  
Therefore, an examination of interest groups’ position papers, adopted policy stances, 
and publications helped provide information to determine what frames should be 
utilized when assessing representative’s private statements. 
The following steps were taken to understand and code the way in which 
representatives speak on the floor on unemployment, foreclosure, and bankruptcy 
issues: 
(1) Create a broad list of economic interest groups. 
(2) Classify these interest groups according to their issue (Appendix: Interest Group 
Classification). 
(3) Within each category, select two interest groups. 
(4) Examine these interest groups websites, position papers, adopted policy 
statements, and publications. 
(5) Identify frames on the basis of the stance of interest groups toward the issue. 
(6) Examine floor speeches and code each representative according to his or her 
primary frame and secondary frame. 
 As shown in the Appendix: Economic Interest Groups, a large number of 
interest groups were selected on the basis of information available from the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development’s list of “Public Interest Groups”, from Project 
VoteSmart, and the National Journal’s Almanac of American Politics.  Thus, these 
interest groups are widely regarded as important in their respective area of expertise and 
should represent a broad range of opinions on a given issue.  From this large list, the 
websites of each of these interest groups was inspected to determine not only the 
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issue(s) that are of importance to the given interest group, but also where the interest 
group stands on the issue(s).   
 These interest groups were classified regarding where they stand on the issue as 
shown in Appendix: Interest Group Classification.  Such classifications were 
determined on the basis of the information on the interest groups mission statement, 
areas of interest, and published works.  On the basis of these classifications, two interest 
groups were selected from each category and every attempt was made to ensure that one 
of these groups was more research-oriented while the other focused largely on 
advocacy.  Thus, the following interest groups were selected for each issue area: 
 
 Unemployment 
o Pro-Worker: Center for Budget and Policy Priorities; AFL-CIO 
o Neutral: Brookings Institution; Committee for Economic Development 
o Pro-Business: Heritage Foundation; National Federation of Independent 
Businesses 
 Foreclosures 
o Pro-Buyer: Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies; National 
Housing and Rehabilitation Association 
o Neutral: Brookings Institution; National Association of Mortgage 
Professionals 
o Pro-Market: Cato Institute; Fannie Mae 
 Bankruptcy 
o Pro-Consumer: Economic Policy Institute; U.S. PIRG 
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o Neutral: Brookings Institution; Concord Coalition 
o Pro-Banking: Heritage Foundation; Americans for Tax Reform 
Thus, selection of these interest groups was based on: whether the group was advocacy 
or research-focused, the size of the group, the reputation of the group, as well as the 
group’s influence. 
Information on these interest groups’ websites was thoroughly examined and 
key words and phrases were identified to help in the designation of frames.  This 
purposive sampling of interest groups is designed for interpretive validity such that the 
frames established by this examination of interest groups will be illustrative of the 
opinions on the issue.  Once these frames were established, representatives’ floor 
speeches were coded on the basis of the primary and secondary frame they are using 
when discussing these economic policy issues.   
Thus, the frames that were established are a product of the information each of 
the six selected interest groups (per issue area) present on their websites.  Because these 
interest groups were selected on the basis of their stances on the issue, the groups 
represent a broad range of opinions on the issue.  Therefore, the frames articulated 
represent a wide range of positions on the issue on the basis of the differing opinions 
these interest groups hold.  Selecting interest groups at random would not present the 
same variety of opinions that are provided using such a purposive sampling technique.  
In using this purposive sampling technique, the frames that are used to examine floor 
speeches should represent a wide array of representative’s possible opinions.  The 





 Responsibility Frame: Unemployment is the result of a weak welfare state.  
Assistance for those who are unemployed is our societal obligation.  The 
government should aid those in need. 
 
 Individuality Frame: Our economy was designed based on the concept of a free 
market; therefore, unemployment is an individual problem.  Laziness and lack of 
ambition contribute to an individual’s unemployed status.  It is not the 
responsibility of the government to help those without jobs.   
 
 Corporate Self-Interest Frame: Corporations have become too greedy, resulting 
in large layoffs and an increasing number of unemployed individuals.  If 
corporations were less concerned with their bottom line, unemployment would 
not be as large of an issue in our country. 
 
 Market Frame: The recent recession hurt our entire economy and made a large 
dent in our unemployment rate.  Capitalism was designed to self-correct when 
the economy is poor.  When the market improves, so will the unemployment 
rate. 
 
 Small Government Frame: The government is overstepping its bounds by 
reaching over into the private sector and attempting to control corporations.  
Corporations have had to let employees go as a result of government-enforced 
policies.  If the government would leave corporations to their own devices, the 





 Responsibility Frame: The increase in foreclosed homes is the result of the 
government’s inability to design and execute policy to aid homeowners.  It is 
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therefore the government’s responsibility to assist those who have had their 
homes foreclosed. 
 
 Individuality Frame: Our economy was designed based on the free market; 
therefore, home foreclosure is an individual problem.  Mismanagement of 
finances results in home foreclosure.  It is not the responsibility of the 
government to help individuals those without jobs maintain ownership of their 
homes.   
 
 Corporate Self-Interest Frame: The mortgage industry has become too greedy, 
resulting in a large number of foreclosures.  If the mortgage industry was less 
concerned with their bottom line, the foreclosure rate would not be nearly as 
high as it is. 
 
 Market Frame: The recent recession hurt our entire economy and made a large 
contribution to our unemployment rate.  Capitalism was designed to self-correct 
when the economy is poor.  When the market improves, so will the 
unemployment rate. 
 
 Small Government Frame: The government is overstepping its bounds by 
reaching over into the private sector and attempting to control the mortgage 
industry.  The mortgage industry feels pressure from the government, which 
results in a large number of foreclosed homes.  The government should not 





 Responsibility Frame: Bankruptcy is the result of poor government regulations 
that allow for individuals to lose their savings.  Those who are bankrupt need 
governmental assistance to get back on their feet. 
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 Individuality Frame: Bankruptcy is an individual problem and society should 
not be responsible for helping those who are unable to pay their bills.  
Individuals should be more conscientious of their money. 
 
 Corporate Self-Interest Frame: Banks have become too greedy and are 
irresponsible in looking after individual’s money, resulting in bankruptcy.  If 
banks were less concerned with their bottom line and more concerned with their 
clients, there would be fewer individuals going bankrupt. 
 
 Market Frame: The recent recession hurt our entire economy and resulted in a 
large number of individuals going bankrupt.  Capitalism was designed to self-
correct when the economy is poor.  When the market improves, so will the 
bankruptcy rate. 
 
 Small Government Frame: The government is overstepping its bounds by 
attempting to regulate the banking sector.  Banks feel pressure from the 
government, which results in a large number of bankruptcies.  The government 
should not attempt to control the actions of banks. 
 
Because each issue is rooted in economic circumstances, the resulting frames are 
fairly consistent from one issue to the next.  An example of the market frame as it 
pertains to foreclosure issues can be found in a floor speech given by Congresswoman 
Judy Biggert (R-IL) on March 16, 2011 in which she stated,  
I have been listening to all of this, and I think that everybody knows, we all want 
to get the housing market back on track. We all want to be able to help those that 
are in trouble. But many of my colleagues on the other side have said that if you 
end these programs there will be nothing, and that’s just not true. Of the 4.1 
million mortgage modifications that were completed, 3.5 million were done by 
the private sector with no government program and not a dime from the 
taxpayers. So there is a market out there.  
 
In advocating for the private sector over government intervention, the Congresswoman 
is clearly articulating the market frame more so than any other.   
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An example of the responsibility frame on the unemployment issue can be found 
in a speech given by Congressman John Tierney (D-MA) on March 1, 2007 in which he 
states, “It is the policy of the United States to protect the exercise of workers of full 
freedom of association. It is the policy of the United States to protect their self-
organizing and their ability to designate representatives of their own choosing.”  
Congressman Tierney is indicating that it is a governmental responsibility to protect 
workers. 
The corporate self-interest frame on the bankruptcy issue can be seen in a 
speech given by Congresswoman Barbara Lee (D-CA) who states, “Make no mistake, 
Mr. Speaker, this bill is a big-time corporate payoff that was drafted with one overriding 
goal in mind, that is, profits, profits, profits.”  The Congresswoman makes it clear that 
she believes corporations are solely concerned with their bottom-line, indicating that the 
proposed legislation “puts corporate greed over fairness for ordinary folks.”   
Rather than include all members of Congress in the data collection process, only 
those members who serve (or previously served) on the Financial Services and 
Education and Labor committees were included.  These committees were selected 
because members on these committees are most likely to have previously heard the 
relevant legislation or legislation similar in nature in their committee hearings.  
Committee members are more likely to be granted the opportunity to make floor 
speeches because debate time is limited and distributed selectively by party leaders.  
Weingast and Marshall (1988) suggest that members of these committees may be 
preference outliers; thus, if any representative is likely to take a stance on these issues it 
would likely be these members. 
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 Table 4.1 indicates the prevalence of each of these frames by economic issue 
area over the four Congresses studied. The vast majority of representatives utilized the 
responsibility or individuality frame on unemployment across all of the Congresses.  
Members who did not articulate a frame usually did not discuss the given economic 
issue within the period under study.  Interestingly, there was a rise in the usage of the 
market frame as a primary unemployment frame in the 112
th
 Congress.  While the 




 Congresses, it showed 
a decline in the 112
th
, as did the small government frame.  Given that the economy was 
starting to recover and the unemployment rate was falling during the 112
th
 Congress, 
this pattern is not surprising.  As previously shown in Table 1.1, the unemployment rate 
rose consistently from 2005 until 2010 before dipping in 2011. 
[INSERT TABLE 4.1 HERE] 
Notably, the number of representatives articulating no frame whatsoever 
declined from 12+% in the 109
th
 Congress to no members at all in the 112
th
.  Clearly 
over this time the unemployment issue gained a great deal of attention such that not 
only was it frequently addressed on the floor but members took notice and felt it 
necessary to take a stance on the issue.  The small size of the small government frame 
as a primary unemployment frame (and, to a lesser extent, as a secondary frame) 
indicates that even when members were taking a stance on this issue, they were not 
indicating a need for unemployment to be addressed in some way through government 
policy. 
It is worth noting how predominant taking a stance on these issues is on the 
floor, as the previous findings (which do utilize a different sample) suggested that many 
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representatives were unlikely to articulate a stance on these issues on their personal 
websites.  Thus, while representatives may be unwilling to clearly define their position 
in a place and manner constituents are likely to access it, they are more than willing to 
take a stance when it comes to speaking on the floor of the House where their 
colleagues are likely to take note of their speeches (but their constituents may be less 
aware).   
 Similar to the unemployment frames, the primary frames articulated on the 
foreclosure issue also appear to be the responsibility and individuality frames, both of 
which showed a general increase in usage over time.  The market frame also indicated 
an increase in usage as the primary frame, as the number of members not articulating a 
position declined drastically from roughly 75% in the 109
th
 Congress to 6% in the 112
th
, 
a decrease of 92% over just four Congresses.  While the frequently used secondary 
frames are similar to those utilized with the unemployment issue, it is the case that with 
the foreclosure issue there is a slightly greater usage of the small government frame.  
 The bankruptcy issue appears similar to the unemployment and foreclosure 
issues when examining the change in members’ willingness to employ a frame in their 
discussion of the issue.  To a greater extent than is apparent with the other economic 
issues, the responsibility and individuality frames are employed as primary frames, as 
by the 112
th
 Congress, a full 71% of members are utilizing one of these two frames.  
Similarly, the corporate self-interest and market frames also dominate as secondary 
frames in discussion of bankruptcy issues. 
 Therefore, regardless of which economic issue representatives are discussing, 
they are most likely to employ a frame that either emphasizes the societal obligation of 
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helping those individuals who are less fortunate or one that stresses that our economy is 
based on a free market system. In conjunction with these frames, they are additionally 
likely to articulate either that capitalistic greed has resulted in a weak economy or that 
capitalism has a self-correcting mechanism.  The small government frame, which 
articulates no government involvement, was utilized the least of all frames.  
 In order to delve deeper into understanding who is utilizing which frames, Table 
4.2 breaks down the primary and secondary frames of each economic issue based on 
political party.  Unsurprisingly, there is a strong divide over which party utilizes which 
frame.  When discussing unemployment, Democrats overwhelmingly used the 
responsibility frame as their primary frame and the corporate self-interest as their 
secondary frame.  Republicans weren’t nearly as consistent in their use of one frame, 
though more than half of them did utilize the individuality frame as their primary frame 
when discussing foreclosure issues and almost half of them used the market frame as 
their secondary frame.  The strong divide between Republicans and Democrats is 
present in many representatives speeches, as they often indicate their concern for 
actions made by the opposing party.  For instance, on July 17, 2011, Paul Ryan (R-WI) 
stated,  
Mr. Speaker, it has been 811 days since they bothered trying to pass a budget. 
Congress has gone for 2 years without a budget. What did we do when we 
assumed the majority? We passed a budget. We wrote a budget. We did it in 
daylight, not in the backroom. We drafted it. We brought it through the 
committee. We had amendments. We brought it to the floor. We debated it and 
we passed it. That is what we’ve done. 
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This example is illustrative of the partisan rhetoric representatives’ use on the floor, as 
Congressman Ryan is contrasting the effectiveness of the Republican party with his 
perceived effectiveness of the Democratic party. 
[INSERT TABLE 4.2 HERE] 
 Results for the foreclosure issue on the basis of party appear to be somewhat 
different than do the results for unemployment.  Over 40% of Democrats did not utilize 
a primary frame or secondary frame while slightly less than 40% of Republicans did not 
do so either.  As with the unemployment issue, Democrats again utilized the 
responsibility and corporate self-interest frames overwhelmingly as their primary and 
secondary frames, respectively.  Nearly 40% of Democrats indicated a position in line 
with the responsibility frame while roughly 15% employed the corporate self-interest 
frame.  On the other hand, Republicans were more likely to employ the individuality 
and market frames.  For instance, 34% of Republicans addressed the chamber on 
foreclosure issues using the individuality frame but nearly 23% did so using the market 
frame.   
 We next turn our attention to the results for the bankruptcy issue which, in many 
ways, is similar to the results for foreclosure and unemployment issues; however, on the 
bankruptcy issue not only is there a clear frame used as primary and secondary for the 
Democrats (responsibility and corporate self-interest), but there also is for the 
Republicans.  While on the unemployment and foreclosure issues, the Republicans 
generally used the individuality frame as their primary frame, they also frequently used 
the market frame, but such is less the case with the bankruptcy issue, in which the 
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individuality frame is used at a higher rate.  Again, the market frame predominated as 
their secondary frame. 
The classification of the frames categorizes them into separate categories which 
have no intrinsic order or ranking, thus necessitating multinomial logistic regression 
which is preferred to ordinal logistic regression (Campbell and Donner 1989).  Wang 
(2005) indicates that the usage of multinomial logistic regression, stating “Unlike a 
binary logistic model, in which a dependent variable has only a binary choice (e.g., 
presence/absence of a characteristic), the dependent variable in a multinomial logistic 
regression model can have more than two choices that are coded categorically” (664).  
Thus, in order to analyze these frames as dependent variables, multinomial logistic 
regression was employed due to the fact that the dependent variable was polytomous.  
Multinomial logistic regression allows for the prediction of a polytomous dependent 
variable, as found in the frames variables, using both continuous and categorical 
predictor variables (Bull and Donner 1987).   
Given the complexity of the statistical model, which includes a relatively large 
number of predictor variables, a cumulative link function was chosen for estimation and 
tests of significance.  Such a link function estimated membership in a category as a 
function of the cumulative likelihoods of a given category of the outcome relative to the 
cumulative likelihood of the remaining categories.  As such, it assumes a “constant” 
degree or amount of change moving from category to category.  The generalized 
multinomial logit model and its results are considered later in this chapter. 
The models utilize the independent variables discussed in Chapter 2, including 
the variables created from the factor analysis, and how they are related to the primary 
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and secondary issue frame for each of the three issue areas (a total of six dependent 
variables).  Once again, the predictor variables of interest include key district 
characteristics (both factor scores for economic circumstances and the electoral 
margin), variables indicating characteristics of the demographic makeup of the district, 
characteristics of the representative, and characteristics of the previous election. 
 
 
Discussion of Findings 
The findings from the multinomial logistic regression for both the primary and 
secondary frames appear in Table 4.3.  These findings indicate that none of the key 
factors managed to reach significance though several did reach marginal significance.  
Representative’s floor speeches are not related to the economic concerns of their 
constituents, as both the personal financial insecurity and macro-economic stress factors 
did not reach significance at the p<.05 level.  The personal financial insecurity factor 
did reach marginal significance (p<.10) on the unemployment and foreclosure primary 
frames, indicating there may be a slight relationship between constituents personal 
economic well-being and their representatives most prominent articulation of these 
economic issues.  The margin by which the representative defeated his or her challenger 
in the previous election is not related to how he or she speaks on the floor.  
[INSERT TABLE 4.3 HERE] 
Odds ratio estimates (Tables 4.4-4.9) indicate that the personal financial 
insecurity factor increases to the greatest extent of nearly every variable when 
comparing across frames articulated.  Odds ratios indicate the likelihood of each of 
 91 
these predictor variables causing a change in the frame utilized by representatives.  For 
instance, on the foreclosure issue, movement of the primary frame utilized by a 
representative causes a change of 1.363 on the personal financial insecurity factor (but 
only 1.003 on the macro-economic stress factor). 
[INSERT TABLE 4.4 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 4.5 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 4.6 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 4.7 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 4.8 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 4.9 HERE] 
 
Because representatives may not view floor speeches as a public forum, they are 
unlikely to view their audience as their constituents but instead as their fellow members 
of Congress.  Therefore, when addressing the chamber, the concerns their constituents 
face are much less likely to factor into what they say than when they are addressing 
their constituents directly and appealing to them for electoral support. 
The 112
th
 Congress appears to be significantly different than the 109
th
 Congress 
almost across the board with respect to the frames representatives are articulating, and 
in many cases the 112
th
 Congress is different than the 110
th
 Congress.  This difference 
could largely be a result of the recession, as representatives were less likely to discuss 




 Congresses than in the 112
th
, when the recession had 
already taken its toll and the economy was attempting to recover.  Such an assertion is 
supported by the fact that the frames for unemployment are not as significant as those 
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for foreclosures and bankruptcy.  Unemployment is often discussed even when the 
economy is not doing poorly; therefore, even in the earlier Congresses, members were 
more likely to take a stance on this issue within the confines of one of the frames than 
they were on bankruptcy and foreclosure issues. 
For the most part, the district and election characteristics fail to reach 
significance, with a few exceptions in the secondary frames of election characteristics.  
However, the same is not true for the member characteristics in which the party variable 
appears to significantly predict all the primary frames and the bankruptcy secondary 
frame.  While those representatives who did not speak on the issue (and were therefore 
coded accordingly) were fairly evenly split across both parties, the five primary frames 
of interest were each very much so divided along party lines, as shown in Table 4.2 
above.  With respect to the frames on each of the economic issues, the individuality and 
market frames were almost entirely the product of Republican representatives while the 
responsibility and corporate self-interest frames were primarily, if not entirely, utilized 
by Democrats.  The small government frame was employed by more Republicans than 
Democrats but was much less partisan than the other frames.  As shown in Tables 4.3, 
party was a strong predictor (p<.001 and p<.05) when it came to four of the six 
dependent variables. 
 One of the reasons for creating the frames on the basis of interest and research 
group stances was to attempt to remove the partisan element, such that the frames could 
hypothetically be employed by members of both parties.  However, recent research 
suggests that the party itself is more far-reaching than is generally viewed and thus 
encompasses such groups (Koger, Masket, and Noel 2009).  While the use of frames did 
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appear to be highly partisan, more than one frame for each of the two major parties was 
utilized, making the use of frames more detailed than would have been examining the 
extent to which the representative took a traditional party stance on the issues, which 
would have been merely dichotomous.  Nonetheless, when speaking on the floor it is 
quite clear that one of the primary drivers of the stance the representative takes is the 
party to which he or she belongs. 
 To determine whether the findings would differ over the four Congresses 
examined, Appendix: Speeches by Congress shows similar analyses broken down by 
Congress.  Interestingly, the only variable found to be significant was the party variable 
in the 112
th
 Congress, as all other variables in each of the Congresses failed to reach 
significance or even marginal significance.  Findings from this analysis revealed little 
difference when examining frames articulated divided by Congress likely because a 
great deal of variability was removed from the analysis. 
 I again conducted a multiple-df contrast utilizing the Wald χ
2
 test for each 
respective set of independent variables.  Again, these tests examine the ability of each 
of the four conceptual sets of independent variables (key factors, district characteristics, 
member characteristics, and election characteristics) to predict a dependent variable, 
within the context of the entire model.  Thus, it is a simultaneous test of whether the 
respective set of estimates within a set equal zero.   Unsurprisingly, the member 
characteristics variable set was highly significant nearly across the board, likely as a 
result of the strong relationship between the party variable and the outcome variables.  
Interestingly, for both primary and secondary frames, this variable set was not 
significant for foreclosure issues.   
 94 
[INSERT TABLE 4.10 HERE] 
 One possible explanation is that the Congress in which the representative was 
addressing foreclosure issues appears highly significant in Table 4.3, which could mean 
that member characteristics as a whole are less predictive on the foreclosure issues.  
Election characteristics variables did reach marginal significance on unemployment 
primary frames and foreclosure secondary frames, likely due to the labor PAC 
contributions variable. 
As noted previously, the multinomial regression used to fit the model utilized 
the cumulative logit function, which was chosen for its simplicity in the face of a 
complex statistical model.  Results of fitting the same model with the assumption of 
generalized logits can be seen in Appendix: Generalized Odds Ratio Estimates for Floor 
Speeches.  As seen in this Appendix, the number of parameters estimated in the 
generalized logit model has increased fivefold over the number of parameters found in 
the cumulative logit function model, and a number of the estimates correspondingly 
appear unstable.  Thus, although the generalized logit model may be the preferred 
model in the abstract, it is too complex to fit the observed data without some degree of 
uncertainty about the stability of the solutions.  However, a comparison of findings 
reported in Tables 4.4-4-9 to those findings reported in the Appendix do show 
considerable consistency.   
 
Conclusion 
 It was previously hypothesized that district economic characteristics variables 
and the election margin variable would not influence representative’s floor speeches.  
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This finding is generally confirmed across all economic issue areas studied.  The actual 
economic circumstances of the district appear to have little relationship to what 
members are saying on the floor, as shown by the inability of the marco-economic 
stress and personal financial insecurity factors to reach significance.  Additionally, the 
representative’s previous electoral margin of victory did not appear to impact the 
content through which he or she addresses colleagues on the floor. 
 Floor debate clearly features party debate.  Rather, than speaking on behalf of 
their constituents, representatives appeared to be speaking to their colleagues.   Rhetoric 
and the framing of issues on the floor appear to reinforce party positions and create the 
notion that the other party was at fault for their actions.  As the results from the 
statistical analyses show, the framing of these economic issues changed to some extent 
over time, indicating that as the recession became more widespread, representative’s 
party positions intensified when addressing the chamber.  
 Salience of these economic issues may lead representatives to be more aware of 
the content of their floor speeches, as parts of their statements could be featured on 
nightly news programs; however, representatives appear to remain unconcerned or 
unconvinced of this reality.  Representatives did discuss these issues more as time went 
on, likely because they became increasingly more salient from the 109
th
 to the 112
th
 
Congress and discussion of them became unavoidable.   
While representatives often took a party-line stance on their websites, in floor 
speeches the direct audience may be viewed as other members of the House, given that 
they are the individuals present on the floor of the House.  Thus, the expectation is that 
representatives will tailor their message to reflect their own party position, as findings 
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confirm.  As members of their party, including more senior members and leadership, 
may be the direct audience of these floor speeches, representatives may see such 
speeches as their opportunity to gain standing within the party.  They may see the 
avenue to gaining standing within their party as supporting a position that the party will 
view positively, particularly in light of the fact that floor speeches are largely party-
controlled.  In general, party leaders hold sway when it comes to deciding who within 
their party can address specific issues.   
By virtually ignoring constituent needs, representatives showed little to no 
concern for potential constituents, as they did not attempt to reach out to voters to gain 
their support.  Their rhetoric was very much that of a party-line stance, often 
aggressively so, rather than one meant to appeal to voters.  However, it could be said 
that such messages are meant to maintain the support of advocate. 
Utilizing frames was an attempt to remove the partisan element from the 
discussion of these economic issues, but findings confirmed that, in general, these 
frames were divided along party lines. Rather than viewing their time on the floor as an 
opportunity to openly debate a topic, my analysis of representative speeches revealed 
that they saw such floor time as an opportunity to attack the opposing party above all 





Chapter 5: How a Representative Acts Legislatively 
John Conyers’ (D-MI) district has one of the highest unemployment rates in the 
country.  Congressman Conyers has been in office since 1965; from 1965-1993 he 
represented Michigan’s 1
st
 district, then from 1993, following redistricting as a result of 
Michigan losing a congressional district, until the present, he has represented the 14
th
 
district.  His current district, Michigan’s 14
th
 district, includes the majority of Detroit, 





Congress, Congressman Conyers’ district had the second-highest unemployment rate in 
the country; second only to Michigan’s 13
th
 district, which also includes areas of 
Detroit.  
[INSERT TABLE 5.1 HERE] 
Congressman Conyers is one of the most legislatively active members of the 
House on economic issues.  As shown in Table 5.1, the Congressman sponsors and co-
sponsors legislation on unemployment issues much more so than the average member, 
and is often one of the leading members in terms of his legislative productivity in such 
areas.  While not shown in this table, Conyers sponsors and co-sponsors legislation with 
similar frequency compared to his colleagues on both foreclosure and bankruptcy 
issues.  The Congressman frequently sponsors and co-sponsors more pro-worker 
legislation than he does neutral legislation, but never is active in sponsoring or co-
sponsoring pro-business legislation.  Therefore, it can be said that Congressman 
Conyers may be acting on the basis of his constituent’s economic desires when he 
sponsors and co-sponsors legislation.  This chapter will examine how all members act 
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legislatively, with respect to sponsorship and co-sponsorship of economic legislation, in 
regards to their district’s economic circumstances. 
Members of Congress represent their districts in the House of Representatives 
by creating or altering policy through the specific activities of introducing, debating, 
and voting on legislation.  The sponsorship and co-sponsorship of legislation is 
particularly important to understanding how representatives appeal to their constituents. 
Unlike voting, bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship are much stronger indicators of 
support. In contrast with yes-no votes taken on the floor, co-sponsorship of legislation 
indicates specific policy preferences and solutions put forth by a given member.  
Representatives not only choose wisely when attaching their name to legislation but 
they are also able to dictate what is within the legislation rather than merely state a 
preference on the passage of said legislation. 
While legislative sponsorship and co-sponsorship may be seen as similar in 
many ways, this chapter illuminates the different characteristics at play that may 
influence these actions; those factors that influence legislative sponsorship are not the 
same as those that influence co-sponsorship.  Additionally, while the characteristics of 
the district may have previously had little to no influence on representative action, such 
is not the case when we turn our attention to legislative activity.  Nonetheless, member 
characteristics, including the party variable remain the strongest predictor, as has been 
consistently proven to influence member activity. 
 
Literature Review and Theoretical Expectations 
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Much of the literature that examines the relationship between constituent 
opinion and representative action employs the use of roll call votes to examine how well 
a member’s voting corresponds with public opinion at-large.  In many ways, 
sponsorship and co-sponsorship are similar variables to roll call votes, as 
representatives are indicating legislative support for public record through their actions 
(Talbert and Potoski 2002); however, recent scholarship has criticized the way in which 
scholars heavily utilize roll call votes as symbolic of representative action (Clinton 
2007).   
With respect to roll call votes, members generally have to choose to take a 
position on the issue, whereas bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship affords members the 
ability to have a great deal of discretion in attaching their names to a bill (Highton and 
Rocca 2005).  Members have the ability to single-handedly bring to the table their own 
initiative or to join with other members in signifying not only their stance on an issue, 
but the way that issue should be shaped and altered through legislation.  Rocco and 
Gordon (2009) indicate the need to examine legislative activity outside roll call votes, 
stating, “Although non-roll call position taking is difficult to analyze systematically, 
shifting from an exclusive roll call focus is important because a large amount of MC 
position taking does not occur through roll call votes” (388).   
Swers (2005) refers to co-sponsoring legislation as ‘loud voting’ because 
members are indicating their support for a bill above and beyond casting a yes or no 
vote.  When members see legislation that is to their liking, they merely need to ask the 
sponsor of the legislation if they can add their name as a co-sponsor.  In contrast, with 
roll call voting members are forced to take a stance one way or another when in fact 
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their position on the issue may be somewhere in the middle.  Unlike with voting, 
actually attaching one’s name in a sponsorship or co-sponsorship capacity has both 
political and policy implications (Rocco and Gordon 2009).  Members may choose to 
co-sponsor legislation because it can affect the consideration the bill receives from other 
members of the House (Wilson and Young 1997).  Thus, members who choose to attach 
their name to a bill are likely to do so only when they see a positive long-term benefit, 
not necessarily with respect to policy but perhaps with the legislation’s success.   
While co-sponsorship certainly is a strong indicator of representative investment 
and concern about a particular issue, sponsorship is an even greater signaling 
mechanism.  Bill sponsors have the greatest investment in the bill, as they face a 
significant cost in not only researching and writing the legislation, but also in taking a 
political stance on the issue (Schiller 1995).  Bill sponsorship is regarded as a powerful 
tool at a representative’s disposal: “While no one familiar with the congressional scene 
would argue that the passage of one’s own legislation is the only manifestation of power 
in Congress, it surely is one, if not the most important measure” (Frantzich 1979, 411). 
Findings with respect to the signaling influence of sponsorship and co-
sponsorship vary widely.  Some work on co-sponsorship indicates that co-sponsoring a 
bill is in fact a signal to a representative’s constituency (Campbell 1982). Other studies 
of sponsorship and co-sponsorship have found that these legislative actions are more 
influential within the House as signaling devices to other members (Kessler and 
Krehbiel 1996; Schiller 1995); thus, they are not a means to gain electoral advantage 
(Canon 1999; Koger 2003).  Kessler and Krehbiel (1996) state, “it appears that 
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legislators do not use bill co-sponsorship as a mechanism for position taking aimed 
predominately at external audiences” (563).   
In a study of representative legislative action on abortion policy, Highton and 
Rocca (2005) found that constituency characteristics strongly influenced representative 
action.  For example, their findings suggest that Catholic members of Congress are less 
likely to take a position on the issue when their constituency is strongly pro-choice.  
Additionally, they find that members representing districts with a more extreme opinion 
on an issue are more likely to be active on that issue than those members representing 
districts with a more moderate opinion. 
The electoral margin variable is presumed to influence bill sponsorship and co-
sponsorship.  A number of scholars have found that there is no significant relationship 
between these variables (Campbell 1982; Wilson and Young 1997).  Koger (2003) 
found that this relationship only existed as it pertained to insecure first-term members, 
who co-sponsored more legislation than secure first-term members.  Nonetheless, I will 
proceed in examining the dependent variables of sponsorship and co-sponsorship of 
economic legislation to determine how the key factors relating to the district’s economic 




In order to better understand how members are acting legislatively with respect 
to the economic concerns of their constituents, I examine all bills in each of the 
economic issue areas (unemployment, foreclosures, and bankruptcy).  Table 5.2 
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indicates the total number of bills introduced and the number that received floor votes 
per congressional session. 
 [INSERT TABLE 5.2 HERE] 
This table clearly indicates that over the course of the four congresses examined, there 
was a large increase in the number of bills introduced within each of the issue areas 





 Congress, there was a 44.9% increase on unemployment issues, a 76.5% 
increase on foreclosure issues and a 4.2% increase on bankruptcy issues.  Data was only 
collected for the first session of the 112
th
 Congress but it does appear as though the total 
number of bills remains high, though perhaps the full Congress would not be as high as 
the 111
th
.  An increase in floor votes also appears but only on the unemployment and 
foreclosure issues.  Perhaps because the focus of the recession was on wasteful 
spending, lawmakers shifted their attention toward legislation to address such economic 
issues. 
Information pertaining to bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship is publicly 
available through Congress’ THOMAS search engine.  A search in THOMAS for 
unemployment, foreclosure, and bankruptcy bills revealed all legislation that in some 
way pertained to or mentioned these issues.  Each bill was coded according to how it 
would presumably affect populations at risk of unemployment, foreclosures, and 
bankruptcies; the number of bills the representative sponsored and co-sponsored within 
each of those categories was tallied and served as the observation for the variable.  The 
content of each bill pertaining to the specified economic issues was examined to 
determine what impact the proposed legislation would have on those facing economic 
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hardships, whether that impact be to assist such citizens, whether it would have a 
negligible effect on them, or whether the potential existed that it could hinder their 
economic situation further.   
For instance, in the 110
th
 Congress Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA) introduced a 
piece of legislation entitled the Security and Financial Empowerment Act.  This piece of 
legislation was designed to create emergency leave and unemployment compensation 
for employees, specifically workers who had experienced domestic violence.  This 
piece of legislation was coded as positive impact because it is designed to assist workers 
and thus would positively affect them.  On the other hand, in the 111
th
 Congress, Judy 
Biggert (R-IL) introduced the Fairness in Housing Recovery Act of 2009.  This act was 
designed to prohibit homeowners from altering their mortgages and created tougher 
limitations on the mortgage approval process.  Because this legislation worked against 
homeowners and citizens financially struggling, it was coded as negative impact.  
Neutral impact legislation was that which would neither help nor harm those financially 
distressed.  For example, in the 112
th
 Congress, Congressman Tim Bishop (D-NY) 
sponsored the United States Call Center Worker and Consumer Protection Act which 
places requirements on the notification of employees within a given call center if the 
business chooses to relocate.  While this legislation does place restrictions on 
employers, it does not necessarily work to better the state of employees, as did the 
legislation that was coded as positive impact. 
Table 5.3 indicates the number and percentage of bills within each of the coded 
categories.  In general, these tables show an increase in the percentage of bills that, if 






Congresses.  There also appears to be an increase in the total number of bills introduced 
on these economic issues in each Congress from the 109
th
 through the 111
th
, particularly 
bills pertaining to unemployment where there was nearly a 150% increase in the total 
number of bills from the 110
th
 to the 111
th
 Congress.  As news of the widespread 
recession spread in the years in this study, the expectation would be that members 
would respond by introducing more legislation that was favorable to low-income 
populations, which is the general trend that appears above (discounting the 112
th
 
Congress for which only the first session is included).   
 [INSERT TABLE 5.3 HERE] 
However, the expectation would also be that there would be a decline in the 
number of bills introduced that could harm economically vulnerable populations. In the 
case of foreclosure and bankruptcy issues, the negative impact bills followed the 
expected pattern but not so in the case of unemployment issues.  The first session of the 
112
th
 Congress actually includes a greater number of bills that could harm economically 
vulnerable populations than was introduced in any of the preceding Congresses.  Once 
again, of the three economic issues on which this dissertation focuses, unemployment is 
the one to which a large majority of both the public and representatives are likely to pay 
attention.  Representatives who support the free market system may be those who are 
more likely to introduce legislation that could harm at-risk populations, believing that 
they are creating a structure to incentivize such populations to work harder. 
For each representative, the total number of bills he or she sponsored and co-
sponsored within each of these three categories (positive, neutral, negative effects on 
low-income populations) for each issue area (unemployment, foreclosures, bankruptcy) 
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was tallied to create a discrete count variable.  Table 5.4 indicates the total number of 
sponsors and co-sponsors, mean number of members who sponsored and co-sponsored, 
and the range in the number of members who sponsored and co-sponsored 
unemployment, foreclosure and bankruptcy legislation that had a positive, neutral, or 
negative impact on low-income populations and is broken down by party.  
 [INSERT TABLE 5.4 HERE] 
Unsurprisingly, it does appear that there were more members co-sponsoring such 
legislation rather than sponsoring it, as the means and ranges for co-sponsorship are 
generally much larger.  Also, more members sponsor and co-sponsor unemployment 
legislation than foreclosure and bankruptcy legislation, which reinforces the same trend 
already seen with unemployment issues taking precedence over other economic issues. 
 The mean and range also indicate a greater likelihood of Democrats sponsoring 
and co-sponsoring legislation with a positive impact on low-income populations and 
Republicans sponsoring and co-sponsoring legislation that would not aid such citizens.  
For instance, in terms of the mean of co-sponsorship of foreclosure legislation, 
Democratic legislators appear more than 13 times more likely to co-sponsor positive 
impact legislation in comparison to their Republican counterparts.  When it came to the 
mean of negative impact foreclosure legislation, Republicans were at least ten times 
more likely to co-sponsor such legislation compared to Democrats.  Overall, neutral 
legislation seemed somewhat evenly split between Democratic or Republican sponsors 
and cosponsors. 
 However, representatives sometimes chose to buck the party line.  Of all 
congressional districts, Congressman Joe Heck (R-NV) had by far the highest number 
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of foreclosures, with 143.1 per 100,000 people.  The clear message this economic 
indicator sends to Congressman Heck is that his district is highly concerned with the 
effects of the recession, particularly as it relates to homeownership.  On his website, 
Congressman Heck states, 
I voted to maintain the FHA Refinance Program. This program allows for those 
who are current on their mortgages, but underwater, the ability to refinance. On 
March 29, 2011, I voted to protect the Home Affordable Modification program 
(HAMP), a program which provides incentives to mortgage servicers to provide 
loan modifications to troubled borrowers. I voted to protect these programs 
because taking away programs which help homeowners who are trying to do the 
right thing is not the answer. 
Despite his membership in the Republican Party, Congressman Heck indicates support 
for homeownership programs that are much more liberal than would be expected.  Some 
Republicans have strongly opposed the FHA Refinance Program and HAMP to the 
extent that several pieces of legislation have been introduced to try to repeal and 
terminate it.  Congressman Heck is thus going against the view of his own party and 
political beliefs in order to support legislation that he believes his constituents will view 
favorably.   
Facing a tough re-election bid, Congressman Heck called for a Financial 
Services Committee hearing in Las Vegas in March of 2012 on the foreclosure issue.  
Prior to the hearing, Congressman Heck introduced a bill entitled the Second Chance at 
Homeownership Act of 2012 to provide assistance to those constituents who might 
otherwise have difficulty obtaining a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage for a second home.  
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At present, no representative has signed on to co-sponsor this legislation, which may be 
because (a) there have been little attempts to get co-sponsors by Congressman Heck’s 
office or (b) because other representatives aren’t attracted to the legislation.   
Congressman Heck may have introduced this legislation merely to make a 
statement and has not substantially pursued it or attempted to get other members to co-
sponsor it.  Another possibility is that his Republican colleagues are hesitant to sign 
onto such legislation that appears, on its face, to assist those facing financial hardship, 
as the Republican Party has an “anti-handouts” policy.  At the same time, Democrats 
may be hesitant to support such legislation because it does include strict requirements 
for those seeking mortgages, such as: proving they are income-eligible for the home, 
showing evidence of rent paid for at least the 12 months prior, and ensuring the 
mortgage payment would be no more than the current amount of rent paid.  Democrats 
may favor less stringent policies toward giving homeowners a second chance and may 
therefore be fearful of such expectations.  However, given that no Dear Colleague letter 
has been written by Congressman Heck’s office and sent out to other members of 
Congress it an attempt to garner co-sponsors and support, it seems likely that the former 
is the case, as he is not trying to seek co-sponsors but merely introduced the legislation 
to signal constituents and help maintain re-election support. 
In order to further analyze the sponsorship and co-sponsorship variables, first 
the simple Pearson product-moment correlations among the variables will be examined, 
as was the case in Chapter 3.  These correlation coefficients indicate the strength and 
direction of the relationships between the variables.  Furthermore, in order to determine 
the magnitude and significance of the effects of variables on the sponsorship and co-
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sponsorship dependent variables, a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) was 
utilized.  This model uses maximum likelihood estimation and ensures the repeated 
factor of Congress is properly taken into account.  GLMM adds a random term to the 
standard linear predictor (Breslow and Clayton 1993).  According to McCulloch (1997), 
“GLMM's enable the accommodation of non-normally distributed responses and 
specification of a possibly nonlinear link between the mean of the response and the 
predictors, and they can model over-dispersion and correlation by incorporating random 
effects” (162). 
Nonetheless, for every economic issue area it was not possible to statistically 
analyze each sponsorship and co-sponsorship dependent variable, due to the fact that 
there were often very few bills that could be coded for a given dependent variable.  For 
instance, there were few bills pertaining to the bankruptcy issue leaving few to be coded 
by representative as per the bankruptcy dependent variables.  As a result, the analyses of 
these dependent variables often were unable to converge when they were analyzed.  
Additionally, the models concerning representative sponsorship and co-sponsorship of 
economically-neutral legislation were often of little added value given that little could 
be said about how the predictors influenced such legislation.   
For those dependent variables for which the models were unable to converge, 
the frequencies appear in Appendix: Frequencies of Legislative Activity Dependent 
Variables.  As previously indicated, these tables show that the vast majority of 
representatives did not sponsor co-sponsor any legislation on the economic issue 
studied, which is likely why there was difficulty analyzing such data.  For these 
particular dependent variables, representatives were re-coded  dichotomously according 
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to whether or not they sponsored or co-sponsored any legislation whatsoever on the 
economic issue of interest (rather than a count of how many bills they sponsored or co-
sponsored) such that logistic regression could be utilized.  The findings for these 
variables appear in Appendix: Logistic Regression of Legislative Activity Dependent 
Variables.  Results from these analyses parallel the findings discussed below, and so are 
not otherwise presented. 
 
Discussion of Findings 
 Findings with respect to the correlations between bill sponsorship and other 
variables appear in Table 5.5.  As shown at the top of the table, in general there appears 
to be a trend in which those representatives sponsoring legislation that has a positive 
impact on economically vulnerable populations in one economic area are significantly 
likely to do so in another.  To a lesser extent, the same may be true of those 
representatives who sponsor legislation that negatively impacts those economically 
disadvantaged.  However, overall, there does not appear to be a strong relationship 
between those sponsoring positive and negative impact legislation, as none of these 
variables reached significance with p<.1. 
[INSERT TABLE 5.5 HERE] 
 Interestingly, this pattern does not hold when we turn our attention to the 
relationship between bill sponsorship and bill co-sponsorship.  Regardless of economic 
issue area or whether the impact was positive or negative, a significant relationship does 
appear to occur between sponsorship and co-sponsorship. In many instances the size of 
this relationship was fairly small, although still significant; regardless, it does indicate 
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an inverse relationship between positive impact sponsorship bills and negative impact 
co-sponsorship bills and vice versa. It is also worth noting that those who sponsor or co-
sponsor more positive impact bills are less likely to sponsor or co-sponsor negative 
impact bills, generally an inverse relationship.   
 An examination of the relationship between bill sponsorship variables and the 
dependent variables in Chapter 3 (website issue position and visibility) revealed some 
significant relationships, although the size of the correlations appeared fairly small, 
particularly with respect to the issue position articulated on representatives’ websites.  
The visibility of such information on their websites correlates significantly with 
representatives who sponsor economic legislation with a positive impact but not a 
negative impact.  In other words, members are advertising their positive impact 
positions on their websites and those positions are strongly correlated to sponsorship 
and co-sponsorship activity; such members are acting on their economic issue positions. 
Those representatives who sponsor legislation beneficial to vulnerable 
populations are members who represent districts that generally are doing poorly from an 
economic standpoint.  For many of these key factors, a significant relationship (albeit 
small with respect to the size of the correlation) occurs when examining bill 
sponsorship for positive impact legislation.  This relationship is not apparent on 
negative impact legislation except for in a few instances on bankruptcy issues. It may be 
that there is no uniformity in those sponsoring legislation that hurts low-income 
populations simply because there are such a small number of bills that do so.  
While only a few of the district characteristics appear significant, many of the 
member characteristics and nearly all of the election characteristics do appear to have a 
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significant association with bill sponsorship.  While few of the negative impact bills 
were significant when it came to district characteristics, quite a few member 
characteristic and all election characteristic variables featured significant relationships 
with negative impact bills.  The sign associated with the correlation of these bills was 
generally the opposite of the sign associated with their positive impact counterparts, 
indicating an inverse relationship.  For instance, Democrats appeared to be a strong 
predictor across the board; representatives identifying as Democrats were positively 
correlated with negative impact legislation but negatively correlated with positive 
impact legislation, which is at odds with what one would expect, particularly in light of 
Table 5.4 above. 
While bill sponsorship variables appeared to only significantly correlate with 
other bill sponsorship variables when the impact of the legislation was positive, the 
same cannot be said for bill co-sponsorship variables, as shown in Table 5.6.  While the 
sign changes, both positive and negative impact legislation are significant, and in many 
instances reflect a relatively strong relationship.  As previously mentioned, there are 
likely to be a vast number of co-sponsors on any piece of legislation which creates more 
variability on these variables than is the case with the sponsorship variables. 
[INSERT TABLE 5.6 HERE] 
These data show that co-sponsorship and sponsorship are very different 
activities.  While sponsorship of bills seldom appears to have a relationship with the 
position a representative articulates on his or her website, the reverse is true of co-
sponsorship. Representatives articulating a more pro-business position on the 
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unemployment issue are more likely to favor negative impact legislation than positive 
impact legislation.   
Additionally, while the visibility of such information on their websites only 
appears to be related to positive impact sponsored legislation, for co-sponsorship the 
significant relationships are much more widespread.  Particularly with respect to the 
unemployment issue, those representatives who co-sponsor more legislation with a 
positive impact are more likely to have the issue visible on their website; however, 
representatives who co-sponsor more legislation with a negative impact are less likely 
to have the issue visible.  Thus, representatives who are acting to harm those financially 
distressed are not advertising this position for the general public whereas those 
representatives who are acting to the benefit of the unemployed are most likely to 
indicate their legislative position to try to gain voter support. 
Again, many more of the key factors reach significance with respect to co-
sponsorship than previously did on the sponsorship variables seen in Table 5.5.  The 
personal financial insecurity factor is significant for nearly all outcome variables, while 
the macro-economic factor is significant on positive impact co-sponsored legislation.  
Many of the economic characteristics that contribute to these factors are also significant 
on nearly every issue, and often on both positive and negative impact legislation.  The 
election margin is again significant on everything but negative impact bankruptcy bills, 
the smallest category.  However, on co-sponsored legislation the size of the correlation 
is generally larger than on sponsored legislation, although both indicate that those 
representatives with a larger margin of victory in their previous election are more likely 
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to sponsor and co-sponsor positive impact legislation, whereas those representatives 
with a smaller margin of victory are partial to negative impact legislation. 
While many of the district characteristic variables do not reach significance in 
the examination of sponsorship, with respect to co-sponsorship they show that districts 
with more minorities are likely to have representatives who co-sponsor positive impact 
legislation.  Additionally, the findings for co-sponsorship appear similar to those of 
sponsorship with respect to member characteristics and the race and party affiliation of 
members; however, given that these are dichotomous variables the correlations are less 
meaningful than the mixed model analysis results. 
 As previously mentioned, the same independent variables used in the previous 
studies were analyzed predicting each of the sponsorship and co-sponsorship dependent 
variables.  Some of these generalized linear mixed models did not converge, notably 
those dealing with sponsorship that negatively impacted low-income citizens.  
Additionally, the models failed to converge on positive-impact foreclosure sponsorship 
legislation as well as negative impact co-sponsorship legislation.  The failure to 
converge in these models is quite likely the result of a very small variance on the 
respective dependent variable. 
 Nonetheless, Table 5.7 shows the relationships in those instances that the 
generalized linear mixed model did converge.  Overall, there does appear to be some 
difference in the factors that affect sponsorship when compared to those that affect co-
sponsorship.  While the personal financial insecurity factor appears to affect few of the 
models, the macro-economic stress factor reaches significance in more than half the 
models.  The higher the district’s foreclosure rate and unemployment rate, the more 
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likely a representative is to sponsor and co-sponsor positive impact economic 
legislation, but the inverse relationship of lower foreclosure and unemployment rates 
with negative impact legislation is not found to be significant. 
[INSERT TABLE 5.7 HERE] 
The odds ratio estimates (Table 5.8-5.10) further support this finding, as the 
estimates indicate a greater degree of change in the key factors when examining bill 
sponsorship as opposed to co-sponsorship, particularly negative-impact co-sponsored 
legislation.  For instance, a one unit increase in the number of bills sponsored or co-
sponsored by the given representative in the particular issue area led to an increase in 
the personal financial insecurity factor of 1.238 and 1.033 (respectively).  Thus, it may 
be the case that representatives who are aware of their district’s financial struggles are 
likely to pursue legislation to benefit them, but representatives whose districts are 
economically prosperous are not those who are the most likely to sponsor or co-sponsor 
legislation that could inhibit those financial distressed at the expense of those 
financially thriving. 
[INSERT TABLE 5.8 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 5.9 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 5.10 HERE] 
 While there does not appear to be a relationship between co-sponsored 
legislation and the electoral margin, a relationship is found with respect to positive-
impact sponsored legislation.  The adjusted odds ratio for election margin is significant 
(AOR=1.006, 95% CI: 1.000-1.012) indicating that for each one percentage point 
increase in the election margin, the odds of providing a rating in a higher rating 
 115 
category is 1.006 higher.  This finding may be the direct result of the visibility of 
sponsorship and the directive representatives may feel when they win by a higher 
margin.  Representatives who know they do not face an uphill battle towards re-election 
may feel that they can act more freely than other representatives and may therefore 
pursue legislation that they themselves feel is necessary but that may be controversial 
and not viewed in a positive light across their district.  Other representatives, who may 
fear a challenge in their upcoming election, are less likely to attach their name directly 
to such legislation. 
 Interestingly, while the earlier Congresses do appear to differ from the 112
th
 
Congress with respect to co-sponsorship (of both positive and negative impact 
legislation), such was not the case for sponsorship.  Representatives sponsoring 
economic legislation do not appear to change as a result of the financial downfall, but 
those choosing to co-sponsor such legislation did.  Odds ratio estimates indicate that 
negative co-sponsored legislation, particularly on the foreclosure issue, are very 
different across Congresses.  For instance, the adjusted odds ratio for Congress on the 
foreclosure issue increases with each succeeding Congress (109
th
: AOR=1.145, 95% CI: 
0.839-1.563, 110
th
: AOR=2.119, 95% CI: 1.601-2.806, 111
th
: AOR=2.147, 95% CI: 
1.640-2.810) such that examining the 109
th
 Congress in comparison to the 112
th
 
Congress results in a 1.145 greater likelihood of co-sponsorship; whereas that likelihood 
increased to 2.147 by the 111
th
 Congress.  While the odds ratios do increase on the 




 Congress and 
only reach 1.171 by the 111
th
.   
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This finding further supports the notion pertaining to electoral stability raised 
previously; those representatives who sponsor economic legislation are now, and have 
previously been, those who see it as necessary, regardless of other circumstances.  On 
the other hand, representatives who co-sponsor legislation may be fearful of attaching 
their name directly to legislation but, with the economy doing poorly, want to show 
their concern and have increasingly chosen to do so as the economic crisis has become 
more widespread. 
 The findings with respect to district characteristics further support the 
differences between representative’s decisions to sponsor versus co-sponsor legislation.  
Interestingly, while a higher black population is related to decreased sponsorship of 
positive impact unemployment legislation, the opposite is the case with respect to 
positive impact bankruptcy legislation.  When examining co-sponsorship, it is apparent 
that districts with a higher population of college-educated constituents are more likely 
to have representatives who co-sponsor positive impact economic legislation; however, 
while this relationship exists for foreclosure issues, it is also the case that districts with a 
high percentage of college-educated citizens are also significantly more likely to have 
representatives who co-sponsor negative impact foreclosure legislation. 
 An examination of the member characteristics variables indicates that the 
attributes of a representative leading to sponsorship and co-sponsorship are not all that 
different. In both sponsored and co-sponsored models, minority members are those 
significantly more likely to advance positive impact economic legislation; the same can 
be said in the case of sponsorship and co-sponsored unemployment legislation, 
members with more years in the House.  Additionally, the variables for party are 
 117 
significant for nearly all outcome variables, indicating that Democrats are significantly 
more likely to sponsor and co-sponsor positive impact economic legislation and 
significantly less likely to co-sponsor negative impact economic legislation. 
 With respect to positive impact co-sponsorship, the percent of the voting 
constituency that cast their ballots for the Democrat in the previous presidential election 
does appear to be a significant predictor, but such is not the case with legislative 
sponsorship or negative-impact co-sponsorship.  While party does impact these other 
cases, the party preference of the constituency is not significant.  In the case of 
sponsorship, members may sponsor legislation out of their own self-interest rather than 
concern for their constituent’s desires.  On the other hand, representatives may be 
paying little attention to constituent party influence and only considering their own on 
negative impact legislation because they see it as a means of appealing to their own 
party members rather than gaining support from the public. 
[INSERT TABLE 5.11 HERE] 
 I again conducted a multiple-df contrast utilizing the Wald χ
2
 test for each 
respective set of independent variables (see Table 5.11).  Again, these tests examine the 
ability of each of the four conceptual sets of independent variables (key factors, district 
characteristics, member characteristics, and election characteristics) to predict a 
dependent variable, within the context of the entire model.  Thus, it is a simultaneous 
test of whether the respective set of estimates within a set equal zero.   Table 5.11 
presents the results of these contrasts.  Much like the analysis in Table 5.6 revealed, it is 
the case that a relatively large number of variables appear to impact the sponsorship and 
co-sponsorship motives of representatives.  Notably, the member characteristics 
 118 
variables are significant in every model, perhaps in part as a result of the party variable.  
However, unlike in previous analyses, many of the other member characteristics 
variables are significant in several models and therefore it could be more than just this 
single variable that explains its significance.  The key factors, district characteristics, 
and election characteristics sets of variables appear significant in nearly every model. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter serves as an examination of representative legislative action to 
determine how the economic circumstances of a constituency factored into the 
economic legislation representatives chose to sponsor and to co-sponsor.  Interestingly, 
findings reveal that different factors are at play with respect to the variables that 
influence sponsorship compared to co-sponsorship of economic legislation.  While 
party is once again a major factor in both instances, the analysis here reveals a number 
of other factors that explain bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship, unlike in many of the 
previous analyses.   
Additionally, the findings revealed that co-sponsorship in one area of economic 
legislation is a good indicator of co-sponsorship on other economic legislation but the 
same is not always the case for sponsorship.  Such a finding may be reflective of the 
nature of sponsorship compared to co-sponsorship, as sponsorship involves a much 
greater cost in terms of time and investment on behalf of the representatives.   
Overall, findings revealed that co-sponsorship is an easily accessible way for 
members to reveal their interest on an issue without taking the lead.  Their action on 
such issues is often in accord with what they see as constituent’s desires and therefore 
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they are often unafraid to advertise their co-sponsorships.  On the other hand, 
sponsorship appears to be something members undertake because they themselves see a 
need to do so, even if it is not something they think their constituents desire.  Members 
who choose to sponsor legislation often are secure in their district and may think they 
could act in a way that would be beneficial for all. 
 While the supposition of this research is that representatives would be most 
likely to appeal to constituents when they are directing their action toward them, the 
findings of the previous chapters indicated that the representative’s party affiliation 
heavily drove their action.  However, the findings of this chapter suggest that while the 
representative’s party may be a driver of his or her actions, it may work in tandem with 
other factors to influence representatives’ actual legislative behavior.  While previous 
findings may have called into question how representative our democratic system truly 
is, the findings here suggest that when it comes to actually sitting down and crafting 
legislation or choosing to attach one’s name to it, representatives may be factoring the 
needs of their constituents into such action. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 This dissertation has sought to understand the actions on economic issues of 
representatives at various levels of visibility.  Given the recent recession and how 
readily available economic data is both to representatives and for the purposes of this 
research, it provided a useful means to examine the actions of members of the House.  
Previous research that sought to understand the dyadic relationship between a member 
of Congress and his or her constituents largely focused on the Senate because state-level 
data is much more prevalent than district-level data.  Because there are more House 
districts with smaller constituencies, these representatives are expected to be more 
responsive to their constituents’ desires.  Thus, I focused my research on members of 
the House to determine how well they are representing their constituents on economic 
issues, which are heavily salient given the recession occurring during the period studied 
and provide easy indicators to representatives without the need for surveying 
constituents. 
 The theory presented in this dissertation assumes that representatives target their 
action not towards voters who already support them but toward voters who are paying 
attention to the political process and who they want to win over.  This theory assumes 
that those constituents who already support a representative are unlikely to waver 
substantially in their support while those who are strongly opposed to a representative 
are also unlikely to ever cast their ballot for him or her.  While my research did not 
directly test this theory, it used it as a catalyst toward understanding representative 
behavior at differing levels of visibility.   
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 Thus, the examination of representative action assumed that such action was 
done under the guise of winning over these potential voters.  However, I assumed that 
representatives might not always be consistent in their actions, as they may present 
information differently depending on who they think is paying attention and how visible 
such information is to them.  Given that representatives may present themselves 
differently based on how visible their action is, such representative action was 
examined in terms of when representatives were speaking directly to their constituents, 
when they were speaking to their colleagues, and when they were actually taking 
legislative action. 
 The present research has as its focus an examination of how certain key 
predictor variables impacted legislative activity.  Because this research examined 
representative behavior on economic issues, these key predictor variables dealt with the 
economic characteristics of the district, as a factor analysis combined the district’s 
foreclosure rate, income level, poverty rate, and unemployment rate into two variables.  
Also, the electoral margin by which a representative won the previous election helps to 
better understand how representatives are communicating with their constituents around 
economic issues especially being sensitive to potentials in the district.  In order to 







 and first session of the 112
th
 Congress was examined.   
 In addition to these key predictor variables, three other sets of variables were 
employed in trying to understand legislative activity: variables pertaining to 
characteristics of the district, variables that dealt with characteristics of the 
representatives, and variables that concerned the representative’s previous election.  The 
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findings with respect to legislative activity and these sets of variables appeared to be 
very different when it came to different types of activity. 
 
Discussion of Findings 
 With respect to how a representative addresses constituents, websites of the 
representative were examined both for the stance they took on the particular economic 
issue as well as for how visible information on such an issue appeared on the website.  
Interestingly, an examination of representative’s websites revealed that even in the first 
session of the 112
th
 Congress (2011), many representatives were unwilling to take a 
stance on these economic issues on their websites, despite national attention focusing 
heavily on the economy.  Those who did not mention these economic issues were 
statistically more likely to be Republicans, Caucasian and male. 
With respect to how the issue was presented on the representative’s website, the 
driving force appeared to be the representative’s party affiliation, as few other variables 
reached significance even at the p<.05 level.  Representatives who identified as 
Republicans were significantly more likely to take a pro-business, pro-market, or pro-
banking position.  Key predictor variables reached marginal significance; notably, the 
electoral margin variable was marginally significant in indicating that those winning by 
a higher margin of victory in the previous election were more likely to take a pro-
business stance on the unemployment issue and a pro-buyer stance on the foreclosure 
issue. 
However, in terms of how visible the information was on the website, the 
personal financial insecurity factor appeared marginally significant on the 
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unemployment and bankruptcy issue while the macro-economic stress factor appeared 
to significantly influence representative’s visibility on foreclosure issues.  Given that 
the macro-economic stress factor utilizes the foreclosure rate, this finding was opposite 
the expected direction, as it indicated that districts with a higher foreclosure and 
unemployment rate had representatives who were less visible on the foreclosure issue. 
With both economic issue position and the visibility of the position on the 
representative’s website, the party variable was highly predictive and indicated large 
odds ratios.  However, with respect to visibility on unemployment issues, this variable 
was not significant, indicating that representatives of both parties may be equally likely 
to discuss the unemployment issue, perhaps because it is the most salient of the 
economic issues. 
 An examination of how representatives speak when they may not necessarily 
think constituents are tuned in was crafted by the formation of frames around the chosen 
economic issues and applying such frames to representative floor speeches.  These 
frames were created based on interest group issue positions in an attempt to eliminate 
partisan biases.  Examination of members’ floor speeches found that, in more recent 
years, these issues have been addressed much more by representatives than previously, 
as the economic downturn likely spurred representatives’ interest in the issue.   
Nevertheless, similar to the message on representatives’ websites, the method by 
which representatives address these issues on the floor is almost entirely partisan-
driven.  Democratic members were much more likely to utilize the frame that 
emphasized that it was societal responsibility to help those hindered by the economy, 
whereas Republican members most often used a frame that articulated that it is the 
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individual’s obligation to ensure his or her own financial well-being.  While some 
variables reached marginal significance, overall findings suggest that party affiliation is 
an incredibly strong predictor of the way representatives are speaking on the floor of the 
House. 
Given that representatives were much more likely to take a stance on these 
issues when speaking on the floor compared to how seldom they did on their websites, 
representatives may believe constituents are not paying attention to their floor speeches 
or that floor speeches if reported at all will reach fewer constituents.  Alternatively, 
members may see floor speeches as brining certain rewards or advantages to gain 
standing among colleagues and within their party. 
 Finally, I examined bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship of legislation that was 
classified according to whom it affected in a financially beneficial manner.  These bills 
were examined to determine how they affect low-income populations to determine how 
many bills of each type representatives’ were sponsoring and co-sponsoring.  Over time 
there appeared to be an increase not only in the total number of economic bills but also 
in the total number of bills that positively impacted low-income populations.   
Unlike in the other analyses, when examining legislative action, the key factors 
did appear to be influential.  The macro-economic stress variable was significant for 
both sponsorship and co-sponsorship of positive-impact legislation, indicating that 
Districts with high foreclosure rates and unemployment rates have representatives who 
are acting in a positive way on these issues.  Additionally, the electoral margin variable 
was significant but only for legislative sponsorship, showing that those winning by a 
high margin have representatives who are more likely to introduce positive impact 
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legislation but not co-sponsor it.  This finding may indicate that those with a high 
margin of victory are willing to strike out and do so on their own whereas the other 
members are co-sponsoring legislation. 
Interestingly and surprisingly, findings appeared to differ for sponsorship and 
co-sponsorship dependent variables.  For instance, only on co-sponsorship did their 
appear to be a significant change in the membership over time, as members may 
increasingly want to attach their name to legislation without doing the work involved 
with sponsoring the legislation.  Nevertheless, it was once again the case that party 
affiliation was significant across nearly all models. 
 Overall, the findings did in fact reveal that representative action at different 
levels of visibility is influenced by different factors.  Representatives know they want to 
reach out to potential voters but they perceive different activities as gaining their 
attention; therefore, they adjust their behavior and how outspoken their position is on 
the basis of when they think they can garner voters’ attention.  Rather than simply reach 
out to potentials in the same way they speak on the floor, representatives are more 
inclined to hide or obscure their position when they think such constituents are paying 
attention. 
 
Findings for Key Variables 
 The key variables that were of interest included the personal financial insecurity 
factor, the macro-economic stress factor, and the representative’s electoral margin of 
victory.  When examining the stance the representative took on economic issues on his 
or her website, the key predictor variables were somewhat predictive; however, they 
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were more predictive when examining the presence of information on the economic 
issues on their websites, particularly when the information pertained to the foreclosure 
issue.  Members from districts with high macro-economic stress (e.g. high foreclosure 
and unemployment rates), were more likely to display their foreclosure position on their 
website. 
 When the dependent variable that examined the frame representatives used in 
articulating their position on economic issues on the floor, most of the key predictors 
appeared to be insignificant.  Unlike with the website analysis, the use of floor speeches 
frames spanned several Congresses and the findings confirmed that earlier Congresses 
were significantly different than the 112
th
 Congress with respect to floor speech frames, 
largely the result of representatives being much less likely to address these economic 
issues earlier. 
 When examining the sponsorship of legislation, several of the key predictors did 
appear to reach significance, particularly with respect to when representatives were 
acting on legislation that was deemed to positively impact individuals experiencing 
economic hardship.  Both in terms of sponsorship and co-sponsorship, the macro-
economic stress variable was highly significant when examining such legislation, 
indicating districts that are struggling financially are more likely to have representatives 
sponsor and co-sponsor positive impact economic legislation.  Members who were 
electorally insecure were significantly less likely to sponsor positive impact economic 
legislation.  
 
Findings for District Characteristics 
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 In the examination of the effects of district characteristics on the issue stance 
representatives posted on their websites, only a few variables reached significance.  The 
foreclosure model of both economic issue position and the visibility of the issue 
indicated that minority prevalence and education within the district could be influential. 
 In general, district characteristic were not very predictive of the frames 
representative’s utilized when speaking on the House floor.  Several variables reached 
marginal significance (p<0.1) but none beyond p<.05, indicating that representatives 
may not be speaking to constituents when they take the microphone on the House floor. 
 With respect to both sponsorship and co-sponsorship, district characteristics 
appeared to be influential in different ways.  When examining the sponsorship model, 
the percent of African-Americans in the district appeared influential; however, its effect 
differed on the unemployment and bankruptcy issues.  With respect to co-sponsorship, 
the percent of the district with a college degree appeared influential on both positive and 
negative impact models, indicating such education increased the prevalence of 
representative co-sponsorship.   
  
Findings for Member Characteristics 
 When discussing economic issue positions on their website, the sole 
characteristic that appeared to be influential was the representative’s party, as no other 
variable even attained marginal significance.  The same cannot be said for the visibility 
of the representative’s position, as party was not significant across the board and other 
factors appeared influential. 
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 In speeches on the floor of the House, party was an extremely strong predictor 
of the frame the representative used when addressing these economic issues.  For both 
primary and secondary frames, party was highly significant for almost every issue, 
failing to reach significance only when the secondary frame was under examination.  
The only variable that appeared significant nearly as often was the comparison of 
previous Congresses to the 112
th
. 
 The findings of the impact of member characteristics on bill sponsorship and co-
sponsorship were interesting because, unlike in many of the other models, more than 
just the party variable appeared significant.  Minorities appeared to sponsor and co-
sponsor more positive-impact economic legislation, while members with more seniority 
were those sponsoring more positive impact legislation.  
 
Findings for Election Characteristics 
 With respect to characteristics of the previous election, the position the 
representative took on his or her site when discussing bankruptcy issues appeared to be 
influenced by both labor and finance PACs, but such was not the case for the other 
economic issues.  However, the visibility of the information did appear to be influenced 
by finance PACs on all issues.  Those representatives receiving more money from 
finance PACs took more pro-business, pro-market, and pro-banking stances but were 
significantly less visible in doing so. 
 When examining secondary frames, there was some significance found in the 
relationship between election characteristics variables and the secondary frame 
employed by the representative at the p<.05 level.  Specifically, the variable 
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representing the percentage of Democrats in the district as well as the labor PAC 
contributions variable was significant. 
 In the examination of sponsorship, election characteristics did not appear 
influential with the exception of the finance PAC variable which indicated that 
contributions of finance PACs significantly increased the prevalence of the sponsorship 
of positive impact bankruptcy legislation. Many more variables appeared to influence 
co-sponsorship; for instance, those districts with a larger Democratic voting public had 
representatives who were significantly more likely to co-sponsor positive impact 
economic legislation of all varieties.   Labor PAC contributions appeared influential on 
negative impact foreclosure legislation. 
 
Implications 
 While the expectation was that representatives would appeal to potential voters 
when addressing their constituents in more public forums, the findings appear to 
suggest that rather representatives are primarily concerned with pleasing their party 
regardless of venue.  While Fenno (1978) argued that representatives speak differently 
when they are at home compared to when they are in Washington, the research 
presented here seems to suggest that representatives consistently view their audience as 
party members, regardless of whether they are addressing constituents or not. 
 This research assumed that websites provide representatives their most visible 
means of addressing constituents.  Surprisingly, at the depth of the worst recession in a 
century, large numbers of Republican members presented no issue positions related to 
the economy on their websites.  It could be the case that representatives do not see these 
 130 
websites as a means of appealing to voters but instead do so through speeches to small 
groups of subconstituencies. Perhaps members decided not to post issue positions in 
order to avoid taking positions contrary to party orthodoxy.  Nevertheless, these 
websites are meant to articulate representatives’ policy standpoints and appeared to 
seldom do so on very salient matters, such as the economy during a recession. 
 Rather than reach out to their constituents to gain support, representatives appear 
to be reaching out to members of their party, either within or outside Washington, to get 
support.  This finding held true both for when representatives were speaking to their 
constituents but also when they were speaking to other members on the floor.  
Representatives’ unwillingness to factor the needs of their constituents into their public 
messages directed toward constituents is surprising.  The expectation was that 
representatives would want to reach out to potentials with these public messages more 
so than in any other setting, but the findings did not support that expectation.  
Representatives may view the audience of their websites as much larger than their direct 
constituency and therefore may not use them as a means to reach out to gain electoral 
support. 
When speaking on the floor, representatives may be inclined to support their 
party’s position given that they want to gain favor within their party, as other members 
are the direct audience of such speeches.  Because party leadership often controls who 
speaks on the floor on the given issue, members may see speaking on the floor as their 
opportunity to gain favor with such party leaders. These findings with respect to floor 
speeches were as expected. 
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  Legislative action appears to be the instance in which representation occurs 
most frequently.  Perhaps visibility on actual legislation concerns representatives more 
than does the visibility of an issue position on their website, as they may assume that 
the visible nature of sponsoring or co-sponsoring legislation is a much easier cue than is 
information on their website.  If they assume that potentials have the ability to obtain 
their legislative action just as easily as they can access their website, they may be more 
inclined to use such legislative activity as cues than merely writing on a website that 
does not necessarily influence action in the way that sponsoring or co-sponsoring 
legislation does. 
On the other hand, representatives may view representation as entirely party-
driven and seek to uphold their party’s position rather than appeal to the needs of their 
constituents.  The message representatives may be sending, both publicly and on the 
floor, is partisan above all else.  Recent scholarship has suggested that now, more than 
ever, the House is divided along party lines (Hetherington 2001; Poole and Rosenthal 
1997; Rohde 1991); while the research presented here was not a direct attempt to test 
the partisan nature of Congress, the findings do suggest that members are willing to 
emphasize their party’s position in all of their actions. 
However, representatives who choose to sponsor or co-sponsor legislation seem 
to reflect constituent economic needs.  Therefore, while it may be concerning to the 
notion of representative democracy that representatives appear to not be reaching out 
directly to their own constituents but instead to their party, when they actually go about 
creating and supporting policy, they do act upon their constituent’s needs. 
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 Additionally, representatives can easily pay lip service to an issue or introduce 
legislation but voting on such legislation is a very different legislative activity.  When 
representatives vote to act on legislation, they are putting forth what could become 
federal law.  As a result, the findings presented here may be vastly different with 
respect to constituency characteristics when actual votes are taken into account.  Even 
introducing legislation differs from voting on it, as representatives can introduce 
legislation merely to gain attention and then not take any action to gain support for that 
legislation, as illustrated in the example of Congressman Joe Heck. 
 
Future Research 
 Further research could examine how the message representatives are sending to 
their constituents specifically targets potential voters.  For instance, if representatives 
seek the support of a certain subconstituency, how clear is their action in gaining that 
subconstituencies support?  And to what extent will winning that subconstituencies 
support affect the representative in the upcoming election?  Such research could aid our 
understanding of not only how representatives see their constituencies but also how 
their actions feed directly into their own re-election goals. 
 Additionally, the research here utilized only some of the actions representatives 
take.  There are a vast number of ways in which representatives take action that could 
be utilized as dependent variables to better understand what factors influence such 
action.  For instance, representative speeches, press releases, dear colleague letters, or 
statements in hearings could all be helpful in better assessing what influences 
representative activity.  
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 The research here examined activity on economic issues but an analysis of 
representative activity on social issues could also be interesting and could have different 
findings depending on how salient a given issue is.  It is possible that for less salient 
issues, representative activity may be more consistent across different activities and 
levels of visibility than was present in these findings. 
 Finally, future research can examine the interplay between representative action 
at the different levels of visibility addressed here to determine how well action at one 
level corresponds with action at a different level of visibility.  This research determined 
the impact of different characteristics on such representative action but did not examine 
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Appendix: Chapter 1 Table 
 







































Appendix: Chapter 2 Tables 
 
 
Table 2.1: Representative Actions that are Visible, Less Visible, and Invisible 
 
Visibility Actions 




Statements in Hearings, Floor Speeches 





Table 2.2: Segments of the Constituency and Their Attitudes  
 
Segment Attitude Toward 
Representative 
Conditions that Could Change 
Attitude 
Advocates Support Representative acts in a significantly 
uncharacteristic manner 
Potentials Intelligent skepticism Representative advocating a policy they 
support; An issue with a high degree of 
salience 
Uninterested Don’t care An issue with a high degree of salience 









Table 2.3: Characteristics of Congress, 109-112 
 






229 202 Dennis Hastert 
(R) 




198 236 Nancy Pelosi 
(D) 




179 255 Nancy Pelosi 
(D) 




240 191 John Boehner 
(R) 












Foreclosure Rate Foreclosures per 100,000 constituents 
Median Income Median household income 
Poverty Rate Percentage of population below poverty 
Unemployment Rate Percent unemployed 





Percent Black Percent African-American 
Percent Latino Percent Hispanic 
Percent Graduated 
College 





Non-Minority Representative is Caucasian 
Male Representative is male 
Democrat Representative is a member of the 
Democratic Party 
Seniority Number of years representative has 







Percent of district voting for the 
Democratic presidential candidate in 
the previous election 
Labor PAC 
Contributions 
Dollar contributions from labor PACs 
Finance PAC 
Contributions 
Dollar contributions from finance and 
real estate PACs 
 150 
Table 2.5: Varimax Rotated Iterated Principal Factor Analysis Loadings for the 4 Key 
Economic Characteristics  
 




Foreclosure Rate 0.161 0.923 
Median Income -0.863 0.330 
Percent of Population 
in Poverty 
0.927 -0.179 




Appendix: Chapter 3 Tables 
 
 



















































Table 3.2: Visibility Scale for all Economic Issues 
 
1 2 3 
Issue is not 
mentioned 
Issue is mentioned 
but never discussed 
at length or in-depth 
Issue is discussed at 

























































Unemployment Foreclosures Bankruptcy 



































































Note: percentages within the parentheses do not include the no issue mention category 















Table 3.5: Member Characteristics of No Issue Mention 
 
Variable Unemployment Foreclosures Bankruptcy 






































Table 3.6: Member Leadership and Experience of No Issue Mention 
 
Variable Unemployment Foreclosures Bankruptcy 









Five or Fewer 










Table 3.7: Distribution of Visibility Scale 
 
Visibility Scale Unemployment Foreclosures Bankruptcy 























Table 3.8: Relationship between Economic Issue Position and Other Variables 
 
Variables Pearson Correlation Coefficient 











Unemployment  - 0.170*** 0.164*** 
Foreclosure 0.170*** - 0.359*** 








Unemployment 0.579*** 0.242*** 0.209*** 
Foreclosure 0.004 0.712*** 0.259*** 
















Foreclosure Rate -0.034 0.148** -0.087
+
 
Median Income 0.034 0.020 -0.039 
Poverty Rate -0.120** 0.027 0.052 
Unemployment Rate -0.130** 0.077
+
 0.016 


















Percent Black -0.123** 0.008 -0.067 
Percent Latino -0.096* 0.102** -0.001 
Percent Graduated 
College 


















Democrat 0.331*** -0.052 0.006 


















-0.250*** 0.058 -0.052 
Labor PAC 
Contributions 
-0.155*** 0.014 -0.001 
Finance PAC 
Contributions 
0.157*** 0.124** 0.175*** 









Table 3.9: Relationship between Visibility of Economic Issues and Other Variables 
 
Variables Pearson Correlation Coefficient 








Unemployment - 0.371*** 0.345*** 
Foreclosure 0.371*** - 0.488*** 










0.020 0.066 0.036 
Macro-Economic 
Stress 
0.023 0.185*** 0.016 
Foreclosure Rate 0.005 0.159*** -0.011 
Median Income 0.016 0.015 0.035 
Poverty Rate 0.038 0.130** 0.083
+
 
Unemployment Rate 0.049 0.167*** 0.057 


















 0.160*** 0.010 























s Non-Minority 0.094* 0.208*** 0.064 
Male 0.139** 0.131** 0.114* 
Democrat -0.209*** -0.312*** -0.269*** 


















0.244*** 0.318*** 0.228 
Labor PAC 
Contributions 
0.173*** 0.120* 0.156*** 
Finance PAC 
Contributions 
0.096* -0.001 0.040 



































































































































































































 N 269 88 68 
R
2
 0.663 0.661 0.855 





Table 3.11: Results for Odds Ratio Analysis of Unemployment Issue Position 
 










 Personal Financial 
Insecurity 
1.107 0.730 1.680 
Macro-Economic Stress 1.123 0.865 1.457 














s Percent Black 1.000 0.973 1.028 
Percent Latino 0.989 0.973 1.006 
Percent Graduated 
College  














s Non-Minority 1.152 0.332 3.999 
Male 0.804 0.427 1.514 
Democrat 126.371 29.414 542.931 


















1.020 0.991 1.050 
Labor PAC 
Contributions 
1.005 0.996 1.013 
Finance PAC 
Contributions 
















Table 3.12: Results for Odds Ratio Analysis of Foreclosure Issue Position 
 










 Personal Financial 
Insecurity 
0.747 0.294 1.897 
Macro-Economic Stress 1.012 0.638 1.606 














s Percent Black 1.089 1.019 1.163 
Percent Latino 1.030 1.001 1.060 
Percent Graduated 
College  














s Non-Minority 2.481 0.239 25.811 
Male 1.206 0.362 4.017 
Democrat 79.424 5.555 >999.999 


















0.988 0.929 1.051 
Labor PAC 
Contributions 
1.001 0.983 1.019 
Finance PAC 
Contributions 















Table 3.13: Results for Odds Ratio Analysis of Bankruptcy Issue Position 
 










 Personal Financial 
Insecurity 
0.337 0.086 1.322 
Macro-Economic Stress 1.446 0.570 3.670 














s Percent Black 1.046 0.952 1.149 
Percent Latino 1.028 0.989 1.069 
Percent Graduated 
College  














s Non-Minority <0.001 <0.001 >999.999 
Male 2.748 0.526 14.360 
Democrat 18.088 0.948 345.243 


















1.083 0.997 1.176 
Labor PAC 
Contributions 
1.029 1.008 1.051 
Finance PAC 
Contributions 



































































































































































































 N 427 427 427 
R
2
 0.1032 0.1624 0.1131 



















 Personal Financial 
Insecurity 
0.792 0.569 1.102 
Macro-Economic Stress 1.028 0.845 1.250 














s Percent Black 1.003 0.982 1.025 
Percent Latino 1.002 0.989 1.015 
Percent Graduated 
College  














s Non-Minority 0.966 0.360 2.593 
Male 1.606 0.958 2.693 
Democrat 1.109 0.517 2.379 















s Democratic Vote 
Previous Election 
0.979 0.957 1.001 
Labor PAC Contributions 0.995 0.988 1.002 
Finance PAC 
Contributions 





























 Personal Financial 
Insecurity 
0.862 0.566 1.313 
Macro-Economic Stress 0.703 0.542 0.911 














s Percent Black 1.008 0.977 1.040 
Percent Latino 0.985 0.968 1.001 
Percent Graduated 
College  














s Non-Minority 2.156 0.600 7.743 
Male 1.294 0.664 2.522 
Democrat 0.248 0.079 0.784 















s Democratic Vote 
Previous Election 
1.003 0.970 1.038 
Labor PAC Contributions 1.001 0.995 1.006 
Finance PAC 
Contributions 





























 Personal Financial 
Insecurity 
0.692 0.431 1.110 
Macro-Economic Stress 1.029 0.763 1.389 














s Percent Black 1.036 1.000 1.072 
Percent Latino 0.994 0.977 1.012 
Percent Graduated 
College  














s Non-Minority 2.497 0.606 10.291 
Male 1.643 0.823 3.281 
Democrat 0.159 0.048 0.533 















s Democratic Vote 
Previous Election 
1.018 0.983 1.054 
Labor PAC Contributions 0.999 0.994 1.004 
Finance PAC 
Contributions 
















Table 3.18: Results of Contrasts of Different Sets of Independent Variables for 







(Degrees of Freedom) 
Unemployment Foreclosures Bankruptcy 








































Table 3.19: Results of Contrasts of Different Sets of Independent Variables for 







(Degrees of Freedom) 
Unemployment Foreclosures Bankruptcy 
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Male 0.086 0.158 -0.033 -0.438
+


















































































































































 N 429 429 429 429 429 429 























Personal Financial Insecurity Factor 1.232 0.93 1.633 
Macro-Economic Stress Factor 0.956 0.793 1.151 
Election Margin 1.000 0.993 1.007 
Percent Black 1.007 0.986 1.030 
Percent Latino 0.998 0.986 1.010 
Percent Graduated College 1.042 0.992 1.095 
Seniority 1.026 0.981 1.073 
Democratic Vote Previous Election 0.992 0.971 1.013 
Labor PAC Contributions 1.000 1.000 1.000 
















Personal Financial Insecurity Factor 1.029 0.774 1.368 
Macro-Economic Stress Factor 0.988 0.786 1.242 
Election Margin 0.997 0.990 1.005 
Percent Black 1.018 0.995 1.041 
Percent Latino 1.005 0.994 1.016 
Percent Graduated College 0.985 0.941 1.031 
Seniority 0.980 0.941 1.021 
Democratic Vote Previous Election 0.997 0.977 1.017 
Labor PAC Contributions 1.000 1.000 1.000 
















Personal Financial Insecurity Factor 1.363 0.970 1.916 
Macro-Economic Stress Factor 1.003 0.819 1.228 
Election Margin 0.995 0.987 1.002 
Percent Black 1.004 0.983 1.025 
Percent Latino 1.001 0.989 1.014 
Percent Graduated College 1.033 0.981 1.087 
Seniority 0.986 0.941 1.032 
Democratic Vote Previous Election 0.995 0.972 1.019 
Labor PAC Contributions 1.000 1.000 1.000 
















Personal Financial Insecurity Factor 1.310 0.893 1.921 
Macro-Economic Stress Factor 0.985 0.796 1.219 
Election Margin 0.994 0.987 1.002 
Percent Black 1.015 0.991 1.040 
Percent Latino 1.003 0.989 1.016 
Percent Graduated College 1.042 0.982 1.107 
Seniority 1.003 0.942 1.067 
Democratic Vote Previous Election 0.989 0.965 1.015 
Labor PAC Contributions 1.000 1.000 1.000 
















Personal Financial Insecurity Factor 0.995 0.722 1.372 
Macro-Economic Stress Factor 0.987 0.810 1.202 
Election Margin 1.004 0.997 1.010 
Percent Black 0.988 0.969 1.009 
Percent Latino 0.999 0.987 1.011 
Percent Graduated College 0.984 0.939 1.032 
Seniority 1.003 0.955 1.053 
Democratic Vote Previous Election 0.987 0.967 1.007 
Labor PAC Contributions 1.000 1.000 1.000 
















Personal Financial Insecurity Factor 1.105 0.810 1.507 
Macro-Economic Stress Factor 0.921 0.747 1.136 
Election Margin 1.000 0.992 1.007 
Percent Black 0.994 0.975 1.013 
Percent Latino 1.006 0.994 1.018 
Percent Graduated College 1.029 0.977 1.084 
Seniority 0.974 0.930 1.020 
Democratic Vote Previous Election 0.979 0.958 1.000 
Labor PAC Contributions 1.000 1.000 1.000 















Table 4.10: Results for Contrasts of Different Sets of Independent Variables on Primary 


























































































































Appendix: Chapter 5 Tables 
 
 
Table 5.1: Conyers Legislative Activity On Unemployment Issues Compared to All 
Other Members of Congress 
 




Sponsored Pro-Worker 1 4 .13 
Neutral 0 3 .14 
Co-Sponsored Pro-Worker 19 22 4 




Sponsored Pro-Worker 2 9 0.17 
Neutral 2 4 0.19 
Co-Sponsored Pro-Worker 17 29 4.62 




Sponsored Pro-Worker 2 11 0.28 
Neutral 4 5 0.25 
Co-Sponsored Pro-Worker 29 36 5.51 




Sponsored Pro-Worker 2 3 0.17 
Neutral 0 3 0.08 
Co-Sponsored Pro-Worker 24 28 3.17 

































10 256 62 171 48 141 26 
Foreclosures 41 
 
9 98 11 88 13 23 3 
Bankruptcy 27 
 

















































































































































Simple Statistics All Members Democrats Republicans 



























Positive Impact 1790 0.190 0-11 925 0.330 0-11 865 0.040 0-2 
Neutral 1790 0.166 0-5 925 0.198 0-5 865 0.133 0-3 









Positive Impact 1790 0.096 0-6 925 0.174 0-6 865 0.012 0-1 
Neutral 1790 0.028 0-2 925 0.037 0-2 865 0.020 0-2 









Positive Impact 1790 0.048 0-6 925 0.083 0-6 865 0.010 0-2 
Neutral 1790 0.058 0-5 925 0.049 0-2 865 0.067 0-5 
























Positive Impact 1790 4.332 0-36 925 7.596 0-36 865 0.843 0-10 
Neutral 1790 2.885 0-14 925 3.836 0-14 865 1.868 0-8 









Positive Impact 1790 1.250 0-17 925 2.270 0-17 865 0.160 0-5 
Neutral 1790 0.431 0-5 925 0.430 0-5 865 0.431 0-4 









Positive Impact 1790 0.959 0-9 925 1.691 0-9 865 0.177 0-3 
Neutral 1790 1.180 0-7 925 0.917 0-5 865 1.461 0-7 
Negative Impact 1790 0.172 0-3 925 0.019 0-2 865 0.335 0-3 
 181 
 
Table 5.5: Simple Correlations between Bill Sponsorship and Other Variables 
 
  Pearson Correlation Coefficients 



























- -0.007 0.213*** -0.036
+



















































































0.366*** -0.087*** 0.277*** -0.076*** 0.234*** -0.064** 
Negative 
Impact 


















































0.254*** -0.082*** 0.209*** -0.073** 0.201*** -0.059** 
Negative 
Impact 
-0.086*** 0.101*** -0.065** 0.042
+
 -0.034 0.070** 
 182 
  Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
























 -0.068 0.028 -0.029 0.068 
Foreclosures 0.083
+
 0.023 0.150** 0.004 0.005 0.014 












0.175*** -0.032 0.127** 0.005 0.117** 0.032 
Foreclosures 0.207*** -0.053 0.278*** 0.006 0.094* 0.018 
Bankruptcy 0.149** -0.050 0.075
+










0.092*** -0.029 0.114*** -0.043+ 0.104*** -0.088*** 
Economic 
Factor 
0.070** 0.054* 0.144*** 0.018 0.131*** 0.031 
Foreclosure 
Rate 
0.030 0.058** 0.106*** 0.014 0.087*** 0.021 
Median 
Income 
-0.034 0.009 -0.058** 0.039+ -0.043+ 0.102*** 
Poverty Rate 0.112*** -0.039
+
 0.137*** -0.055 0.123*** -0.081*** 
Unemploy-
ment Rate 
0.130*** 0.010 0.176*** -0.008 0.172*** -0.017 
Election 
Margin 
0.163*** -0.046* 0.113*** -0.047* 0.147*** -0.009 
 183 
  Pearson Correlation Coefficients 




























































 0.156*** -0.033 
Male 0.111*** -0.062** 0.089*** -0.018 0.050* -0.007 
Democrat -0.226*** 0.180*** -0.192*** 0.123*** -0.129*** 0.098*** 
Seniority 0.170*** -0.031 0.035
+




























-0.022 0.060** 0.072** 0.129*** 0.018 0.081*** 
















Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
  Unemployment Foreclosures Bankruptcy 
























- -0.362*** 0.721*** -0.257*** 0.723*** -0.234*** 
Negative 
Impact 























0.721*** -0.321*** - -0.186*** 0.500*** -0.196*** 
Negative 
Impact 






















0.723*** -0.292*** 0.500*** -0.216*** - -0.208*** 
Negative 
Impact 





















 0.176*** 0.115** 0.072
+
 












0.213*** -0.042 0.170*** 0.097* 0.20*** -0.080
+
 
Foreclosures 0.371*** -0.139** 0.305*** 0.048 0.362*** -0.113* 
Bankruptcy 0.198*** -0.102* 0.176*** 0.076
+




Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
  Unemployment Foreclosures Bankruptcy 










0.226*** -0.086*** 0.167*** -0.145*** 0.097*** -0.023 
Economic 
Factor 
0.142*** 0.007 0.122*** 0.004 0.103*** 0.020 
Foreclosure 
Rate 
0.067** 0.028 0.078*** 0.032 0.064** -0.023 
Median 
Income 
-0.080*** 0.014 -0.055* 0.101*** 0.005 0.019 





 0.184*** -0.103*** 0.136*** 0.076*** 
Election 
Margin 

















0.407*** -0.122*** 0.296*** -0.120*** 0.276*** -0.092*** 
Percent 
Latino 




















0.517*** -0.154*** 0.369*** -0.130*** 0.348*** -0.113*** 
Male 0.210*** -0.114*** 0.172*** -0.038
+
 0.170*** -0.052* 




Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
  Unemployment Foreclosures Bankruptcy 
  Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative 






























 0.171*** -0.119*** 0.062** 



























Table 5.7: Results of the Generalized Linear Mixed Model Analyses of Sponsorship and 
Co-Sponsorship 
 
  Sponsorship Co-Sponsorship 














































































































































































































































































































































































  Sponsorship Co-Sponsorship 










































































































 N 1706 1706 1706 1706 1706 1706 1706 

























Table 5.8: Positive-Impact Sponsorship Bills Odds Ratio 
 






































 Personal Financial 
Insecurity Factor 
1.238 0.955 1.604 1.218 0.828 1.791 
Macro-Economic 
Stress Factor 
1.153 0.973 1.367 1.584 1.224 2.050 










 Congress 0.696 0.455 1.064 1.905 0.836 4.340 
110
th
 Congress 0.834 0.551 1.263 0.810 0.313 2.099 
111
th














s Percent Black 0.972 0.955 0.990 1.030 1.000 1.061 
Percent Latino 0.992 0.982 1.003 0.992 0.972 1.013 
Percent Graduated 
College 















Non-Minority 0.277 0.138 0.553 2.798 0.903 8.669 
Male 0.705 0.479 1.038 0.492 0.255 0.947 
Democrat 2.673 1.205 5.927 3.894 0.890 17.032 


















1.014 0.993 1.036 1.006 0.970 1.042 
Labor PAC 
Contributions 
1.002 1.001 1.004 1.000 0.997 1.004 
Finance PAC 
Contributions 














Table 5.9: Positive-Impact Co-Sponsorship Bills Odds Ratios 
 






























































1.075 1.016 1.137 1.144 1.067 1.226 1.134 1.052 1.223 
Election 
Margin 







































1.000 0.995 1.005 0.999 0.993 1.006 0.999 0.991 1.006 
Percent 
Latino 





















0.631 0.509 0.781 0.675 0.519 0.880 0.670 0.499 0.899 
Male 0.898 0.790 1.021 0.967 0.830 1.127 0.960 0.815 1.130 
Democrat 4.129 3.280 5.197 5.255 3.720 7.422 5.016 3.580 7.027 



































































Table 5.10: Negative-Impact Co-Sponsorship Bills Odds Ratios 
 














































1.013 0.914 1.122 0.921 0.749 1.133 
Election 
Margin 










 Congress 1.145 0.839 1.563 0.110 0.048 0.252 
110
th
 Congress 2.119 1.601 2.806 0.139 0.061 0.317 
111
th















Percent Black 0.999 0.987 1.011 1.012 0.988 1.036 



















Non-Minority 0.925 0.382 2.244 2.277 0.183 28.383 
Male 0.782 0.601 1.017 0.794 0.443 1.423 
Democrat 0.309 0.168 0.570 0.163 0.044 0.602 



















0.991 0.977 1.006 0.974 0.946 1.004 
Labor PAC 
Contributions 
0.991 0.988 0.994 0.997 0.991 1.004 
Finance PAC 
Contributions 














(Degrees of Freedom) 
 Sponsorship Co-Sponsorship 















































































































































































































































































































 N 430 430 429 
R
2
 0.078 0.239 0.176 










































































































































































































































































 N 445 452 452 441 







Appendix: Generalized Odds Ratio Estimates for Floor Speeches 
 





Responsibility 1.132 0.276 4.647 
Individuality 1.349 0.328 5.555 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.314 0.400 4.310 
Market 0.932 0.212 4.093 
Small 
Government 
1.608 0.445 5.818 
Macro-Economic 
Stress Factor 
Responsibility 0.850 0.378 1.914 
Individuality 0.764 0.314 1.856 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.740 0.390 1.405 
Market 0.722 0.279 1.867 
Small 
Government 
0.884 0.453 1.727 
Election Margin Responsibility 0.989 0.960 1.018 
Individuality 1.005 0.968 1.043 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.984 0.960 1.008 
Market 0.997 0.958 1.038 
Small 
Government 
0.984 0.957 1.011 
Percent Black Responsibility 1.078 0.968 1.200 
Individuality 1.003 0.900 1.118 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.078 0.972 1.197 
Market 1.013 0.906 1.134 
Small 
Government 
1.094 0.982 1.219 
Percent Latino Responsibility 0.989 0.920 1.063 
Individuality 0.980 0.915 1.050 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.030 0.966 1.098 
Market 0.993 0.925 1.066 
Small 
Government 





Responsibility 0.975 0.784 1.214 
Individuality 1.033 0.818 1.303 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.006 0.843 1.199 
Market 0.966 0.758 1.232 
Small 
Government 
1.005 0.831 1.215 
Seniority Responsibility 0.836 0.678 1.030 
Individuality 0.891 0.724 1.098 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.015 0.864 1.191 
Market 0.779 0.618 0.981 
Small 
Government 
1.015 0.850 1.212 
Democratic Vote 
Previous Election 
Responsibility 0.985 0.897 1.081 
Individuality 0.999 0.893 1.117 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.944 0.862 1.034 
Market 1.027 0.912 1.156 
Small 
Government 
0.967 0.874 1.070 
Labor PAC 
Contributions 
Responsibility 1.005 0.988 1.023 
Individuality 0.995 0.979 1.012 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.015 0.995 1.036 
Market 0.992 0.975 1.009 
Small 
Government 
1.006 0.983 1.031 
Finance PAC 
Contributions 
Responsibility 0.999 0.994 1.005 
Individuality 0.997 0.992 1.002 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.006 1.000 1.011 
Market 0.999 0.994 1.005 
Small 
Government 
1.006 1.000 1.011 
109
th
 Congress Responsibility >999.999 <0.001 . 
Individuality 0.556 0.017 18.725 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.093 0.014 0.612 




0.070 0.010 0.513 
110
th
 Congress Responsibility >999.999 <0.001 . 
Individuality 3.270 0.088 121.323 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.321 0.042 2.474 
Market 4.029 0.100 162.413 
Small 
Government 
0.192 0.022 1.637 
111
th
 Congress Responsibility >999.999 <0.001 . 
Individuality 0.299 0.010 9.390 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.181 0.028 1.179 
Market 0.493 0.014 17.325 
Small 
Government 
0.224 0.033 1.534 
Non-Minority Responsibility 29.588 0.185 >999.999 
Individuality 5.021 0.049 516.073 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.580 <0.001 . 
Market 5.265 0.043 651.097 
Small 
Government 
4.188 <0.001 . 
Male Responsibility 2.652 0.406 17.339 
Individuality 1.615 0.223 11.697 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.787 0.404 7.900 
Market 3.318 0.396 27.841 
Small 
Government 
0.721 0.154 3.369 
Democrat Responsibility 6.485 0.051 821.836 
Individuality >999.999 47.483 >999.999 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
<0.001 <0.001 . 
Market >999.999 9.517 >999.999 
Small 
Government 











Responsibility 1.394 0.498 3.908 
Individuality 1.129 0.437 2.917 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.012 0.393 2.607 
Market 1.786 0.771 4.134 
Small 
Government 
0.890 0.422 1.876 
Macro-Economic 
Stress Factor 
Responsibility 1.152 0.608 2.181 
Individuality 1.105 0.536 2.278 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.972 0.632 1.495 
Market 1.131 0.602 2.124 
Small 
Government 
0.806 0.550 1.180 
Election Margin Responsibility 0.996 0.971 1.022 
Individuality 0.981 0.947 1.016 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.009 0.987 1.032 
Market 0.997 0.972 1.023 
Small 
Government 
1.006 0.987 1.026 
Percent Black Responsibility 1.006 0.942 1.075 
Individuality 0.960 0.897 1.027 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.022 0.961 1.086 
Market 0.937 0.884 0.993 
Small 
Government 
0.985 0.934 1.038 
Percent Latino Responsibility 0.980 0.927 1.036 
Individuality 1.012 0.963 1.063 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.010 0.971 1.050 
Market 0.981 0.939 1.026 
Small 
Government 
0.990 0.958 1.024 
Percent 
Graduated 
Responsibility 1.002 0.847 1.185 




0.942 0.818 1.084 
Market 1.031 0.890 1.194 
Small 
Government 
0.999 0.896 1.113 
Seniority Responsibility 0.906 0.749 1.096 
Individuality 1.027 0.850 1.241 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.056 0.928 1.202 
Market 1.142 0.978 1.335 
Small 
Government 
0.990 0.890 1.101 
Democratic Vote 
Previous Election 
Responsibility 1.000 0.931 1.075 
Individuality 1.039 0.938 1.151 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.049 0.972 1.133 
Market 1.003 0.929 1.083 
Small 
Government 
1.024 0.965 1.087 
Labor PAC 
Contributions 
Responsibility 1.003 0.993 1.013 
Individuality 0.994 0.985 1.004 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.997 0.980 1.013 
Market 0.995 0.987 1.004 
Small 
Government 
1.000 0.989 1.010 
Finance PAC 
Contributions 
Responsibility 0.998 0.994 1.002 
Individuality 0.999 0.996 1.003 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.001 0.997 1.004 
Market 0.997 0.994 1.000 
Small 
Government 
1.002 0.999 1.005 
109
th
 Congress Responsibility >999.999 <0.001 . 
Individuality 1.808 0.144 22.703 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.001 0.280 3.586 
Market 2.068 0.249 17.205 
Small 
Government 




 Congress Responsibility >999.999 <0.001 . 
Individuality 0.946 0.088 10.160 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.493 0.139 1.743 
Market 0.617 0.083 4.576 
Small 
Government 
0.890 0.329 2.406 
111
th
 Congress Responsibility >999.999 <0.001 . 
Individuality 2.549 0.220 29.483 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.025 0.315 3.338 
Market 1.094 0.137 8.751 
Small 
Government 
0.838 0.303 2.319 
Non-Minority Responsibility 2.517 0.082 77.396 
Individuality 0.279 0.014 5.543 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
8.887 <0.001 . 
Market 0.280 0.020 3.883 
Small 
Government 
>999.999 <0.001 . 
Male Responsibility 0.686 0.129 3.647 
Individuality 0.864 0.146 5.118 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.151 0.042 0.541 
Market 0.345 0.072 1.647 
Small 
Government 
0.851 0.253 2.861 
Democrat Responsibility 2.183 0.101 47.125 
Individuality >999.999 <0.001 . 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
<0.001 <0.001 . 
Market 914.838 44.384 >999.999 
Small 
Government 













Responsibility 0.873 0.287 2.655 
Individuality 0.294 0.087 1.000 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.579 0.480 5.194 
Market 0.311 0.084 1.154 
Small 
Government 
1.007 0.301 3.367 
Macro-Economic 
Stress Factor 
Responsibility 0.930 0.478 1.810 
Individuality 0.741 0.343 1.599 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.695 0.859 3.343 
Market 0.675 0.290 1.568 
Small 
Government 
1.370 0.691 2.715 
Election Margin Responsibility 0.988 0.965 1.012 
Individuality 0.986 0.956 1.017 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.990 0.962 1.019 
Market 0.988 0.953 1.024 
Small 
Government 
1.003 0.977 1.030 
Percent Black Responsibility 1.012 0.936 1.093 
Individuality 0.992 0.910 1.080 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.989 0.912 1.073 
Market 1.056 0.962 1.159 
Small 
Government 
0.972 0.891 1.060 
Percent Latino Responsibility 1.005 0.960 1.051 
Individuality 1.008 0.960 1.060 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.972 0.922 1.025 
Market 1.039 0.981 1.101 
Small 
Government 
0.984 0.935 1.035 
Percent 
Graduated 
Responsibility 0.973 0.826 1.147 




1.048 0.881 1.247 
Market 0.988 0.803 1.215 
Small 
Government 
0.951 0.793 1.140 
Seniority Responsibility 0.939 0.805 1.095 
Individuality 1.005 0.842 1.199 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.069 0.903 1.265 
Market 0.972 0.794 1.190 
Small 
Government 
0.990 0.836 1.173 
Democratic Vote 
Previous Election 
Responsibility 0.996 0.927 1.069 
Individuality 1.033 0.940 1.135 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.978 0.893 1.070 
Market 0.985 0.882 1.101 
Small 
Government 
0.994 0.913 1.081 
Labor PAC 
Contributions 
Responsibility 1.002 0.989 1.016 
Individuality 0.998 0.984 1.012 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.992 0.975 1.010 
Market 1.001 0.986 1.016 
Small 
Government 
0.997 0.981 1.015 
Finance PAC 
Contributions 
Responsibility 1.000 0.996 1.005 
Individuality 1.000 0.995 1.004 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.005 1.000 1.010 
Market 0.997 0.991 1.003 
Small 
Government 
1.003 0.998 1.008 
109
th
 Congress Responsibility 16.170 2.421 108.018 
Individuality 0.117 0.009 1.615 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.244 0.035 1.720 
Market 0.128 0.007 2.209 
Small 
Government 




 Congress Responsibility 5.541 0.932 32.949 
Individuality 0.192 0.017 2.204 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.838 0.161 4.367 
Market 0.032 0.002 0.580 
Small 
Government 
0.484 0.087 2.705 
111
th
 Congress Responsibility 1.344 0.231 7.833 
Individuality 0.180 0.016 1.987 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.516 0.111 2.400 
Market 0.219 0.017 2.903 
Small 
Government 
0.466 0.096 2.258 
Non-Minority Responsibility <0.001 <0.001 . 
Individuality <0.001 <0.001 . 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
<0.001 <0.001 . 
Market <0.001 <0.001 . 
Small 
Government 
0.048 <0.001 . 
Male Responsibility 2.232 0.541 9.208 
Individuality 2.034 0.403 10.272 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.211 0.277 5.295 
Market 2.321 0.388 13.862 
Small 
Government 
2.258 0.449 11.363 
Democrat Responsibility 6.603 0.217 200.692 
Individuality >999.999 <0.001 . 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
<0.001 <0.001 . 
Market >999.999 <0.001 . 
Small 
Government 













Responsibility 1.670 0.765 3.647 
Individuality 0.885 0.319 2.458 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.400 0.524 3.737 
Market 0.659 0.286 1.517 
Small 
Government 
2.178 0.872 5.445 
Macro-Economic 
Stress Factor 
Responsibility 1.037 0.668 1.611 
Individuality 0.910 0.462 1.792 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.511 0.905 2.522 
Market 1.019 0.612 1.696 
Small 
Government 
1.337 0.850 2.105 
Election Margin Responsibility 0.988 0.972 1.004 
Individuality 0.996 0.965 1.027 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.990 0.968 1.012 
Market 0.992 0.971 1.013 
Small 
Government 
0.986 0.965 1.007 
Percent Black Responsibility 1.052 0.992 1.116 
Individuality 1.103 1.022 1.191 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.046 0.969 1.128 
Market 1.029 0.967 1.095 
Small 
Government 
1.064 0.993 1.139 
Percent Latino Responsibility 1.001 0.974 1.029 
Individuality 1.029 0.981 1.080 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.963 0.914 1.014 
Market 1.001 0.971 1.031 
Small 
Government 
0.984 0.947 1.023 
Percent 
Graduated 
Responsibility 1.063 0.945 1.197 




1.028 0.886 1.192 
Market 0.960 0.842 1.096 
Small 
Government 
1.102 0.965 1.259 
Seniority Responsibility 1.018 0.907 1.143 
Individuality 1.147 0.969 1.358 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.112 0.972 1.271 
Market 1.102 0.971 1.250 
Small 
Government 
1.084 0.951 1.235 
Democratic Vote 
Previous Election 
Responsibility 1.000 0.952 1.050 
Individuality 0.954 0.865 1.053 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.982 0.915 1.054 
Market 1.016 0.955 1.081 
Small 
Government 
0.980 0.916 1.048 
Labor PAC 
Contributions 
Responsibility 1.010 1.001 1.019 
Individuality 1.009 0.998 1.021 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.009 0.996 1.022 
Market 1.004 0.995 1.013 
Small 
Government 
1.006 0.993 1.020 
Finance PAC 
Contributions 
Responsibility 1.000 0.997 1.003 
Individuality 0.995 0.989 1.001 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.002 0.998 1.006 
Market 1.000 0.996 1.003 
Small 
Government 
1.004 1.001 1.008 
109
th
 Congress Responsibility 51.839 11.152 240.965 
Individuality 1.159 0.114 11.757 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
2.086 0.412 10.547 
Market 0.676 0.111 4.126 
Small 
Government 




 Congress Responsibility 13.751 3.651 51.796 
Individuality 0.308 0.031 3.107 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.279 0.318 5.141 
Market 1.135 0.263 4.890 
Small 
Government 
1.243 0.358 4.314 
111
th
 Congress Responsibility 2.362 0.649 8.592 
Individuality 0.977 0.143 6.653 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.661 0.188 2.330 
Market 0.618 0.152 2.504 
Small 
Government 
0.737 0.246 2.201 
Non-Minority Responsibility 2.652 0.224 31.346 
Individuality 2.281 0.108 48.036 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
>999.999 <0.001 . 
Market 0.845 0.069 10.396 
Small 
Government 
>999.999 <0.001 . 
Male Responsibility 0.277 0.056 1.357 
Individuality 0.198 0.030 1.311 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.131 0.023 0.732 
Market 0.214 0.040 1.135 
Small 
Government 
0.182 0.034 0.977 
Democrat Responsibility 0.784 0.104 5.933 
Individuality >999.999 <0.001 . 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.078 0.004 1.667 
Market 18.167 1.870 176.450 
Small 
Government 













Responsibility 1.018 0.409 2.533 
Individuality 0.529 0.196 1.424 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.125 0.474 2.672 
Market 0.725 0.247 2.125 
Small 
Government 
1.842 0.644 5.263 
Macro-Economic 
Stress Factor 
Responsibility 1.120 0.659 1.904 
Individuality 1.252 0.662 2.367 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.106 0.713 1.717 
Market 1.222 0.620 2.409 
Small 
Government 
1.223 0.717 2.085 
Election Margin Responsibility 1.004 0.982 1.026 
Individuality 1.006 0.978 1.035 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.016 0.992 1.041 
Market 0.998 0.968 1.030 
Small 
Government 
1.010 0.981 1.040 
Percent Black Responsibility 1.007 0.951 1.066 
 Individuality 1.022 0.962 1.086 
 Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.008 0.947 1.072 
 Market 1.074 1.004 1.149 
 Small 
Government 
1.026 0.958 1.099 
Percent Latino Responsibility 1.003 0.965 1.042 
Individuality 1.005 0.964 1.048 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.962 0.926 0.999 
Market 1.025 0.977 1.075 
Small 
Government 
0.977 0.934 1.023 
Percent 
Graduated 
Responsibility 1.001 0.874 1.145 




0.975 0.856 1.110 
Market 1.079 0.910 1.280 
Small 
Government 
1.081 0.931 1.254 
Seniority Responsibility 1.075 0.928 1.246 
Individuality 1.313 1.099 1.568 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.993 0.869 1.133 
Market 1.207 0.990 1.473 
Small 
Government 
1.037 0.885 1.215 
Democratic Vote 
Previous Election 
Responsibility 0.973 0.913 1.037 
Individuality 0.965 0.886 1.052 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.985 0.918 1.058 
Market 0.945 0.861 1.038 
Small 
Government 
0.985 0.902 1.076 
Labor PAC 
Contributions 
Responsibility 1.000 0.991 1.009 
Individuality 0.994 0.984 1.004 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.003 0.992 1.015 
Market 0.996 0.985 1.006 
Small 
Government 
0.987 0.964 1.010 
Finance PAC 
Contributions 
Responsibility 1.001 0.997 1.004 
Individuality 0.999 0.995 1.003 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.005 1.001 1.008 
Market 0.997 0.992 1.002 
Small 
Government 
1.004 1.000 1.008 
109
th
 Congress Responsibility 74.888 8.653 648.130 
Individuality 2.756 0.271 28.009 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.198 0.042 0.929 
Market 4.507 0.351 57.810 
Small 
Government 




 Congress Responsibility 5.403 0.733 39.826 
Individuality 0.771 0.096 6.202 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.399 0.128 1.247 
Market 2.219 0.230 21.458 
Small 
Government 
0.519 0.133 2.026 
111
th
 Congress Responsibility 1.877 0.225 15.644 
Individuality 0.772 0.090 6.615 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.508 0.159 1.620 
Market 2.482 0.244 25.288 
Small 
Government 
0.660 0.173 2.512 
Non-Minority Responsibility 3.086 0.260 36.659 
Individuality 2.763 0.225 33.990 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
>999.999 <0.001 . 
Market 8.998 0.552 146.619 
Small 
Government 
13.288 <0.001 . 
Male Responsibility 0.369 0.094 1.452 
Individuality 0.169 0.036 0.801 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.929 0.527 7.070 
Market 0.220 0.041 1.176 
Small 
Government 
0.526 0.137 2.015 
Democrat Responsibility 38.444 2.628 562.411 
Individuality >999.999 <0.001 . 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.062 0.002 1.624 
Market 948.033 23.261 >999.999 
Small 
Government 













Responsibility 0.981 0.402 1.862 
Individuality 0.983 0.202 1.475 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.950 0.607 4.488 
Market 1.032 0.204 1.021 
Small 
Government 
0.972 0.548 3.149 
Macro-Economic 
Stress Factor 
Responsibility 0.999 0.455 1.112 
Individuality 0.992 0.346 1.257 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.005 0.618 1.663 
Market 0.992 0.360 1.018 
Small 
Government 
1.007 0.571 1.319 
Election Margin Responsibility 0.999 0.979 1.013 
Individuality 0.994 0.955 1.014 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.998 0.964 1.021 
Market 0.998 0.966 1.011 
Small 
Government 
1.000 0.983 1.025 
Percent Black Responsibility 74.673 0.925 1.018 
Individuality 9.418 0.959 1.084 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.867 0.901 1.035 
Market 2.072 0.920 1.018 
Small 
Government 
0.271 0.926 1.035 
Percent Latino Responsibility 10.974 0.985 1.055 
Individuality 9.597 0.980 1.077 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.563 0.965 1.062 
Market 1.021 0.977 1.049 
Small 
Government 
1.131 0.974 1.055 
Percent 
Graduated 
Responsibility 4.239 0.882 1.116 




1.273 1.002 1.346 
Market 1.417 0.781 1.009 
Small 
Government 
1.219 0.950 1.233 
Seniority Responsibility 0.102 0.880 1.104 
Individuality 0.140 0.849 1.208 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
>999.999 0.861 1.154 
Market 0.077 0.976 1.238 
Small 
Government 
0.070 0.891 1.144 
Democratic Vote 
Previous Election 
Responsibility 0.623 0.931 1.034 
Individuality 0.439 0.896 1.077 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.486 0.874 1.033 
Market 0.374 0.960 1.108 
Small 
Government 
0.930 0.905 1.044 
Labor PAC 
Contributions 
Responsibility 7.349 0.992 1.006 
Individuality 140.970 0.983 1.001 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.027 0.992 1.019 
Market 406.715 0.984 0.999 
Small 
Government 
<0.001 0.995 1.020 
Finance PAC 
Contributions 
Responsibility 0.981 0.996 1.001 
Individuality 0.983 0.989 0.999 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.950 0.994 1.002 
Market 1.032 0.995 1.001 
Small 
Government 
0.972 0.997 1.003 
109
th
 Congress Responsibility 0.999 10.691 521.562 
Individuality 0.992 0.684 129.748 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.005 0.184 4.090 
Market 0.992 0.316 13.590 
Small 
Government 




 Congress Responsibility 0.999 1.721 69.966 
Individuality 0.994 0.905 101.727 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.998 0.409 5.980 
Market 0.998 0.188 5.529 
Small 
Government 
1.000 0.362 3.535 
111
th
 Congress Responsibility 74.673 0.613 29.331 
Individuality 9.418 1.374 160.227 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
0.867 0.337 4.809 
Market 2.072 0.257 7.829 
Small 
Government 
0.271 0.393 3.779 
Non-Minority Responsibility 10.974 0.009 1.170 
Individuality 9.597 0.009 2.178 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.563 <0.001 . 
Market 1.021 0.007 0.911 
Small 
Government 
1.131 <0.001 . 
Male Responsibility 4.239 0.198 1.963 
Individuality 14.837 0.097 1.986 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
1.273 0.132 1.797 
Market 1.417 0.106 1.311 
Small 
Government 
1.219 0.273 3.163 
Democrat Responsibility 0.102 0.861 62.747 
Individuality 0.140 4.127 >999.999 
Corporate Self-
Interest 
>999.999 <0.001 1.585 
Market 0.077 21.621 >999.999 
Small 
Government 





Appendix: Frequencies of Legislative Activity Dependent Variables 
 





0 1,668 93.18% 
1 93 5.20% 
2 18 1.01% 
3 5 0.28% 
4 4 0.22% 
5 1 0.06% 
6 1 0.06% 
 
 





0 1,725 96.37% 
1 54 3.02% 
2 8 0.45% 
3 3 0.17% 
 
 





0 1,764 98.55% 
1 25 1.40% 
2 1 0.06% 
 
 





0 1,770 98.88% 
1 19 1.06% 










0 1,114 62.23% 
1 350 19.55% 
2 183 10.22% 
3 88 4.92% 
4 39 2.18% 
5 13 0.73% 
6 2 0.11% 





Appendix: Logistic Regression of Legislative Activity Dependent Variables 
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Appendix: Economic Interest Groups 
 
-ABA Commission on Homelessness and Poverty 
(http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_services/homelessness_poverty.html) 
-Alliance for Worker Freedom (http://www.workerfreedom.org/) 
-American Federation of Government Employees (http://www.afge.org/) 
-American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization, AFL-CIO 
(http://www.aflcio.org/) 
-Americans for Fair Taxation (http://www.fairtax.org/site/PageServer) 
-Americans for Tax Reform (http://www.atr.org/) 
-American Shareholders Association (http://www.americanshareholders.org/) 
-Appraisal Institute (http://www.appraisalinstitute.org/) 
-Brookings Institution (http://www.brookings.edu/) 
-Cato Institute (http://www.cato.org/) 
-Center for Community Change (http://www.communitychange.org/) 
-Center for Urban Community Services (http://www.cucs.org/) 
-Center for Budget and Policy Priorities (http://www.cbpp.org/about/) 
-Citizens Against Government Waste (http://www.cagw.org/) 
-Citizens for Tax Justice (http://www.ctj.org/) 
-Citizen’s Housing and Planning Association (http://www.chapa.org/) 
-Coalition of Community Development Financial Institutions (http://www.cdfi.org/) 
-Committee for Economic Development (http://www.ced.org/) 
-Community Reinvestment Fund (http://www.crfusa.com/Pages/Default.aspx) 
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-Concord Coalition (http://www.concordcoalition.org/) 
-Consumer Federation of America (http://www.consumerfed.org/) 
-Council for Affordable and Rural Housing (http://www.carh.org/) 
-Economic Policy Institute (http://www.epi.org/) 
-Fannie Mae (http://www.fanniemae.com/kb/index?page=home) 
-Federal Home Loan Bank System (http://www.fhlbanks.com/) 
-Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (http://www.ffiec.gov/) 
-Federal Housing Finance Agency (http://www.fhfa.gov/) 
-Federally Employed Women (http://www.few.org/) 
-Freddie Mac (http://www.freddiemac.com/) 
-FreedomWorks (http://www.freedomworks.org/) 
-Heritage Foundation (http://www.heritage.org/) 
-Hudson Institute (http://www.hudson.org/) 
-Institute of Real Estate Management (http://www.irem.org/) 
-International Economic Development Council (http://www.iedconline.org/) 
-International Brotherhood of Teamsters (http://www.teamster.org/) 
-Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies (http://www.jointcenter.org/) 
-Mortgage Bankers Association (http://www.mbaa.org/default.htm) 
-Mortgage Insurance Companies of America (http://www.micanews.com/) 
-National Affordable Housing Management Association (http://www.nahma.org/) 
-National Alliance to End Homelessness (http://www.endhomelessness.org/) 
-National Association of Home Builders (http://www.nahb.com/) 
-National Association of Manufacturers (http://www.nam.org/) 
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-National Association of Mortgage Professionals (http://www.namp.org/) 
-National Association for the Self-Employed (http://www.nase.org/Home.aspx) 
-National Center for Homeless Education (http://center.serve.org/nche/) 
-National Coalition for the Homeless (http://www.nationalhomeless.org/) 
-National Federation of Independent Business (http://www.nfib.com/) 
-National Healthcare for the Homeless Council (http://www.nhchc.org/) 
-National Housing and Rehabilitation Association (http://www.housingonline.com/) 
-National Housing Institute (http://www.nhi.org/) 
-National Housing Trust (http://www.nhtinc.org/) 
-National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty (http://www.nlchp.org/) 
-National Low Income Housing Coalition (http://www.nlihc.org/template/index.cfm) 
-National Small Business Association (http://www.nsba.biz/) 
-National Taxpayers Union (http://www.ntu.org/) 
-Partnership for the Homeless (http://www.partnershipforthehomeless.org/home.php5) 
-Public Citizen’s Congress Watch (http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=183) 
-Sergeant Shriver Center on Poverty Law (http://www.povertylaw.org/) 
-Taxpayers for Common Sense (http://www.taxpayer.net/) 
-United Auto Workers (http://www.uaw.org/) 
-U.S. Chamber of Commerce (http://www.uschamber.com/) 
-U.S. PIRG (http://www.uspirg.org/) 
-Women Employed (http://www.womenemployed.org/) 
-Workplace Fairness (http://www.workplacefairness.org/) 
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Appendix: Interest Group Classifications 
 
Unemployment 
Pro-Worker Neutral Pro-Business 
Alliance for Worker 
Freedom 
Brookings Institution Heritage Foundation 
American Federation of 
Government Employees 




AFL-CIO  National Association of 
Manufacturers 
Center for Community 
Change 
 National Association for 
the Self-Employed 
Center for Budget and 
Policy Priorities 




 National Small Business 
Association 










Pro-Worker Neutral Pro-Business 
Joint Center for Political 
and Economic Studies 
  
National Healthcare for the 
Homeless Council 
  
National Law Center on 
Homelessness and Poverty 
  
Sergeant Shriver Center on 
Poverty Law 
  
United Auto Workers   
Women Employed   




Pro-Buyer Neutral Pro-Market 
ABA Commission on 
Homelessness and Poverty 
Appraisal Institute Cato Institute 
Center for Community 
Change 
Federal Housing Finance 
Agency 
Fannie Mae 
Center for Urban 
Community Services 
National Association of 
Mortgage Professionals 
Federal Home Loan Banks 
Center for Budget and Brookings Institution Freddie Mac 
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Pro-Buyer Neutral Pro-Market 
Policy Priorities 
Citizens’ Housing and 
Planning Association 
 Heritage Foundation 
Consumer Federation of 
America 
 Institute of Real Estate 
Management 
Council for Affordable and 
Rural Housing 
 Mortgage Bankers 
Association 
Joint Center for Political 
and Economic Studies 
 Mortgage Insurance 




 National Association of 
Home Builders 
National Alliance to End 
Homelessness 
  
National Center for 
Homelessness Education 
  
National Coalition for the 
Homeless 
  
National Healthcare for the 
Homeless Council 
  




Pro-Buyer Neutral Pro-Market 
National Housing Institute   
National Housing Trust   
National Law Center on 
Homelessness and Poverty 
  
National Low Income 
Housing Coalition 
  






Pro-Consumer Neutral Pro-Banking 
Citizens Against 
Government Waste 
Americans for Fair 
Taxation 
Americans for Tax Reform 
Citizens for Tax Justice Brookings Institution American Shareholders 
Association 
Coalition of Community 
Development Financial 
Institutions 





Federal Home Loan Banks 
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Pro-Consumer Neutral Pro-Banking 
Council 
Consumer Federation of 
America 
Taxpayers for Common 
Sense 
Heritage Foundation 
Economic Policy Institute  International Economic 
Development Council 
FreedomWorks  National Taxpayers Union 
National Housing and 
Rehabilitation Program 
  
Public Citizen’s Congress 
Watch 
  


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix: Members by Committee 
 








 29 D/38 R 32 D/38 R/1 I 22 D/26 R 16 D/24 R 
110
th
 37 D/32 R 41 D/36 R 26 D/21 R 23 D/17 R 
111
th
 37 D/23 R 42 D/29 R 27 D/23 R 26 D/15 R 







David Obey, D-WI 
John Murtha, D-PA 
Norman Dicks, D-WA 
Martin Olav Sabo, D-MN 
Steny Hoyer, D-MD 
Alan Mollohan, D-WV 
Marcy Kaptur, D-OH 
Peter Visclosky, D-IN 
Nita Lowey, D-NY 
Jose Serrano, D-NY 
Rosa DeLauro, D-CT 
James Moran, D-VA 
John Olver, D-MA 
Ed Pastor, D-AZ 
David Price, D-NC 
Chet Edwards, D-TX 
Bud Cramer, D-AL 
Patrick Kennedy, D-RI 
James Clyburn, D-SC 
Maurice Hinchey, D-NY 
Lucille Royal-Allard, D-CA 
Sam Farr, D-CA 
Jesse Jackson Jr., D-IL 
Carolyn Kilpatrick, D-MI 
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Allen Boyd, D-FL 
Chaka Fattah, D-PA 
Steven Rothman, D-NJ 
Sanford Bishop, D-GA 
Marion Berry, D-AR 
Jerry Lewis, R-CA 
C.W. Bill Young, R-FL 
Ralph Regula, R-OH 
Harold Rogers, R-KY 
Frank Wolf, R-VA 
Jim Kolbe, R-AZ 
James Walsh, R-NY 
Charles Taylor, R-NC 
David Hobson, R-OH 
Ernest Istook Jr., R-OK 
Henry Bonilla, R-TX 
Joe Knollenberg, R-MI 
Jack Kingston, R-GA 
Rodney Frelinghuysen, R-NJ 
Roger Wicker, R-MS 
Randy Cunningham, R-CA 
Todd Tiahrt, R-KS 
Zach Wamp, R-TN 
Tom Latham, R-IA 
Anne Meagher Northup, R-KY 
Robert Aderholt, R-AL 
Jo Ann Emerson, R-MO 
Kay Granger, R-TX 
John Peterson, R-PA 
Virgil Goode Jr., R-VA 
John Doolittle, R-CA 
Ray LaHood, R-IL 
John Sweeney, R-NY 
Don Sherwood, R-PA 
Dave Weldon, R-FL 
Michael Simpson, R-ID 
John Culberson, R-TX 
Mark Kirk, R-IL 
Ander Crenshaw, R-FL 
Dennis Rehberg, R-MT 
John Carter, R-TX 
Rodney Alexander, R-LA 





Barney Frank, D-MA 
Paul Kanjorski, D-PA 
Maxine Waters, D-CA 
Carolyn Maloney, D-NY 
Luis Gutierrez, D-IL 
Nydia Velazquez, D-NY 
Melvin Watt, D-NC 
Gary Ackerman, D-NY 
Darlene Hooley, D-OR 
Julia Carson, D-IN 
Brad Sherman, D-CA 
Gregory Meeks, D-NY 
Barbara Lee, D-CA 
Dennis Moore, D-KS 
Michael Capuano, D-MA 
Harold Ford Jr., D-TN 
Ruben Hinojosa, D-TX 
Joseph Crowley, D-NY 
William Clay, D-MO 
Steve Israel, D-NY 
Carolyn McCarthy, D-NY 
Joe Baca, D-CA 
Jim Matheson, D-UT 
Stephen Lynch, D-MA 
Brad Miller, D-NC 
David Scott, D-GA 
Artur Davis, D-AL 
Al Green, D-TX 
Emanuel Cleaver, D-MO 
Melissa Bean, D-IL 
Debbie Wasserman Schultz, D-FL 
Gwen Moore, D-WI 
Michael Oxley, R-OH 
James Leach, R-IA 
Richard Baker,R-LA 
Deborah Pryce, R-OH 
Spencer Bachus, R-AL 
Michael Castle, R-DE 
Peter King, R-NY 
Ed Royce, R-CA 
Frank Lucas, R-OK 
Robert Ney, R-OH 
Sue Kelly, R-NY 
Ron Paul, R-TX 
Paul Gillmor, R-OH 
Jim Ryun, R-KS 
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Steven LaTourette, R-OH 
Donald Manzullo, R-IL 
Walter Jones Jr., R-NC 
Judy Biggert, R-IL 
Christopher Shays, R-CT 
Vito Fossella, R-NY 
Gary Miller, R-CA 
Patrick Tiberi, R-OH 
Mark Kennedy, R-MN 
Tom Feeney, R-FL 
Jeb Hensarling, R-TX 
Scott Garrett, R-NJ 
Ginny Brown-Waite, R-FL 
Gresham Barrett, R-SC 
Katherine Harris, R-FL 
Rick Renzi, R-AZ 
Jim Gerlach, R-PA 
Steven Pearce, R-NM 
Randy Neugebauer, R-TX 
Tom Price, R-GA 
Michael Fitzpatrick, R-PA 
Geoff Davis, R-KY 
Patrick McHenry, R-NC 
John Campbell, R-CA 
Bernard Sanders, I-VT 
 
 
Education and the Workforce 
George Miller, D-CA 
Dale Kildee, D-MI 
Major Owens, D-NY 
Donald Payne, D-NJ 
Robert Andrews, D-NJ 
Robert Scott, D-VA 
Lynn Woolsey, D-CA 
Ruben Hinojosa, D-TX 
Carolyn McCarthy, D-NY 
John Tierney, D-MA 
Ron Kind, D-WI 
Dennis Kucinich, D-OH 
David Wu, D-OR 
Rush Holt, D-NJ 
Susan Davis, D-CA 
Betty McCollum, D-MN 
Danny Davis, D-IL 
Raul Grijalva, D-AZ 
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Chris Van Hollen, D-MD 
Ryan Timothy, D-OH 
Timothy Bishop, D-NY 
John Barrow, D-GA 
John Boehner, R-OH 
Thomas Petri, R-WI 
Howard McKeon, R-CA 
Michael Castle, R-DE 
Sam Johnson, R-TX 
Mark Souder, R-IN 
Charles Norwood, R-GA 
Vernon Ehlers, R-MI 
Judy Biggert, R-IL 
Todd Russell Platts, R-PA 
Patrick Tiberi, R-OH 
Ric Keller, R-FL 
Tom Osborne, R-NE 
Addison Wilson, R-SC 
Jon Porter, R-NV 
John Kline, R-MN 
Marilyn Musgrave, R-CO 
Bob Inglis, R-SC 
Cathy McMorris, R-WA 
Kenny Marchant, R-TX 
Tom Price, R-GA 
Bobby Jindal, R-LA 
Charles Boustany, R-LA 
Virginia Foxx, R-NC 
Thelma Drake, R-VA 
John Kuhl Jr., R-NY 
 
 
Ways and Means 
Charles Rangel, D-NY 
Fortney Pete Stark, D-CA 
Sander Levin, D-MI 
Benjamin Cardin, D-MD 
James McDermott, D-WA 
John Lewis, D-GA 
Richard Neal, D-MA 
Michael McNulty, D-NY 
William Jefferson, D-LA 
John Tanner, D-TN 
Xavier Becerra, D-CA 
Lloyd Doggett, D-TX 
Earl Pomeroy D-ND 
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Stephanie Tubbs Jones, D-OH 
Mike Thompson, D-CA 
John Larson, D-CT 
Rahm Emanuel, D-IL 
William Thomas, R-CA 
E. Clay Shaw Jr., R-FL 
Nancy Johnson, R-CT 
Wally Herget, R-CA 
Jim McCrery, R-LA 
Dave camp, R-MI 
Jim Ramstad, R-MN 
Jim Nussle, R-IA 
Sam Johnson, R-TX 
Rob Portman, R-OH 
Phil English, R-PA 
J.D. Hayworth, R-AZ 
Gerald Weller, R-IL 
Kenny Hulshof, R-MO 
Ron Lewis, R-KY 
Mark Foley, R-FL 
Kevin Brady, R-TX 
Thomas Reynolds, R-NY 
Paul Ryan, R-WI 
Eric Cantor, R-VA 
John Linder, R-GA 
Melissa Hart, R-PA 
Bob Beauprez, R-CO 
Chris Chocola, R-IN 








David Obey, D-WI 
John Murtha Jr., D-PA 
Norman Dicks, D-WA 
Alan Mollohan, D-WV 
Marcy Kaptur, D-OH 
Peter Visclosky, D-IN 
Nita Lowey, D-NY 
Jose Serrano, D-NY 
Rosa DeLauro, D-CT 
James Moran, D-VA 
John Olver, D-MA 
Ed Pastor, D-AZ 
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David Price, D-NC 
Chet Edwards, D-TX 
Bud Cramer, D-AL 
Patrick Kennedy, D-RI 
Maurice Hinchey, D-NY 
Lucille Roybal-Allard, D-CA 
Sam Farr, D-CA 
Jesse Jackson Jr., D-IL 
Carolyn Kilpatrick, D-MI 
Allen Boyd, D-FL 
Chaka Fattah, D-PA 
Steven Rothman, D-NJ 
Sanford Bishop, D-GA 
Marion Berry, D-AR 
Barbara Lee, D-CA 
Tom Udall, D-NM 
Adam Schiff, D-CA 
Mike Honda, D-CA 
Betty McCollum, D-MN 
Steve Israel, D-NY 
Timothy Ryan, D-OH 
C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger, D-MD 
A.B. Chandler, D-KY 
Debbie Wasserman Schultz, D-FL 
Ciro Rodriguez, D-TX 
Jerry Lewis, R-CA 
C.W. Bill Young, R-FL 
Ralph Regula, R-OH 
Harold Rogers, R-KY 
Frank Wolf, R-VA 
James Walsh, R-NY 
David Hobson, R-OH 
Joe Knollenberg, R-MI 
Jack Kingston, R-GA 
Rodney Frelinghuysen, R-NJ 
Roger Wicker, R-MS 
Todd Tiahrt, R-KS 
Zach Wamp, R-TN 
Tom Latham, R-IA 
Robert Aderholt, R-AL 
Jo Ann Emerson, R-MO 
Kay Granger, R-TX 
John Peterson, R-PA 
Virgil Goode Jr., R-VA 
John Doolittle, R-CA 
Ray LaHood, R-IL 
 243 
Dave Weldon, R-FL 
Michael Simpson, R-ID 
John Culberson, R-TX 
Mark Kirk, R-IL 
Ander Crenshaw, R-FL 
Dennis Rehberg, R-MT 
John Carter, R-TX 
Rodney Alexander, R-LA 
Ken Calvert, R-CA 




Barney Frank, D-MA 
Paul Kanjorski, D-PA 
Maxine Waters, D-CA 
Carolyn Maloney, D-NY 
Luis Gutierrez, D-IL 
Nydia Velazquez, D-NY 
Melvin Watt, D-NC 
Gary Ackerman, D-NY 
Julia Carson, D-IN 
Brad Sherman, D-CA 
Gregory Meeks, D-NY 
Dennis Moore, D-KS 
Michael Capuano, D-MA 
Ruben Hinojosa, D-TX 
William Lacy Clay, D-MO 
Carolyn McCarthy, D-NY 
Joe Baca, D-CA 
Stephen Lynch, D-MA 
Brad Miller, D-NC 
David Scott, D-GA 
Al Green, D-TX 
Emanuel Cleaver, D-MO 
Melissa Bean, D-IL 
Gwen Moore, D-WI 
Lincoln Davis, D-TN 
Albio Sires, D-NJ 
Paul Hodes, D-NH 
Keith Ellison, D-MN 
Ron Klein, D-FL 
Tim Mahoney, D-FL 
Charles Wilson, D-OH 
Ed Perlmutter, D-CO 
Christopher Murphy, D-CT 
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Joe Donnelly, D-IN 
Robert Wexler, D-FL 
Jim Marshall, D-GA 
Dan Boren, D-OK 
Travis Childers, D-MS 
Bill Foster, D-IL 
Andre Carson, D-IN 
Karen Lorraine Speier, D-CA 
Donald Cazayoux, D-LA 
Spencer Bachus, R-AL 
Richard Baker, R-LA 
Deborah Pryce, R-OH 
Michael Castle, R-DE 
Peter King, R-NY 
Ed Royce, R-CA 
Frank Lucas, R-OK 
Ron Paul, R-TX 
Paul Gillmor, R-OH 
Steven LaTourette, R-OH 
Donald Manzullo, R-IL 
Walter Jones Jr., R-NC 
Judy Biggert, R-IL 
Christopher Shays, R-CT 
Gary Miller, R-CA 
Tom Feeney, R-FL 
Jeb Hensarling, R-TX 
Scott Garrett, R-NJ 
Ginny Brown-Waite, R-FL 
Gresham Barrett, R-SC 
Rick Renzi, R-AZ 
Jim Gerlach, R-PA 
Stevan Pearce, R-NM 
Randy Neugebauer, R-TX 
Tom Price, R-GA 
Geoff Davis, R-KY 
Patrick McHenry, R-NC 
John Campbell, R-CA 
Adam Putnam, R-FL 
Marsha Blackburn, R-TN 
Michele Bachmann, R-MN 
Peter Roskam, R-IL 
Shelley Moore Capito, R-WV 
Kenny Marchant, R-TX 
Thaddeus McCotter, R-MI 
Kevin McCarthy, R-CA 




Education and Labor 
George Miller, D-CA 
Dale Kildee, D-MI 
Donald Payne, D-NJ 
Robert Andrews, D-NJ 
Robert Scott, D-VA 
Lynn Woolsey, D-CA 
Ruben Hinojosa, D-TX 
Carolyn McCarthy, D-NY 
John Tierney, D-MA 
Denis Kucinich, D-OH 
David Wu, D-OR 
Rush Holt, D-NJ 
Susan Davis, D-CA 
Danny Davis, D-IL 
Raul Grijalva, D-AZ 
Timothy Bishop, D-NY 
Linda Sanchez, D-CA 
John Sarbanes, D-MD 
Joe Sestak, D-PA 
David Loebsack, D-IA 
Mazie Hirono, D-HI 
Jason Altmire, D-PA 
John Yarmuth, D-KY 
Phil Hare, D-IL 
Yvette Clarke, D-NY 
Joe Courtney, D-CT 
Carol Shea-Porter, D-NH 
Howard McKeon, R-CA 
Thomas Petri, R-WI 
Peter Hoekstra, R-MI 
Michael Castle, R-DE 
Mark Souder, R-IN 
Vernon Ehlers, R-MI 
Judy Biggert, R-IL 
Todd Platts, R-PA 
Ric Keller, R-FL 
Addison Wilson, R-SC 
John Kline, R-MN 
Bob Inglis, R-SC 
Cathy McMorris Rodgers, R-WA 
Kenny Marchant, R-TX 
Tom Price, R-GA 
Charles Boustany, R-LA 
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Virginia Foxx, R-NC 
John Kuhl Jr., R-NY 
Rob Bishop, R-UT 
David Davis, R-TN 
Tim Walberg, R-MI 
Dean Heller, R-NV 
 
 
Ways and Means 
Charles Rangel, D-NY 
Fortney Pete Stark, D-CA 
Sander Levin, D-MI 
James McDermott, D-WA 
John Lewis, D-GA 
Richard Neal, D-MA 
Michael McNulty, D-NY 
John Tanner, D-TN 
Xavier Becerra, D-CA 
Lloyd Doggett, D-TX 
Earl Pomeroy, D-ND 
Stephanie Tubbs Jones, D-OH 
Mike Thompson, D-CA 
John Larson, D-CT 
Rahm Emanuel, D-IL 
Earl Blumenauer, D-OR 
Ron Kind, D-WI 
William Pascrell, D-NJ 
Shelley Berkley, D-NV 
Joseph Crowley, D-NY 
Chris Van Hollen, D-MD 
Kendrick Meerk, D-FL 
Allyson Schwartz, D-PA 
Artur Davis, D-AL 
Jim McCrery, R-LA 
Wally Herger, R-CA 
Dave Camp, R-MI 
Jim Ramstad, R-MN 
Sam Johnson, R-TX 
Phil English, R-PA 
Gerald Weller, R-IL 
Kenny Hilshof, R-MO 
Ron Lewis, R-KY 
Kevin Brady, R-TX 
Thomas Reynolds, R-NY 
Paul Ryan, R-WI 
Eric Cantor, R-VA 
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John Linder, R-GA 
Devin Nunes, R-CA 
Patrick Tiberi, R-OH 








David Obey, D-WI 
John Murtha Jr., D-PA 
Norman Dicks, D-WA 
Alan Mollohan, D-WV 
Marcy Kaptur, D-OH 
Peter Visclosky, D-IN 
Nita Lowey, D-NY 
Jose Serrano, D-NY 
Rosa DeLauro, D-CT 
James Moran Jr., D-VA 
John Olver, D-MA 
Ed Pastor, D-AZ 
David Price, D-NC 
Chet Edwards, D-TX 
Patrick Kennedy, D-RI 
Maurice Hinchey, D-NY 
Lucille Roybal-Allard, D-CA 
Sam Farr, D-CA 
Jesse Jackson Jr., D-IL 
Carolyn Kilpatrick, D-MI 
Allen Boyd, D-FL 
Chaka Fattah, D-PA 
Steven Rothman, D-NJ 
Sanford Bishop, D-GA 
Marion Berry, D-AR 
Barbara Lee, D-CA 
Adam Schiff, D-CA 
Mike Honda, D-CA 
Betty McCollum, D-MN 
Steve Israel, D-NY 
Timothy Ryan, D-OH 
C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger, D-MD 
A.B. Chandler, D-KY 
Debbie Wasserman Schultz, D-FL 
Ciro Rodriguez, D-TX 
Lincoln Davis, D-TN 
John Salazar, D-CO 
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Jerry Lewis, R-CA 
C.W. Bill Young, R-FL 
Harold Rogers, R-KY 
Frank Wolf, R-VA 
Jack Kingston, R-GA 
Rodney Frelinghuysen, R-NJ 
Todd Tiahrt, R-KS 
Zach Wamp, R-TN 
Tom Latham, R-IA 
Robert Aderholt, R-AL 
Jo Ann Emerson, R-MO 
Kay Granger, R-TX 
Michael Simpson, R-ID 
John Culberson, R-TX 
Mark Kirk, R-IL 
Ander Crenshaw, R-FL 
Dennis Rehberg, R-MT 
John Carter, R-TX 
Rodney Alexander, R-LA 
Ken Calvert, R-CA 
Jo Bonner, R-AL 
Steven LaTourette, R-OH 
Tom Cole, R-OK 




Barney Frank, D-MA 
Paul Kanjorski, D-PA 
Maxine Waters, D-CA 
Carolyn Maloney, D-NY 
Luis Gutierrez, D-IL 
Nydia Velazquez, D-NY 
Melvin Watt, D-NC 
Gary Ackerman, D-NY 
Brad Sherman, D-CA 
Gregory Meeks, D-NY 
Dennis Moore, D-KS 
Michael Capuano, D-MA 
Ruben Hinojosa, D-TX 
William Lacy Clay, D-MO 
Carolyn McCarthy, D-NY 
Joe Baca, D-CA 
Stephen Lynch, D-MA 
Brad Miller, D-NC 
David Scott, D-GA 
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Al Green, D-TX 
Emanuel Cleaver, D-MO 
Melissa Bean, D-IL 
Gwen Moore, D-WI 
Paul Hodes, D-NH 
Keith Ellison, D-MN 
Ron Klein, D-FL 
Charles Wilson, D-OH 
Ed Perlmutter, D-CO 
Joe Donnelly, D-IN 
Bill Foster, D-IL 
Andre Carson, D-IN 
Karen Lorraine Jacqueline Speier, D-CA 
Travis Childers, D-MS 
Walt Minnick, D-ID 
John Adler, D-NJ 
Mary Jo Kilroy, D-OH 
Steve Driehaus, D-OH 
Suzanne Kosmas, D-FL 
Alan Grayson, D-FL 
James Himes, D-CT 
Gary Peters, D-MI 
Daniel Maffei, D-NY 
Spencer Bachus, R-AL 
Michael Castle, R-DE 
Peter King, R-NY 
Ed Royce, R-CA 
Frank Lucas, R-OK 
Ron Paul, R-TX 
Donald Manzullo, R-IL 
Walter Jones Jr., R-NC 
Judy Biggert, R-IL 
Gary Miller, R-CA 
Shelley Moore Capito, R-WV 
Jeb Hensarling, R-TX 
Scott Garrett, R-NJ 
Gresham Barrett, R-SC 
Jim Gerlach, R-PA 
Randy Neugebauer, R-TX 
Tom Price, R-GA 
Patrick McHenry, R-NC 
John Campbell, R-CA 
Adam Putnam, R-FL 
Michele Bachmann, R-MN 
Kenny Marchant, R-TX 
Thaddeus McCotter, R-MI 
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Kevin McCarthy, R-CA 
Bill Posey, R-FL 
Lynn Jenkins, R-KS 
Christopher John Lee, R-NY 
Erik Paulsen, R-MN 
Leonard Lance, R-NJ 
 
 
Education and Labor 
George Miller, D-CA 
Dale Kildee, D-MI 
Donald Payne, D-NJ 
Robert Andrews, D-NJ 
Robert Scott, D-VA 
Lynn Woolsey, D-CA 
Ruben Hinojosa, D-TX 
Carolyn McCarthy, D-NY 
John Tierney, D-MA 
Dennis Kucinich, D-OH 
David Wu, D-OR 
Rush Holt, D-NJ 
Susan Davis, D-CA 
Raul Grijalva, D-AZ 
Timothy Bishop, D-NY 
Joe Sestak, D-PA 
David Loebsack, D-IA 
Mazie Hirono, D-HI 
Jason Altmire, D-PA 
Phil Hare, D-IL 
Yvette Clarke, D-NY 
Joe Courtney, D-CT 
Carol Shea-Porter, D-NH 
Marcia Fudge, D-OH 
Jared Polis, D-CO 
Paul Tonko, D-NY 
Dina Titus, D-NV 
Howard McKeon, R-CA 
Thomas Petri, R-WI 
Peter Hoekstra, R-MI 
Michael Castle, R-DE 
Mark Souder, R-IN 
Vernon Ehlers, R-MI 
Judy Biggert, R-IL 
Rodd Russell Platts R-PA 
Addison Wilson, R-SC 
John Kline, R-MN 
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Cathy McMorris Rodgers, R-WA 
Tom Price, R-GA 
Virginia Foxx, R-NC 
Rob Bishop, R-UT 
Brett Guthrie, R-KY 
Bill Cassidy, R-LA 
Tom McClintock, R-CA 
Duncan Hunter, R-CA 
David Roe, R-TN 
Judy Chu, R-CA 
Glenn Thompson, R-PA 
Howard McKeon, R-CA 
Judy Chu, R-CA 
 
 
Ways and Means 
Charles Rangel, D-NY 
Fortney Pete Stark, D-CA 
Sander Levin, D-MI 
James McDermott, D-WA 
John Lewis, D-GA 
Richard Neal, D-MA 
John Tanner, D-TN 
Xavier Becerra, D-CA 
Lloyd Doggett, D-TX 
Earl Pomeroy, D-ND 
Mike Thompson, D-CA 
John Larson, D-CT 
Earl Blumenauer, D-OR 
Ron Kind, D-WI 
William Pascrell, D-NJ 
Shelley Berkley, D-NV 
Joseph Crowley, D-NY 
Chris Van Hollen, D-MD 
Kendrick Meek, D-FL 
Allyson Schwartz, D-PA 
Artur Davis, D-AL 
Danny Davis, D-IL 
Bob Etheridge, D-NC 
Linda Sanchez, D-CA 
Brian Higgins, D-NY 
John Yarmuth, D-KY 
Dave Camp, R-MI 
Wally Herger, R-CA 
Sam Johnson, R-TX 
Kevin Brady, R-TX 
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Paul Ryan, R-WI 
Eric Cantor, R-VA 
John Linder, R-GA 
Devin Nunes, R-CA 
Patrick Tiberi, R-OH 
Ginny Brown-Waite, R-FL 
Geoff Davis, R-KY 
David Reichert, R-WA 
Charles Boustany, R-LA 
Dean Heller, R-NV 








Harold Rogers, R-KY 
C.W. Bill Young, R-FL 
Jerry Lewis, R-CA 
Frank Wolf, R-VA 
Jack Kingston, R-GA 
Rodney Frelinghuysen, R-NJ 
Tom Latham, R-IA 
Robert Aderholt, R-AL 
Jo Ann Emerson, R-MO 
Kay Granger, R-TX 
Michael Simpson, R-ID 
John Culberson, R-TX 
Ander Crenshaw, R-FL 
Dennis Rehberg, R-MT 
John Carter, R-TX 
Rodney Alexander, R-LA 
Ken Calvert, R-CA 
Jo Bonner, R-AL 
Steven LaTourette, R-OH 
Tom Cole, R-OK 
Jeff Flake, R-AZ 
Mario Diaz-Balart, R-FL 
Charles Dent, R-PA 
Steve Austria, R-OH 
Cynthia Lummis, R-WY 
Tom Graves, R-GA 
Kevin Yoder, R-KS 
Steve Womack, R-AR 
Alan Nunnelee, R-MS 
Norman Dicks, D-WA 
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Marcy Kaptur, D-OH 
Peter Visclosky, D-IN 
Nita Lowey, D-NY 
Jose Serrano, D-NY 
Rosa DeLauro, D-CT 
James Moran, D-VA 
John Olver, D-MA 
Ed Pastor, D-AZ 
David Price, D-NC 
Maurice Hinchey, D-NY 
Lucille Roybal-Allard, D-CA 
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